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Brewer v. Williams, Massiah, and
Miranda: What Is "Interrogation"?
When Does It Matter?
YALE KAMISAR*
I didn't even know what those words ["psychological coercion"]
meant, until I looked them up in the dictionary after I was accused
of using it ...
Shucks, I was just being a good old-fashioned cop, the only kind
I know how to be ...
I have never seen a prisoner physically abused, though I heard
about those things in the early days ...
That type of questioning just doesn't work. They'll just resist
harder.
You have to butter 'em up, sweet talk 'em, use that-what's the
word?-"psychological coercion."
-Captain Learning, reminiscing about his "Christian
burial speech" nine years later.1
On Christmas Eve, 1968, a ten-year-old girl, Pamela Powers, disappeared
while with her family in Des Moines, Iowa. 2 Defendant Williams, an escapee
from a mental institution and a deeply religious person, 3 was suspected of
murdering her, and a warrant was issued for his arrest.4 Williams telephoned
a Des Moines lawyer, McKnight, and on his advice surrendered himself to the
Davenport, Iowa, police.5
Captain Learning and another Des Moines police officer arranged to drive
the 160 miles to Davenport, pick up Williams, and return him directly to Des
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan; A.B. 1950, New York University; LL.B. 1954, Columbia
University; LL.D. 1978, John Jay College of Criminal Justice (CUNY).
As usual, I am greatly indebted to my colleague, Jerold H. Israel, for the many hours he has spent with
me discussing various aspects of this article. As usual, too, we have not always agreed. I am also indebted to
Welsh S. White, Visiting Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania and Professor of Law, University of
Pittsburgh, for comments on an earlier draft of portions of this article and for permitting me to read, and
profit by, a draft of his forthcoming article on police trickery in inducing confessions. Finally, I am
indebted to Mitchell L. Chyette and Ethan Falk, presently third-year law students at the University of
Michigan, for their valuable research assistance.
1. Lamberto, Learning's "Speech". "I'd do it again," Des Moines Register, April 7, 1977, § B, at 1, col.
1.
2. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 390 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). In view of the extensive
discussion of Williams, the "Christian burial speech" case, in Kamisar, Foreword: Brewer v. Williams-A
Hard Look at a Discomfiting Record, 66 GEO. L.J. 209 (1977), a brief description of the case should suffice
here.
3. 430 U.S. at 412 (Powell, J., concurring).
4. Id. at 390.
5. Id.
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Moines. 6 Both the trial court 7 and the federal district court8 found that
defense attorney McKnight and the Des Moines police agreed that Williams
would not be "questioned" until after he returned to Des Moines and
conferred with his lawyer.9 Before being driven back to Des Moines, Williams
was advised of his rights many times-by McKnight over the phone, by Kelly(his Davenport attorney), by the Davenport judge who arraigned him on the
warrant, by a Davenport police officer, and by Leaming himself.' 0
More important, Williams asserted his rights many times. He retained
counsel in both Des Moines I and Davenport. 12 He requested and was granted
a private meeting with the Davenport judge.' 3 After Leaming arrived and
advised him of his rights, Williams requested and was granted two private
meetings with attorney Kelly.' 4 Kelly, furthermore, told Leaming that
Williams was not to be questioned until he met with McKnight. 15 Kelly also
requested, but was refused, permission to ride back with his client.' 6 Finally,
on the trip back, Williams told Leaming several times that he would tell him
"the whole story" after he saw McKnight in Des Moines.' 7
The Court's reading of the record, and the best reading, 18 is that not long
after Captain Leaming and his prisoner left Davenport and entered the
freeway, the captain delivered his now famous "Christian burial speech."' 9
Although there are two significantly different versions of "the speech, '20 I
shall proceed, as did the Supreme Court and lower federal courts, on the
assumption that there was only one.21 According to the Court's opinion, the
detective addressed Williams as "Reverend" and continued:
"I want to give you something to think about while we're
traveling down the road . . . .Number one, I want you to
observe the weather conditions, it's raining, it's sleeting, it's
freezing, driving is very treacherous, visibility is poor, it's going
to be dark early this evening. They are predicting several inches
of snow for tonight, and I feel that you yourself are the only
person that knows where this little girl's body is, that you
6. Brief for Petitioner, Joint App. at 25, 37-38, 53, 60, 97, Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
7. Id. at 1-2.
8. Williams v. Brewer, 375 F. Supp. 170, 173, 176 (S.D. Iowa 1974).
9. Brief for Petitioner, Joint App. at 54, 78, 90, The record does not indicate, however, that there was an
explicit agreement, or even that McKnight specifically instructed the Des Moines police not to question his
client on the return trip. At best there seems to have been an understanding or assumption that the police
would not do so. See generally Kamisar, supra note 2, at 212 n.23.
10. Brief for Petitioner, Joint App. at 41, 47, 49-51, 52,75.
11. See 430 U.S. at 390.
12. See id. at 391.
13. Brief for Petitioner, Joint App. at 50.
14. Id. at 75, 76.
15. 375 F. Supp. at 173, 176.
16. Id.
17.430 U.S. at 392 (emphasis added). The record indicates that Williams probably told Learning this at
least once before, and just before the latter delivered the "Christian burial speech," see Kamisar, supra note
2, at 226 n.71, 227, but the Court did not consider this point.
18. See Kamisar, supra note 2, at 215.
19. Brief for Petitioner, Joint App. at 63.
20. For an extensive discussion of these versions, see Kamisar, supra note 2, at 216-33.
21. See id. at 215 n.38.
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yourself have only been there once, and if you get a snow on top
of it you yourself may be unable to find it. And, since we will be
going right past the area on the way into Des Moines, I feel that
we could stop and locate the body, that the parents of this little
girl should be entitled to a Christian burial for the little girl who
was snatched away from them on Christmas [E]ve and mur-
dered. And I feel we should stop and locate it on the way in
rather than waiting until morning and trying to come back out
after a snow storm and possibly not being able to find it at all."
Williams asked Detective Leaming why he thought their route
to Des Moines would be taking them past the girl's body, and
Leaming responded that he knew the body was in the area of
Mitchellville-a town they would be passing on the way to Des
Moines. . . . Leaming then stated: "I do not want you to answer
me. I don't want to discuss it any further. Just think about it as
we're riding down the road. '22
I. WAS THE "CHRISTIAN BURIAL SPEECH" "INTERROGATION" WITHIN
THE MEANING OF Miranda-oR "COMPULSION" WITHIN THE MEANING
OF THE PRIVILEGE?
Once the Williams Court chose the Massiah route over a Miranda one,
once it decided to resolve the case on "Sixth Amendment-Massiah, '23 not
"Fifth Amendment-Miranda,"24 grounds,25 there was no longer any need to
22. 430 U.S. at 392-93.
23. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
24. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
25. 430 U.S. at 397-99. In granting habeas corpus relief, the federal district court in Williams v. Brewer
relied on three independent grounds-that Williams' disclosures were involuntary, that they were obtained
in violation of Miranda, and that they were secured in violation of his sixth amendment-Massiah rights.
375 F. Supp. at 185. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit appears to have affirmed on
the second and third grounds. Williams v. Brewer, 509 F.2d 227, 233-34 (8th Cir. 1975). The Supreme
Court, in an opinion by Justice Stewart, saw "no need ... in this case" to review the Miranda doctrine,
"designed to secure the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination," or to evaluate the district court
ruling that Williams' statements were involuntarily made because, inasmuch as judicial proceedings had
been initiated against Williams before the start of his return trip to Des Moines, "it is clear that the
judgment before us must in any event be affirmed upon the ground that Williams was deprived of a
different constitutional right-the right to the assistance of counsel." 430 U.S. at 397-99. The Court then
found "the circumstances of this case ... constitutionally indistinguishable from those presented in
Massiah v. United States [377 U.S. 201 (1964)]." 430 U.S. at 400. The Massiah case is discussed extensively
in the text at notes 272-86 infra. In brief, after Massiah had been indicted, had retained a lawyer, and had
been released on bail, his codefendant, Colson, invited him to discuss the pending case. Unaware that
Colson had decided to cooperate with government agents, Massiah talked freely to him and made several
damaging admissions that were overheard by a nearby agent equipped with a receiving device. 377 U.S. at
202.03. The Massiah Court held, in an opinion authored by Justice Stewart, that the use of these
admissions, "which federal agents had deliberately elicited from him after he had been indicted and in the
absence of his counsel," violated petitioner's sixth amendment right to counsel. Id. at 206. According to the
Williams Court, "that the incriminating statements were elicited surreptitiously in the Massiah case, and
otherwise here, is constitutionally irrelevant." 430 U.S. at 400. The Williams dissenters sharply disagreed.
See text at notes 272-86 infra.
1978]
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consider whether "the speech" constituted police "interrogation" (as that
term is normally used). At that point, whether "the speech" constituted
"interrogation" became, or should have become, constitutionally irrelevant. 26
Nevertheless, the Williams majority evidently thought it desirable, if not
necessary, to classify the "Christian burial speech" as a form of interrogation
or "tantamount to interrogation" 27-and all four dissenting Justices insisted
it was not.28 To the latter, Captain Leaming's remarks were merely "observa-
tions and comments" 29 or only "travel conversation" 30 or simply a "statement
• ..accompanied by a request that respondent not respond to it.''31
26. See text at notes 272-86 infra.
27. See 430 U.S. at 399-400. Writing for the Court, Justice Stewart pointed out several factors indicating
that interrogation did in fact take place: (1) Leaming "deliberately and designedly set out to elicit
information from Williams just as surely as-and perhaps more effectively than-if he had formally
interrogated him"; (2) the Iowa courts "proceeded upon the hypothesis that. . .[the] 'speech' had been
tantamount to interrogation"; (3) they "recognized that Williams had been entitled to the assistance of
counsel at the time he had made the incriminating statements," "[y]et no such constitutional protection
would have come into play if there had been no interrogation"; and (4) in the Supreme Court oral argument
the State of Iowa had "acknowledged that the 'Christian burial speech' was tantamount to interrogation."
Id. at 399-400 & 399 n.6.
The lawyers for the State of Iowa arguably acknowledged four or five times that Captain Leaming's
"speech" was tantamount to interrogation (depending, of course, on one's definition of "interrogation").
Although he refused to call it "interrogation," Iowa's Assistant Attorney General Winders, who spoke for
the first seven minutes of the Supreme Court oral argument, agreed with a statement made by one Justice
that when Leaming delivered his speech it would "be correct to say that he wanted the defendant to reveal
the whereabouts of the child." Transcript of Oral Argument at 9, Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977)
(copy on file at the Georgetown Law Journal). In the opening minutes of his presentation, Attorney General
Turner acknowledged that Learning made his "Christian burial" remarks-and "even called" Williams
"Reverend"-"to induce [Williams] to tell him where Pamela Powers' body was." Id. at 11. Then, the
Attorney General agreed with Justice Powell's comments that Learning made the statement for the
"purpose" of "lead~ing] Williams into stating where the body was located," and that "a lawyer would
consider that [Leaming was] pursuing interrogation," but insisted that this interrogation "was very brief."
Id. at 16-17.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Powell "join[ed] the opinion of the Court which. . . finds that the
efforts of Detective Learning 'to elicit information from Williams,' as conceded by counsel for [Iowa] at
oral argument, . . . were a skillful and effective form of interrogation." 430 U.S. at 412. "Moreover,"
added Powell, "the entire setting was conducive to the psychological coercion that was successfully
exploited." Id.
It is possible that the Williams majority only considered the "Christian burial speech," and only deemed
it important to consider it, "interrogation" within the meaning of Massiah, not Miranda. In context,
however, I think this highly unlikely. Moreover, considering the facts of Massiah, see text at notes 216-22,
243-59, 272-86 infra, to talk about "interrogating" a person within the meaning of Massiah is to stretch the
normal meaning of words to the breaking point. Such peculiar use of language seems no more helpful and
no less misleading than to talk about, for example, "interviewing" a person within the meaning of Ashcraft
v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944), a case involving thirty-six hours of "relay" interrogation. See Kamisar,
Fred E. Inbau: "The Importance of Being Guilty," 68 3. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 182, 186-87 n.24 (1977)
(discussion of pejorative and euphemistic terms to characterize police interrogation).
28. See text at notes 33-35, 53, 63, 71, 79, 84infra.
29. 430 U.S. at 439 (Blackmun, J., with White & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting). In deeming it "clear [that]
there was no interrogation," Justice Blackmun also noted that "[i]n this respect, I am in full accord with
Judge Webster in his vigorous dissent." Id. at 440. Judge (now FBI Director) Webster described Leaming's
speech as an "observation about the weather" and an "express[ion] [of] hope that Williams would agree to
stop and locate the body." Williams v. Brewer, 509 F.2d 227, 235 (8th Cir. 1974).
30. "[I]t was [Williams] who started the travel conversation and brought up the subject of the criminal
investigation." 430 U.S. at 440 (Blackmun, J., with White & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting).
31. Id. at 434 (White, J., with Blackmun & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting). Justice White also noted that
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I find the dissenters' begrudging view of "interrogation" so disturbing that
for purposes of discussion I shall assume that Williams is a straight Miranda
case. This entails the triple assumption that, at the time of Leaming's speech,
no judicial proceedings had been initiated against Williams, no agreement had
been made between the defense attorney and the police, and no lawyer had
been retained by, or appointed for, Williams. 32
JUSTICE BLACKMUN'S DISSENT
In his dissent, Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices White and Rehnquist,
deemed it "clear there was no interrogation, '33 but whether he meant simply
no interrogation within the meaning of Miranda or no interrogation within
the meaning of Massiah as well is not readily apparent. If Justice Blackmun
meant that "not every attempt to elicit information should be regarded as
'tantamount to interrogation' -34 for Miranda purposes he is plainly right
when-unlike the situation in Williams-the suspect is unaware that he is in
the presence of a government agent. Hoffa v. United States,35 decided only six
months after Miranda, illustrates this point.
Hoffa incriminated himself by talking to an apparent friend who was
actually a paid government informer.36 Because Hoffa did not know that his
court retainer was a secret government agent, 37 he could not claim that his
Leaming's speech "was delivered hours before respondent decided to make any statement." Id. But this
point is only relevant to the issue whether Williams' disclosure was a "product" of Leaming's speech, not to
whether the speech was "interrogation" when made. On what might be called the causation issue, Justice
White's point about the substantial time lapse between Leaming's speech and Williams' disclosure would
have been more impressive if Leaming had not ended his speech by telling Williams to "[j]ust think about it
[stopping and locating the body on the way into Des Moines] as we're riding down the road" and Williams
had not made the disclosure while they were still "riding down the road." See text at notes 71-74 infra.
32. In both Massiah and Williams the challenged statements were obtained at a time when judicial
proceedings had been initiated against the accused and he had already obtained counsel. It is fairly clear,
however, that the commencement of adversary proceedings alone activates the right to counsel. See text at
notes 511-36 infra. Whether representation by counsel without more triggers the right to counsel is a good
deal less clear, but New York's Donovan-Arthur-Hobson rule operates on this premise. See notes 504-09
infra. The Supreme Court is likely to so hold, at least when law enforcement officials treat the defense
lawyer deceitfully or disdainfully. See text at notes 537-43 infra.
33. See note 29 supra.
34. 430 U.S. at 439 (Blackmun, J., with White & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting).
35. 385 U.S. 293 (1966) (Stewart, J.).
36. Id. at 296-98.
37. Id. at 319 (Warren, C.J., dissenting) (Partin had "worm[ed] his way into Hoffa's hotel suite and [had
become] part and parcel of Hoffa's entourage"). At the time Hoffa made the incriminating statements he
had not yet been charged with, or even arrested for, endeavoring to bribe members of the Test Fleet jury.
Thus, he was compelled to argue that his Massiah-Escobedo rights should have come into play once the
government had "sufficient ground for taking the petitioner into custody and charging him with endeavors
to tamper with the Test Fleet jury." Id. at 309 (emphasis added). The Court purported to be stunned by
this argument: "Nothing in Massiah, in Escobedo, or in any other case. . . even remotely suggests this
novel and paradoxical constitutional doctrine. . . . There is no constitutional right to be arrested." Id. at
310. The Court did note, however, that if the government had taken Hoffa into custody and charged him
with attempts to tamper with the Test Fleet jury "it could not have continued to question [him] without
observance of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel." Id. at 309 (citing Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S.
201 (1964), and Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964)).
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incriminating statements were the product of legal or factual coercion.38 The
facts of Massiah would have provided a similar illustration if judicial
proceedings had not been initiated against the defendant and if he had not
been represented by counsel when he met with his codefendant, Colson.39
It is considerably more difficult to envision instances in which, once
judicial proceedings have been initiated, successful attempts to elicit informa-
tion would not be tantamount to a Massiah interrogation or, more accurately,
"deliberate elicitations" of incriminating statements. But consider the follow-
ing hypothetical: Suppose Captain Leaming had admitted that one of the
reasons he had decided to drive his prisoner back to Des Moines during
daylight hours rather than at night was that he wanted Williams to get a good
look at either the filling station where he had hidden the child's shoes or the
turnoff he had taken to bury the body. Suppose Leaming also admitted that
he had hoped and prayed that on passing these spots Williams would make
"spontaneous" incriminating disclosures. Suppose further that in the long
drive back Leaming and Williams discussed nothing bearing even remotely on
the murder case, but that Williams did make the hoped-for. "spontaneous"
disclosures at the filling station or the turnoff. Most courts in this case would
surely excuse Leaming's course of action as neither "tantamount to interroga-
tion" nor an "attempt to elicit" incriminating statements.
This hypothetical seems to support Justice Blackmun's contention that no
interrogation occurred in Williams. I think, however, that the disclosure
would be admissible not because it was the product of a permissible attempt to
elicit information but because no "attempt" occurred at all.40 A police officer
who returns a prisoner by the most feasible route does not, it seems to me,
"attempt to elicit information" merely because he is aware of the possibility
that passing some spot along the way might inspire his prisoner to confess. A
38. Id. at 304. It seems fairly clear that the result would have been the same even if the secret
governmrent agent had asked questions of Hoffa or otherwise actively elicited incriminating statements
from him. Such conduct by an apparent friend still would not have been "coercive," inherently or
otherwise. Cf Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966). The Court in Osborn affirmed the conviction
of one of Hoffa's attorneys for attempting to bribe a prospective federal juror, even though the informer in
this case made at least an overture toward crime by mentioning that one of the prospective jurors was his
cousin and falsely telling the attorney that he had visited his cousin and found him "susceptible to money
for hanging this jury." See id. at 326.
39. In fact, Colson had also held separate meetings in his "bugged" car with two of Massiah's
confederates, Anfield and Maxwell, prior to their eventual arrest and indictment. These conversations, too,
had been tape-recorded and "broadcasted" to Agent Murphy. Anfield was tried together with Massiah;
although indicted the same day as Massiah and Anfield, Maxwell and other coconspirators were brought to
trial five years later. See United States v. Maxwell, 383 F.2d 437, 441 (2d Cir. 1967); Brief for United States
at 6, 8, Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
40. This is a relatively easy hypothetical because the captain also had perfectly good reasons for driving
back during daylight hours. For one thing, he was supposed to bring Williams back as soon as possible. For
another, weather conditions, bad enough in daylight (freezing rain, slippery roads, poor visibility), might
have made nighttime driving all but impossible. Finally, a heavy snow storm was predicted for that night.
See 430 U.S. at 392. Even if an "ulterior motive" theoretically undermines an otherwise justified course of
police conduct, an impermissible motive test would probably prove to be unworkable.
Suppose, on the other hand, that Captain Leaming had theorized that Williams had hidden the body in
some desolate area unapproachable from the freeway and had driven his prisoner many miles over the back
road in order to come as near as possible to this out-of-the-way spot. Such a circuitous return trip, taken for
the reason stated, would, I think, be an impermissible "attempt to elicit information," and any
incriminating disclosures it produced should be excluded on sixth amendment-Massiah grounds.
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police officer need not refrain from detaining a traffic offender and from
running a license check on the car, as he normally would do under the
circumstances, because he hopes and prays that such routine procedures will
prompt an admission that the car was stolen. Nor, when he takes a person
into custody, need he decline to ask routine questions unrelated to the
investigation of the case, such as where the arrestee lives and how he spells his
last name, because he harbors the secret desire that such standard "booking
procedure" will evoke incriminating statements.41
These hypotheticals, however, are a far cry from the Williams case.
Captain Leaming did not simply decline to depart from standard operating
procedure. He did not simply harbor the secret desire that Williams would be
moved to reveal the location of the body on the return trip to Des Moines.
Captain Leaming relied on more than a hope and a prayer. He invoked the
trickery, deception, and "psychology" recommended in the P'how-to-do-it
interrogation manuals"42 that so aroused the ire of the Miranda majority.43
He appealed in the name of religion to someone he knew to be deeply
religious. 44 In effect, he challenged Williams to display some evidence of
honor and decency.45 He addressed Williams as "Reverend" admittedly to
win his friendship and confidence46 and also probably because someone like
Williams would be more vulnerable to such flattery than persons of high
social or professional status.47 In his "speech," Leaming assumed that the girl
was dead and that Williams knew where the body was.48 And he falsely told
Williams that he "knew" the girl's body was in the Mitchellville area.49
These are all standard interrogation techniques. 50 They are tantamount to
"straight questioning" because they generate similar pressures, anxieties, and
intimidation. They are not only calculated to, but likely to, evoke incriminat-
ing statements. They "endanger the privilege against self-incrimination"51 no
less than does more readily identifiable "interrogation. ' 52
41. There is general agreement that Miranda does not apply to "administrative questioning." Smith,
The Threshold Question in Applying Miranda: What Constitutes Custodial Interrogation? 25 S.C. L. REV.
699, 704-05 (1974); see C. WHITEBREAD, CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 178-79 (1978);
Kamisar, "Custodial Interrogation" Within the Meaning of Miranda, in INsT. OF CONTINUING LEGAL
EDUC., CRIMINAL LAW AND THE CONSTrrUTION-SOURCES AND COMMENTARIES 335, 358-60 (1968);
cf. Graham, What Is "Custodial Interrogation?": California's Anticipatory Application of Miranda v.
Arizona, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 59, 104-06 (1966) ("purpose doctrine" excuses questions asked for
information rather than confession). As a general proposition, Massiah is equally inapplicable to such
"questioning."
42. Graham, supra note 41, at 106.
43. See 384 U.S. at 448-55.
44. Kamisar, supra note 2, at 221-23; see notes 45-48 infra.
45. Kamisar, supra note 2, at 228 n.80.
46. Id. at 223.
47. Id. at 221-22 &n.57.
48. Id. at 224-25 & n.69.
49. The federal district court so found, 375 F. Supp. at 175, and members of the Supreme Court
proceeded on the same assumption, 430 U.S. at 393, but Leaming's testimony on this matter was
inconsistent. At one point Learning testified that he had said that he "knew" where the body was, and at
another that he told Williams that he had "theorized" (which was true) or had "an idea" (which was also
true) that the body was in the Mitchellville area. See Kamisar, supra note 2, at 236.
50. See generally Kamisar, supra note 2, at 221-22 & nn.56-60, 225-28 & nn.69-80.
51. Graham, supra note 41, at 104.
52. See generally Rothblatt & Pitler, Police Interrogation: Warnings and Waivers-Where Do We Go
19781
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In determining that no interrogation took place in Williams, Justice
Blackmun pointed out that although Williams was repeatedly advised of his
rights, "it was he who started the travel conversations and brought up the
subject of the criminal investigation. ' 53 There are several responses to Justice
Blackmun's contention. First, "interrogation is a social situation, and
suspects respond according to the normal rules of social interaction in such a
situation." 54 It was highly likely, almost inevitable, that sitting close together
in the back seat of a car for hours, Learning and Williams would "visit."
Indeed, just before they started out on their journey, the captain told his
prisoner they would be "visiting" on the long ride back to Des Moines.5 5 It is
not readily apparent why a suspect who "desire[s] to appear courteous and
not to offend, '56 as many persons do even when they are involved in much less
"psychologically close" encounters with the police,57 should somehow
"waive" or be deprived of his constitutional protection against police
questioning or against police "psychological ploys" that amount to the same
thing.58
Second, although the record indicates that Williams did start the travel
conversation, his opening question was whether the captain "hated him" and
"wanted to kill him" or whether some other police officer was desirous of
doing so. 59 This question enabled Leaming to get right to work. He responded
that he himself "had had religious training and background as a child" and
that he "would probably come more near praying for" Williams than abusing
or striking him.60 Thus, it was Learning who first brought up the subject of
religion and who suggested in their very first conversation that he was aware
of Williams' moral and religious obligations under the circumstances.
Although, along with "a great deal of conversation not related to the case,"
Williams did ask a few questions about the progress of the murder investiga-
tion6 t -is that surprising?-he neither provided any information about the
From Here? 42 NOTRE DAME LAW. 479, 486 (1967); text at notes 115-36 infra.
53. 430 U.S. at 440 (Blackmun, J., with White & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting).
54. Griffiths & Ayres, A Postcript to the Miranda Project: Interrogation of Draft Protesters, 77 YALE L.J.
300, 315 (1967).
55. See Kamisar, supra note 2, at 209, 215 & n.34.
56. See Griffiths & Ayres, supra note 54, at 315.
57. See Driver, Confessions and the Social Psychology of Coercion, 82 HARV. L. REV. 42, 44-46 (1968)
("To be physically close is to be psychologically close. The situation has a structure emphasizing to the
persons involved the immediacy of their contact . . . . When the norm governing spatial distance is
violated, a person's instantaneous and automatic response is to back up, again and again. The suspect,
unable to escape, will become even more anxious and unsure.").
58. The Iowa Attorney General told the Supreme Court:
Learning. . . did not really ask any questions. He made this Christian burial statement, and
he said "I don't want you to answer me." Now, that may be considered to be-that is going to
be a question for this Court to decide, whether that constituted interrogation or a
psychological ploy.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 16 (copy on file at the Georgetown Law Journal) (emphasis added). He
later admitted, however, that Leaming's statement was an interrogation, but that "it was very brief." Id. at
17.
59. Brief for Petitioner, Joint App. at 79, 94-95.
60. Id. at 80.
61. Id. at 56.
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case in the conversation preceding the "Christian burial speech" nor in-
dicated in any way that he was going to do so. 62 Nor had there been any
previous mention of the body when Leaming launched "the speech."
Justice Blackmun further maintained that "Leaming's purpose was not
solely to obtain incriminating evidence"; he was also " 'hoping to find out
where that little girl was,' but such motivation does not equate with an
intention to evade the Sixth Amendment. '63 It seems to me, as it did to
Professor Graham a dozen years ago, that so long as the police conduct is
likely to elicit incriminating statements and thus endanger the privilege, it is
police "interrogation" regardless of its primary purpose or motivation, and that
if it otherwise qualifies as "interrogation," it does not become something else
because the interrogator's main purpose is the saving of a life rather than the
procuring of incriminating statements, even though self-incrimination may be
foreseen as a windfall.64
Justice Blackmun may have had something else in mind. He may have been
seeking to invoke the so-called "rescue" or "emergency" doctrine. 65 If, when
he delivered "the speech," Captain Learning had believed the little girl might
still be alive and had been motivated by a desire to find her before she froze to
death, I venture to say that one or more members of the 5-4 Williams majority
would have switched their votes. But in light of the factual circumstances in
Williams, the "rescue" or "emergency" doctrine could not have been properly
applied.
When pressed on cross-examination by defense attorney McKnight about
whether he was trying to get as much information from Williams as he could
before they returned to Des Moines, Leaming did say that he "was sure
hoping to find out where that little girl was."' 66 In light of the entire record,
however, it appears that he probably meant the girl's body, not the girl. For
only a moment or two earlier, during the same cross-examination by
McKnight, the following exchange occurred:
Q. Didn't you [make the "Christian burial speech"] to him to
induce him to show you where the body was?
A. I was hoping he would ...
62. Id. at 79-81.
63. 430 U.S. at 439 (Blackmun, J., with White & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting). Justice Blackmun's
"hoping to find out where that little girl was" quotation is taken from the majority opinion, id. at 399,
which refers to Leaming's testimony in Brief for Petitioner, Joint App. at 95.
64. Graham, supra note 41, at 104-06, 126-29.
65. The California courts have admitted into evidence statements obtained without giving the suspect
the requisite warnings when the police questioning was motivated primarily by a desire to save the victim's
life. See, e.g., People v. Modesto, 62 Cal. 2d 436, 398 P.2d 753, 42 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1965); People v. Dean, 39
Cal. App. 3d 875, 114 Cal. Rptr. 555 (1974). Compare Graham, supra note 41, at 118-22 (criticizing
Modesto rule) and Rothblatt, Police Interrogation and the Right to Counsel, Post-Escobedo v. Illinois:
Application v. Emasculation, 17 HASTINGS L.J. 41, 49-50 (1965) (same) and Comment, People v. Dean:
Another Swipe at Miranda, 4 U. SAN. FERN. V.L. REa. 85, 94-96 (1974) (criticizing extension of Modesto
rule in Dean) with Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 929, 949
(1965) (suggesting police may properly question suspect about endangered victim's whereabouts) and
Traynor, The Devils of Due Process in Criminal Detection, Detention, and Trial, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 657,
677-78 n.86 (1966) (defending Modesto rule).
66. See Brief for Petitioner, Joint App. at 95 (emphasis added).
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Q. Well, I said wasn't [the "Christian burial speech"] for the
purposes of getting Mr. Williams to talk?
A. Well, I was hoping he would tell me where the body was, Mr.
McKnight, absolutely. 67
This admission, by itself, might not be conclusive. Indeed, one problem
with the "rescue" doctrine is that the record almost never establishes that the
investigators knew for sure, or even that they assumed, that the victim was
dead-and the temptation to attribute a lifesaving purpose to the interroga-
tion, at least in retrospect, is great.68 The record in Brewer v. Williams,
however, does demonstrate Leaming's knowledge of the girl's death. Im-
mediately after this cross-examination of Leaming, the following occurred:
Redirect Examination
Q. Captain, when Mr. McKnight was in your office [the morning
he talked to Williams long-distance], what conversation did you
hear from him when he was on the telephone?
A. Well, I heard him say [to Williams] that, "You have to tell the
officers where the body is," and he repeated a second time, "You
have got to tell them where she is.". . . "When you get back
here, you tell me and I'll tell them .... "69
Recross Examination [by McKnight]
Q. Say, officer. . . we didn't know whether the girl was dead or
alive when you left here, did we?
A. You [McKnight] told me she was dead.
Q. You want to say that I told you that?
A. Yes, sir. You said that Williams told you that ....
You said he said she was dead when he left the YMCA with
her.70
67. Id. at 92-93 (emphasis added).
68. Thus, nine years after the event, although nothing in the record substantiates the view that a
lifesaving purpose motivated his "Christian burial" statement, see note 70 infra and accompanying text,
Captain Learning defended his action on the ground that "[i]f we had found that girl alive, with even a
breath of life remaining because of what Williams told us, I doubt if anyone would have said anything
about anything being illegal." Lamberto, supra note 1.
69. Brief for Petitioner, Joint App. at 96 (emphasis added).
70. Id. at 96-97 (emphasis added). Evidently McKnight thought that revealing to Captain Learning and
Chief Nichols (who was also present) that Williams had told him that the little girl was dead was a foolish
thing for Williams' lawyer to have done. Thus, McKnight endeavored on cross-examination and recross to
get Nichols as well as Learning to back down on this point. Although Nichols finally conceded that he was
unsure whether McKnight actually said Williams said that the girl was dead, id. at 108, he did not retract
his testimony that McKnight reported the girl was dead after his phone conversation with Williams, id. at
108-09.
The important point is that Captain Leaming was convinced McKnight had told him that the girl was
dead and that the captain never doubted this was so. At least nothing in the record indicates that lie had
any doubt. Indeed, Learning "figured" that Williams
[Vol. 67:1
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JUSTICE WHITE'S DISSENT
Justice White, who was joined in his dissent by Justices Blackmun and
Rehnquist, sugggested another reason why Williams was "not questioned":
the "Christian burial speech" "was accompanied by a request by [Leaming]
that the accused make no response."' 7! Not quite. The "speech" was in fact
accompanied by the remark: "I do not want you to answer me. I don't want to
discuss it any further. Just think about it as we're riding down the road."72
had probably got rid of the body as soon as he possibly could after he left Des Moines. I felt
that it wasn't in the Grinnell area [where a search had turned up the girl's clothing, but no
body], it wasn't in the Newton area [where a search had produced nothing]. So I then thought
probably as quick as he could get out of Des Moines [Williams] would dispose of the body
.... [S]o I figured Mitchellville.
Id. at 65 (emphasis added).
71. 430 U.S. at 434.
72. Id. at 392-93 (emphasis added).
Captain Leaming's closing remark seems to illustrate what one interrogation expert, Lt. C.H. Van
Meter, has called, in his chapter on "closing," a" 'soft'-type closing" or "closing with the door open." C.
VAN METER, PRINCIPLES OF POLICE INTERROGATION 100-01 (1973). The first two "samples" of this
technique offered by Lt. Van Meter are:
INTERROGATOR: Karl, I want you to know that I don't feel that this whole problem has
been straightened out. I want you to think things over and we can get together later, and
maybe go over this whole thing again.
or
INTERROGATOR: Karl, why don't you kick this thing around in your mind awhile and
think over what we have been talking about. All you have to do is let your conscience be your
guide in all of this, and then, if you need me to talk over anything, just give a whistle.
Id. at 100. Adds Van Meter:
In all phases of your interrogation, you must make yourself available to receive the
confession, and this holds true at the termination of the interrogation as well. By leaving
yourself and the suspect an opening to renew your conversation, you'll quite often give
yourself a confession that you would not otherwise have gotten. Make yourself available to
the suspect and give yourself the break of being able to easily renew any further contact you
might have with him.
Id.
When the police car neared the Mitchellville exit, Williams did announce, according to Captain
Leaming, that he was going to show the police where the body was. But one cannot help wondering
whether, had Williams not done so, Leaming would have renewed the discussion at this point. Consider the
following comments by Van Meter regarding the continuing effectiveness of this "closing" technique:
[By "closing with the door open"] we left ourselves plenty of room to start anew at a later date
if necessary, and also we made our interrogator "available" should the suspect feel that he
wants to talk. We tried for the confession and thereby reinforced in the suspect's mind the fact
that we are not convinced that he is innocent as he has stated; further, we gave him a number
of good reasons to think about as to why he should confess. By leaving the door open to him,
we can renew our conversation anytime by just saying, "Well, Karl, did you think over what
we talked about last time?"
Id. at 103.
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Think about what? Think about the fact that "you [Williams] are the only
person that knows where this little girl's body is"; that you are the only one
who can fulfill the desire and the right of the girl's parents to give their
daughter a Christian burial; that, because of the predicted snowstorm, even
you may be unable to bring about a Christian burial if you do not locate the
body before we get back to Des Moines; and that we will be going right past
the area on the way into Des Moines.
Learning was not just asking Williams to think about it. He was setting a
time limit on how long Williams had to think about it. He was "asking"
Williams, it seems plain to me, to think about telling him, or showing him,
where the body was by the time they reached the turnoff to the area where the
body was buried. What else could Leaming have meant? That was the whole
point of his "Christian burial speech." Certainly that was the way the third
man in the police car, Detective Nelson, heard it. When Nelson was asked
whether he or Leaming had asked Williams anything on the drive back to Des
Moines, he replied that they had not, except that "when we left Davenport,
Captain Leaming asked him to think about telling us where the body is. ''73
That under the circumstances Leaming's request that Williams not "an-
swer" him or "discuss it any further" is an insignificant factor may be
demonstrated, I think, by modifying the facts in the famous Spano case. 74 The
actual facts were as follows: Spano called his childhood friend, Bruno, then a
fledgling police officer, and told him that he had shot a man when still dazed
by the man's blows and unaware of what he was doing, and that he intended
to get a lawyer and give himself up. Bruno relayed this information to his
superiors. The next day Spano, accompanied by counsel, did surrender
himself to the authorities. His attorney left him in the custody of the police,
who subjected him to intensive questioning. But Spano persisted in his refusal
to incriminate himself.75
At this point Bruno's superiors instructed him to tell Spano that the latter's
phone call "had gotten him 'in a lot of trouble' and that he should seek to
extract sympathy from [Spano] for Bruno's pregnant wife and three child-
ren."'76 Bruno "played [the] part of a worried father, harried by his superiors,
in not one but four different acts" 77 before Spano "succumbed to his friend's
prevarications and agreed to make a statement. 78
Suppose Bruno had had only one session with Spano and in that session he
had delivered the following "pregnant wife and three children speech":
Spano, old buddy, I don't mind telling you that your phone call
has gotten me into a lot of trouble. A friend of mine told me this
morning he heard Lieutenant Gannon is going to see to it that I
lose my job. I have an appointment to see the lieutenant in two
hours. I'm probably going to get the bad news then.
What a time to lose a job! Three children and a fourth on the
way. I don't know how we're going to survive. Mary is a wonderful
73. Brief for Petitioner, Joint App. at 104 (emphasis added).
74. Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
75. Id. at 317-18.
76. Id. at 319.
77. Id. at 323.
78. Id. at 319.
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wife. She's entitled to a husband with a decent job. The three kids
are darlings. They're entitled to a father with a decent job.
You're my only hope. You're the only one who can prevent this
disaster from happening. If you agree to make a statement I'm sure
Lieutenant Gannon will calm down. But considering the mood
Gannon is in, if you don't do so this afternoon, not even you may
be able to help me.
I'm so upset I can't work. I'm just going to sit right outside your
door and try to read a magazine until the time for my appointment
with Gannon.
I don't want you to answer me. I don't want to discuss it any
further. Just think about it as I'm sitting outside trying to read a
magazine.
Suppose further that an hour and a half later Spano had made a statement.
Would anyone doubt that Bruno's "speech" constituted "interrogation" or
was "tantamount to interrogation"? How is Captain Leaming's "speech"
different?
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER'S DISSENT
In a third dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Burger suggested that Justice
Powell had asserted "that the result in this case turns on whether Detective
Leaming's remarks constituted 'interrogation,' as [Justice Powell] views
them, or whether they were 'statements' intended to prick the conscience of
the accused." 79 But Justice Powell neither made nor suggested any such
distinction in his concurring opinion. Quite the contrary. Justice Powell
seems to be saying-and rightly so-that" 'statements' intended to prick the
conscience of the accused," in the words of the Chief Justice, at least when
they are likely to persuade the accused to incriminate himself, can be, as they
were in the Williams case, as "skillful and effective" a "form of interrogation"
as any set of direct questions. 80
If a distinction between "questioning" for the purpose of eliciting informa-
tion and the use of "psychological ploys," such as appeals to conscience, to
achieve the same purpose, emerged anywhere in the Williams case, such a
distinction was drawn only by the Iowa Attorney General 81 or by the Chief
Justice himself. Neither the opinion of the Court nor any of the concurring
opinions made that distinction. Nor is it to be found in any of the
interrogation manuals. Indeed, appeals to conscience and other "psychologi-
cal ploys" are the very stuff of which "interrogation" is made.82 On this point,
79. 430 U.S. at 419 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
80. See note 26 supra.
81. See note 58 supra.
82. See, eg., C. O'HARA, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION 102-03 (lst ed. 1956). This
manual was quoted extensively by the Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 453. See note 102 infra.
The first two "categories" described by O'Hara when he set forth "some of the techniques practiced by
experienced investigators" are: "Emotional Appeals" (subdivisions include "Sympathetic Approach" and
"Kindness") and "Friendliness" (subdivisions include "The Helpful Advisor" and "The Sympathetic
Brother," each capitalizing on the subject's need "to square things with his own conscience"). C. O'HARA,
supra, at 102.
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a page from the "how-to-do-it" and the "how-we-have-done-it-ourselves"
manuals is worth a volume of semantics.83
The Chief Justice also observed that he found "it most remarkable that a
murder case should turn on judicial interpretation that a statement becomes a
question simply because it is followed by an incriminating disclosure from the
suspect." 84 That would indeed have been a startling contention-if anyone
had made it. No one did, however.
No one suggested that if Captain Leaming had said, "Let's pull off at the
next Holiday Inn and get something to eat," or "I hope we can get back to
Des Moines without sliding off these icy roads," or had made some other
remark neither calculated nor likely to elicit an incriminating disclosure that
any such remark would have become "interrogation" if Williams were to have
choosen that occasion to announce: "I'm going to show you where the body
is." The "Christian burial speech" did not become "interrogation" because it
was followed by an incriminating disclosure; it constituted "interrogation" or
its equivalent when first delivered because its purpose and its tendency were
to elicit an incriminating disclosure.
A QUESTION BY ANY OTHER NAME
What may have struck Chief Justice Burger as "remarkable" is the notion
that a "statement" or "speech" containing no question marks should be
regarded as "questioning" or "interrogation." But how could it be otherwise?
The techniques that police interrogators are able to use-and for generations
have used-are so many and varied that, unless Miranda and the privilege
against self-incrimination it is designed to effectuate were to become empty
gestures in custodial surroundings, the Court could not have intended to limit
their applicability to only one form of official "interrogation" or "compul-
sion"-verbal conduct ending in question marks. Indeed, as I hope to
convince the reader, Miranda and the privilege against self-incrimination
cannot be limited to situations in which the police directly address a suspect or
even to those occasions on which they engage in verbal conduct.8 5
83. Cf. New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("a page of
history is worth a volume of logic").
84. 430 U.S. at 419-20 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
85. Because the custody issue has arisen more frequently and has generally been regarded as a more
difficult one, a good deal more attention has been paid to what constitutes custodial interrogation than to
what constitutes custodial interrogation. So far as I have been able to ascertain, however, most, if not all,
commentators who have addressed the issue have recognized that "[p]olice conduct, though not verbal,
may nevertheless be tantamount to interrogation for purposes of requiring Miranda warnings." 3 J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 826a, at 383 n.23 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1970). See also C. MCCORMICK,
EVIDENCE 330 (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972); Graham, supra note 41, at 107; Rothblatt & Pitler, supra note 52,
at 486.
J.V. Smith does not define "interrogation," but rather points out "the major areas which are generally
held not to be interrogation: volunteered statements and responses given to administrative questions" (the
routine questions asked of all arrestees who are "booked" or otherwise processed). Smith, supra note 41, at
702-03. It seems fairly clear that, although pressuring, persuading, or prompting a suspect to confess by
showing him incriminating physical evidence, such as a ballistics report or a bank surveillance photograph,
or by confronting him with an accusatory aeomplice, see note 115 infra, need involve no verbal conduct,
such tactics fit neither of the noninterrogation categories discussed by Smith.
Professor Charles Alan Wright's reading of the Miranda opinion differs from mine, but it is plain that
[Vol. 67:1
HeinOnline  -- 67 Geo. L. J.  14 1978-1979
1978] "INTERROGATION" AFTER Brewer v. Williams
Eighty years ago, in the famous Bram case,86 the Court held that when a
murder suspect was informed by the police that a cosuspect had charged him
with the crime, this information "produce[d] upon his mind the fear if he
remained silent it could be considered an admission of guilt ' 87 and thus under
the circumstances rendered the resulting incriminating statement a violation
of the privilege. 88 But the only one who asked a question in the course of the
Bram "interrogation" was the suspect himself:
Detective Power: Brain, we are trying to unravel this horrible
mystery [the murder of the captain of Brain's ship]. Your position
is rather an awkward one. I have had [Seaman] Brown in this office
and he made a statement that he saw you do the murder [which
was true].
Brain: He could not have seen me; where was he?
Power: He states he was at the wheel.
he is unhappy with his reading. Although "not clear," "the breadth of the exception for volunteered
statements," he observes, "seems to include. . . the statement of a person who has not been given the
benefits of warnings and counsel so long as he is not interrogated. If so, the police, so long as they ask no
questions, could deliberately hold a person in custody without giving him the Miranda warnings, and
confront him with the victim of the crime, or perhaps other evidence of it, in the hope that he would then
spontaneously say something incriminating. If this is what the Court intended to permit, it has left a large
gap in the protections otherwise provided by Miranda. ... 1 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE (CRIMINAL) § 76, at 112-13 (1969). I cannot believe that the Miranda Court did leave such a
"large gap" in the protections it otherwise provided that would permit the police, without giving the
requisite warnings or having given the warnings after a suspect has asserted his rights, to resort to tactics
and techniques that generate pressure, tension, and anxiety above and beyond that inherent in normal arrest
and detention. See note 112 infra. To call a statement prodded or prompted by police revelation of
damaging evidence or by police arrangement of a confrontation with the victim (or with an accusatory
accomplice) a "volunteered" or "spontaneous" statement strikes me as a peculiar use of language.
"Volunteered" connotes offering something on one's own initiative (the Court in Miranda seems to define
"volunteered" as produced "without any compelling influences," not merely without verbal conduct, 384
U.S. at 478); "spontaneous" is usually defined as self-generated, happening without apparent external
cause.
86. Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897). In Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), the Court, in an
opinion authored by Justice Brennan, performed "what might have seemed to some a shotgur wedding of
the privilege [against self-incrimination] to the confessions rule." Herman, The Supreme Court and
Restrictions on Police Interrogation, 25 OHIO ST. L.J. 449, 465 (1964). The Malloy Court announced:
[Today the admissibility of a confession in a state criminal prosecution is tested by the same
standard applied in federal prosecutions since 1897, when, in Brain v. United States, 168 U.S.
at 532, the Court held that "[in criminal trials, in the courts of the United States, wherever a
question arises whether a confession is incompetent because not voluntary, the issue is
controlled by" [the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination].
378 U.S. at 7. See also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 461 (quoting same Brain language with approval).
Although "[t]he old Brain case might well have furnished a steppingstone to the standard advanced in
Malloy, ...until Escobedo, at any rate, it only amounted to an early excursion from the prevailing
multifactor approach." Kamisar, Equal Justice in the Gatehouses and Mansions of American Criminal
Procedure, in Y. KAMISAR, F. INBAU & T. ARNOLD, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN OUR TIME 1,147 (A..Howard
ed. 1965); see Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (decided same Term as Brain).
87. Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. at 562. Moreover, added the Court, "it cannot be conceived that the
converse impression could not also have naturally arisen that by denying [the cosuspect's accusation] there
was hope of removing the suspicion from himself." Id.
88. Id. at 562-64. Brain was confronted with this communication while stripped or being stripped by the
police. Id. at 538, 561, 563.
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Bram: Well, he could not see me from there.89
Escobedo did not "crack" until confronted with an alleged accomplice who
claimed that Escobedo had fired the fatal shots. In the presence of the police,
Escobedo called his accomplice a liar-"I didn't shoot Manuel, you did
it"90-and "[iun this way. . for the first time, admitted to some knowledge
of the crime."91 Ashcraft did not admit that he had hired Ware to kill his wife
until a copy of Ware's confession was given or read to Ashcraft. 92 Neither in
Escobedo nor in Ashcraft did any Justice suggest that the police conduct
described above constituted something other than "interrogation" because it
was accomplished without any questions being asked. Indeed, in each case the
"interrogation" might have been carried out without the police engaging in
any "verbal conduct."
In Rogers v. Richmond,93 when petitioner persisted in his refusal to admit
involvement in a felony-murder, "Chief Eagan pretended, in petitioner's
hearing, to place a telephone call to police officers, directing them to stand in
readiness to bring in petitioner's wife [who suffered from arthritis] for
questioning. ' 94 Petitioner continued to hold out until the chief indicated that
he was about to have petitioner's wife taken into custody.95 If the feigned
phone call had immediately produced the desired result, however, I doubt
that the State would have had the audacity to argue that this psychological
ploy was not "interrogation" at all because it was not a "question" or because
the statements were not addressed to petitioner.
Only once in his opinion for the Court in Rogers did Justice Frankfurter
label Eagan's remarks "questioning" or "interrogation. ' 96 Both in his general
discussion of the standard demanded by fourteenth-amendment due process
for determining the admissibility of confessions and in his application of the
standard to the particular facts of the case, Justice Frankfurter employed such
terminology as the following: "confessions which are involuntary, i.e., the
product of coercion, either physical or psychological, cannot stand"; 97 "confes-
sions obtained by impermissible methods";98 subjecting a defendant "to
pressures to which, under our accusatorial system, an accused should not be
89. Id. at 539, 562.
90. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 483 (1964).
91. Id.
92. Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 151 (1944). The Court, in an opinion by Justice Black, stated
that Ware's confession "was read to Ashcraft." Id. The dissenters stated that it "was given" to him. Id. at
166 (Jackson, J., with Roberts & Frankfurter, JJ., dissenting) . Whether Ware's confession was read to
Ashcraft or whether the latter read it himself in the presence of the police or, for that matter, whether Ware
directly confronted and accused Ashcraft in the presence of the police strikes me as an insignificant
distinction. The result should not turn on whether the police asked a question or even whether they
engaged in "verbal conduct"; in all three situations the purpose of the police and effect on the suspect are
essentially the same. See text at notes 115-16, 133-36 infra.
93. 365 U.S. 534 (1961).
94. Id. at 535.
95. Id. at 535-36.
96. Id. at 548 ("[W]e need not, on this record, consider whether the circumstances of the interrogation
and the manner in which it was pressed barred admissibility of the confession as a matter of federal law.").
97. Id. at 540 (emphasis added).
98. Id. at 541 (emphasis added).
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subjected"; 99 "whether the behavior of the State's law enforcement officials
was such as [to] bring about confessions not freely self-determined." 100
It is true that Miranda contains much talk about "custodial police
interrogation," "in-custody interrogation," "questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers," and about the warnings that must be given "prior to
any questioning." But it also contains strong criticism and apparent con-
demnation of (1) many standard interrogation techniques that need not take
the form of "questions," such as "posit[ing]" "the guilt of the subject as a
fact," "minimiz[ing] the moral seriousness of the offense," and "cast[ing]
blame on the victim or on society,"' 1 1 and (2) various stratagems that do not
require any "verbal conduct" on the part of the police at all, such as the "false
line-up" and the "reverse line-up." 102
It was argued long ago that in-custody interrogation without more imper-
missibly compels a person to incriminate himself.103 But the courts put that
issue aside for many years. It was hard enough to prevent the police from
resorting to physical violence, "relay questioning," and other crude and
99. Id. (emphasis added).
100. Id. at 544 (emphasis added). Consider also the observation in the last of the pre-Escobedo-Miranda
cases, Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963), that "It]he line between proper and permissible police
conduct and techniques and methods offensive to due process is, at best, a difficult one to draw, particularly
in cases such as this where it is necessary to make fine judgments as to the effect of psychologically coercive
pressures and inducements on the mind and will of an accused." Id. at 515 (Goldberg, J.) (emphasis added).
101. 384 U.S. at 450.
102. Id. at 453. In the "false lineup" ploy, "[tihe witness or complainant (previously coached, if
necessary) studies the lineup and confidently points out the subject as the guilty party." Id. at 453 (quoting
C. O'HARA, supra note 82, at 106). Thus, no police officer himself need say anything. In the "reverse
lineup" variation, the suspect is again placed in a lineup, "but this time he is identified by several fictitious
witnesses or victims who associated him with different offenses. It is expected that the subject will become
desperate and confess to the offense under investigation in order to escape from the false accusations." Id.
(quoting C. O'HARA, supra note 82, at 106).
Among the other techniques discussed in this edition of the O'Hara manual is a variation of the "bluff
on a split pair": A, a cosuspect, is seated in an outer office also occupied by a busy stenographer. B, a
cosuspect, is taken into the interrogation room and the stenographer is then ordered to come in, too-with
pencil and notebook. "After an appropriate period of time, the stenographer returns and begins to type
from his notes [and in various ways suggests that he is typing up B's confession]. Subsequently, A is
returned to the interrogation room, which B has now left. He is viewed with a grave silence. The
interrogator opens up with: 'I don't think we'll need any confession from you, but if you want to clear up a
few points .... .' " C. O'HARA, supra note 82, at 106. The interesting thing about this "interrogation
technique" for purposes of present discussion is that it may well pressure or persuade A to incriminate
himself while he is watching the stenographer type up "B's confession" or while he is being returned to the
interrogation room or when he is "viewed with a grave silence" on his return. If A were to make an
incriminating statement at any one of these points, the "interrogation technique" would have "worked"
without A having been asked a single question-or without anyone even speaking to him.
The first edition of the O'Hara manual was not revised until 1970 (two years after Captain Leaming
"visited" with Williams), but post-Miranda editions have recognized that the techniques described above
and similar tactics spelled out in the first edition may "conflict with the spirit of the Miranda ruling" and
that "although such techniques may have been accepted as legal, their misapplication or misinterpretation
might serve to produce or intensify the inherent pressures of the interrogation atmosphere that the Supreme
Court's ruling was designed to overcome." C. O'HARA, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION
121 (4th ed. 1976) (emphasis added).
103. See E. HOPKINS, OUR LAWLESS POLICE 193-95 (1931). According to Professor Zechariah Chafee,
Ernest Hopkins, an official investigator for the Wickersham Commission, showed "notable skill and
enterprise in breaking through the barriers of silence which surround official lawlessness." Id. at vii
(preface).
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oppressive practices.104 After three decades and thirty-odd "coerced confes-
sion" cases that saw "the overall gauge. . . steadily changing, usually in the
direction of restricting admissibility,"1 05 the Court in Miranda finally held
that "[e]ven without employing brutality, the 'third degree' or the specific
stratagems described [in the interrogation manuals, from which it had quoted
at length earlier in the opinion], the very fact of custodial interrogation exacts
a heavy toll on individual liberty and trades on the weaknesses of individu-
als."' 06 Thus, the Court stated:
We are satisfied that all the principles embodied in the privilege
[against self-incrimination] apply to informal compulsion exerted
by law-enforcement officers during in-custody questioning. An
individual swept from familiar surroundings into police custody,
surrounded by antagonistic forces, and subjected to the techniques
of persuasion described [in the interrogation manuals quoted] above
cannot be otherwise than under compulsion to speak. As a
practical matter, the compulsion to speak in the isolated setting of
the police station may well be greater than in courts or other
official investigations, where there are often impartial observers to
guard against intimidation or trickery.07
The whole point of applying the privilege to custodial surroundings was
that it imposed "more exacting restrictions than [did] the Fourteenth
Amendment's voluntariness test."' 08 It would be standing Miranda on its
head to say that because the Court was "concern[ed]. .. primarily with [the]
interrogation atmosphere and the evils it can bring,"'109 it somehow managed
to lift restrictions against other forms of compulsion, persuasion, trickery,
and cajolery. The aim of the Miranda rules, as the dissenters well understood,
was to "reinforce the nervous or ignorant suspect"o and to "negate all
pressures""' above and beyond the coercion of arrest and detention it-
self' 12 -"to offset [the] minor pressures and disadvantages intrinsic to any
104. Chafee, Remedies for the Third Degree, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Nov. 1931, at 621. "It is hard
enough to prevent policemen from using physical violence on suspects; it would be far harder to prevent
them from asking a few questions. We had better get rid of the rubber hose and twenty-four hour grillings
before we undertake to compel or persuade the police to give up questioning altogether." Id. at 626,
Professor Chafee coauthored the famous report to the Wickersham Commission on the "third degree."
105. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 508 (Harlan, J., with Stewart & White, JJ., dissenting),
106. Id. at 455 (emphasis added).
107. Id. at 461 (emphasis added).
108. Id. at 511 (Harlan, J., with Stewart & White, JJ., dissenting). The Miranda opinion may contain
some overstatements, but surely the observation that "[i]n these cases, we might not find the defendants'
statements to have been involuntary in traditional terms" is not one of them. Id. at 457.
109. Id. at 456.
110. Id. at 505 (Harlan, J., with Stewart & White, JJ., dissenting).
111. Id.
112. "Zero-value pressure condition[s]" are not required by Miranda, nor are they possible in custodial
surroundings. Cf C. O'HARA, supra note 82, at 121. The Miranda Court might have held that the inherent
and unavoidable pressures produced by arrest and detention without more are substantial enough to require
"neutralizing" warnings, but it did not do so. Thus, in the absence of "questioning," or some other form of
prodding or persuasion, the "compulsion" inherent in arrest and detention does not rise to the level of
"compulsion" within the meaning of the privilege. As Justice White correctly pointed out in his Miranda
dissent, a suspect "may blurt out [an admissible] confession despite the fact that he is alone and in custody,
[Vol. 67:1
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kind of police interrogation"' 13 previously allowable under due process
precedents that "exert[ed] a tug on the suspect to confess.1 14 How, then, can
it be said that the "Christian burial speech" was not "interrogation" within
the meaning of Miranda?
I think it is plain that the "Christian burial speech" was in fact a form of
"interrogation." It had the same purpose and effect as a question, "[tjhe
question was implied if not spoken," and "[e]verything was there but a
question mark." 115 More generally, "it simply is not enough to mechanically
without any showing that he had any notion of his right to remain silent or of the consequences of his
admission." 384 U.S. at 533 (White, J., with Harlan & Stewart, JJ., dissenting). But see A MODEL CODE OF
PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 120.8 (Official Draft 1975) [hereinafter cited as MODEL CODE];
UNIFORM RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 212, 241 (Approved Draft 1974) (recommending that in
order to relieve some of pressure, confusion, and anxiety likely to be generated by arrest and arrival at
police station, suspect should be given certain advice at these stages whether or not any questioning is
attempted).
At some point, however, prolonged detention (albeit in complete silence) for the purpose and with the
likely effect of pressuring or prodding a suspect to confess will supply the "something more" that
transforms "custody" into custodial interrogation within the meaning of Miranda. See Rothblatt & Pitler,
supra note 52, at 486. To put it another way, an extended period of detention raises the pressure and
anxiety generated by normal arrest and detention to the level of "compulsion" within the meaning of the
privilege. See text accompanying notes 132, 135-36 infra.
113. 384 U.S. at 516 (Harlan, J., with Stewart & White, JJ., dissenting).
114. Id. at 515.
115. See Combs v. Wingo, 465 F.2d 96,97-99 (6th Cir. 1972). In Combs a murder suspect who had been
given Miranda warnings asserted his right to counsel. The officer responded: "[Al1 right. I want to read
you something." He then read the incriminating ballistics report, whereupon the accused broke down and
confessed. Id. at 97-98. The state appellate court, in Combs v. Commonwealth, 438 S.W.2d 82 (Ky. 1969),
held that the reading of the report (the dissenters referred to the "showing" of the report) did not amount
to "interrogation" within the meaning of Miranda, but merely constituted "furnish[ing]" defendant
"information the police had already acquired by their [independent] investigation." Id. at 85. Judge
Palmore, joined by Judge Milliken, wrote a strong dissent. In a federal habeas corpus proceeding, the Sixth
Circuit, in an opinion written by Judge (now Solicitor General) McCree, agreed with the dissenters in the
Kentucky Court of Appeals decision:
The purpose of a question is to get an answer. Anything else that has the same purpose falls in
the same category and is susceptible of the same abuses Miranda seeks to prevent. The only
possible object of showing the ballistics report to tle appellant in this case was to break him
down and elicit a confession from him. The question was implied if not spoken. Everything
was there but a question mark. It was a form of question and got the desired result.
465 F.2d at 99 (quoting 438 S.W.2d at 86 (Palmore, J., with Milliken, J., dissenting)).
Both state and federal courts are split on whether confronting a suspect with physical evidence or with
an accomplice who has confessed constitutes interrogation within the meaning of Miranda. See NAT'L
DIsT. ATrORNEYS ASS'N, CONFESSIONS AND INTERROGATIONS AFTER Miranda 34-35 (J. Zagel 5th rev.
ed. 1975) (collection of state and federal cases). It is fairly clear, for example, that the Ninth Circuit would
have admitted the ballistics report-prompted confession held inadmissible in Combs. See United States v.
Pheaster, 544 F.2d 353, 365, 366-68 (9th Cir. 1976) (after asserting right to counsel, suspect told that
fingerprint found on kidnappers' note had been positively identified as his; resulting confession admissible);
United States v. Davis, 527 F.2d 1110, 1111 (9th Cir. 1975) (after asserting right to remain silent, suspect
shown bank surveillance photograph of himself participating in bank robbery and asked to reconsider his
position; subsequent waiver deemed valid).
The Pheaster case might well have fallen within the "rescue" or "emergency" exception to Miranda. See
note 65 supra. As written, however, the opinion seems fatally defective on several counts, including its
reliance on Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975). See 544 F.2d at 367.
The Supreme Court in Michigan v. Mosley held admissible incriminating statements obtained from a
suspect during a second "interrogation session," even though he had asserted his right to remain silent at
an earlier session. 423 U.S. at 104-06; see notes 409-61 infra and accompanying text (full discussion of
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attempt to ascertain what 'interrogation' means without considering the
rationales behind Miranda and the fifth and sixth amendments. . . .The
Mosley). The Court deemed it particularly significant that the suspect had been given "full and complete
Miranda warnings at the outset of the second interrogation," that the second interrogation was "restricted
...to a crime that had not been the subject of the earlier interrogation," and that the questioning was
resumed by a different officer. 423 U.S. at 104-06. None of these factors was present in Pheaster. Whether
or not the disclosure to Pheaster that his fingerprint implicated him in the kidnapping constituted
"interrogation" (though I think it plain that it did), it was undeniably a police effort to convince Pheaster
to change his mind. Under the circumstances, it would be unreasonable to assert that Pheaster's "right to
cut off questioning" was "scrupulously honored" or "fully respected." See id. at 104. Nor can a renewed
effort by the same police to persuade Pheaster to talk about the same crime that had been the subject of the
earlier interrogation, without giving him a fresh set of warnings, be viewed as "quite consistent with a
reasonable interpretation of [the suspect's] earlier refusal to answer any questions about the [kidnapping]."
See id. at 105.
Moreover, whereas Mosley only dealt with a suspect who invoked his right to remain silent, Pheaster
involved a suspect who twice asserted his right to counsel, the first time before the warnings were given and
the second time while they were being given. See 544 F.2d at 364-65. Both the majority opinion in Mosley
and Justice White's concurring opinion recognize that the Miranda Court apparently created a per se rule
against further interrogation (which presumably includes "nonverbal" police efforts to persuade a suspect
to reconsider his position) that is effective after assertion of the right to counsel until an attorney is present,
but not after a mere claim of the right to remain silent. See 423 U.S. at 104 n.10 (quoting Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. at 474); id. at 109-10 (White, J., concurring). See also notes 430-46 infra.
Putting aside the Miranda-Mosley point, the Pheaster court's view that no "interrogation" followed the
suspect's assertion of his right to counsel represents a triumph of semantics over reality. Once Pheaster was
placed in a car, the agent in charge "engaged [him] in a 'firm' 'one-way conversation.' " 544 F.2d at 365.
How is this different from "interrogation"? Much, if not most, "interrogation," constitutes a "one-way
conversation." The court noted a "key distinction between questioning [a suspect] and presenting the
evidence against him." Id. at 366. This distinction is not found in Miranda. The sole authority cited by the
Pheaster court in support of this distinction was Davis v. United States, which is even harder to digest than
Pheaster.
In Davis, after asserting his desire not to talk to an investigating agent, the suspect was shown a bank
surveillance photograph of himself participating in the robbery and then asked, "Are you sure you don't
want to reconsider?" 527 F.2d at 1111. Confronted with this evidence, the suspect concluded, that he did
want to reconsider after all (or, I think it fair to say, that he might as well), and the court called this a valid
"waiver." Id. Davis seems to say that, after a person asserts his rights, the police may pressure or persuade
him to change his position as long as they restrict their efforts to the presentation or recitation of evidence
against him, and that any question based on such evidence is not "interrogation," either because it is
"cured by" or "auxiliary to" the presentation or recitation of the evidence.
To those who wish Miranda were overruled, the Pheaster-Davis approach represents the next best thing.
It allows police interrogators to do what they have long been advised to do---"display an air of confidence
in the subject's guilt," "point out" some of the "circumstantial evidence indicative of a subject's guilt," and
"point out the futility of resistance to telling the truth." F. INDAU & J. REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION
AND CONFESSIONS 26, 31, 77 (2d ed. 1967). The Pheaster-Davis approach permits a police interrogator, as
long as he confines his efforts to presentation or recitation of the incriminating evidence against the
suspect, and apparently as long as he asks not more than one or two subsidiary questions, to " 'talk [a
suspect] out of' his refusal to talk" or "his desire for a lawyer." Id. at 4. Not even the authors of the leading
interrogation manual thought such questioning possible after Miranda. See id.
Furthermore, if these tactics may be resorted to after a suspect has asserted his rights, it would seem to
follow that they are permissible a fortiori before he has asserted them. To put it another way, if these tactics
do not amount to "interrogation" within the meaning of Miranda, then why can they not be employed to
"talk a suspect into confessing" without ever advising him of his Miranda rights?
The Ninth Circuit seems to be under the impression that as long as a police recitation of the evidence
against a suspect is "objective" and "undistorted," it does not constitute "interrogation" within the
meaning of Miranda or "compulsion" within the meaning of the privilege. See United States v. Pheaster,
544 F.2d at 368 & n.9. Putting aside the notion that the weight and quality of the government's evidence
should be appraised by the defense attorney and not by the suspect, the objectivity with which that evidence
is presented raises another issue-trickery.
The police "pressured" Escobedo by telling him that an alleged accomplice claimed that he had fired the
fatal shots. It is unclear whether the accomplice actually made such an accusation. See text at notes 90-91
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requirement of 'interrogation' is designed to permit the use by the prosecution
of a confession that is given by an accused without any prompting .... ,,I16
Admittedly, "as long as the matter to be considered is debated in artificial
terms,"' 7 there is the danger that a judge will take the words "questioning"
and "interrogation" and the dictionary and be "led by a technical definition
to apply a certain name, and then to deduce consequences which have no
relation to the grounds on which the name was applied." ' S But "the logic of
words" need not, and should not, "yield to the logic of realities." ' 19 If we
"think things not words,"'120 as we must, if we "constantly translate our words
supra. If the information were true, Escobedo was not "tricked," but he was still "pressured." Similarly,
the police persuaded Combs that further resistance was futile by showing him a ballistics report implicating
him in the murder. If the ballistics report were authentic, Combs was not "tricked," but he was still
convinced of the "hopelessness of his situation" and thereby "encourage[d] . . . to confess immediately."
See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 85, at 330 (discussion of Kentucky Court of Appeals decision). Miranda
does not ban unfair "custodial interrogation"; it bans any "custodial interrogation." The fifth amendment
prohibition is not limited to deceitful "compulsion"; it applies to aboveboard "compulsion" as well. Indeed,
the latter is sometimes the most compelling kind.
116. Commonwealth v. Simala, 434 Pa. 219, 226, 252 A.2d 575, 578-79 (1969) (Roberts, J.) (emphasis in
original).
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has been especially alert on the "interrogation" front. In my
judgment, with one exception-Commonwealth v. Franklin, 438 Pa. 411, 265 A.2d 361 (1970) (police
statement to appellant that statement from him unnecessary because witnesses had already identified him
but that they would like to hear his side of story held not to be "interrogation"; strong dissent by Roberts,
J.)-the Pennsylvania Court has properly classified various forms of official prompting and prodding as
interrogation within the meaning of Miranda. In the Simala case itself an official's statement to the suspect,
"you look kind of down in the dumps. . . if you want to talk, talk," was viewed as "interrogation"; the
court perceived "no difference for constitutional purposes between questioning an accused outright and
more subtly suggesting that he incriminate himself without being asked specific questions." 434 Pa. at 226,
252 A.2d at 579. In Commonwealth v. Leaming, 432 Pa. 326, 247 A.2d 590 (1968), a police officer told
appellant that his alleged accomplice had been apprehended and was likely to talk, and that if appellant
wished to make a statement this was the time to do so because he was liable to end up a "patsy" otherwise.
Id. at 335, 247 A.2d at 595. This "advice" was held to be "interrogation." Id. at 337, 247 A.2d at 596. In
Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 445 Pa. 292, 285 A.2d 172 (1971), appellant was confronted, in the presence
of several police officers, with an alleged coconspirator who accused him of being the "triggerman" in the
crime. Id. at 295, 285 A.2d at 174. In regarding the confrontation as a "form" of "interrogation," the court
noted that the coconspirator was admittedly "being used in an attempt to pry an incriminating statement
from appellant" and that to permit this technique "would be to place a premium on the ingenuity of the
police to devise methods of indirect interrogation, rather than to implement the plain mandate of Miranda
... "Id. at 297, 285 A.2d at 175. In Commonwealth v. Mercier, 451 Pa. 211, 302 A.2d 337 (1973), the
reading to appellant of a statement by an alleged accomplice implicating him in the crime was held to be
"interrogation"; the court refused "to distinguish between confronting the appellant directly with those
who implicate him and reading their statement to him, both have the same effect-both are a form of
official interrogation." Id. at 214-15, 302 A.2d at 340.
The view, reflected in the Pennsylvania cases, that any police conduct designed to or likely to elicit an
incriminating statement should be considered "Miranda interrogation" assumes, of course, that the suspect
realizes that he is talking with or being talked to by a law enforcement official, or that he is aware that a
confrontation is taking place in the presence of police. None of the aforementioned Pennsylvania cases
involved the use of undercover agents or police informants. As to this issue, see text at notes 288-399 infra.
117. See Guy v. Donald, 203 U.S. 399, 406 (1906) (Holmes, J.).
118. Id.
119. De Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 43 (1927) (Brandeis, 3., with Holmes, 3., dissenting).
120. O.W. HOLMES, Law In Science and Science in Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 224, 238
(1920).
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into the facts for which they stand,"'121 as we must, the words "questioning"
and "interrogation" will prove to be no insurmountable barrier.
I must add that one need not work with the words "questioning" and
"interrogation" at all. The courts' extension of first amendment protections to
conduct furnishes a useful analogy. Because th6 Constitution protects free-
dom of "speech," the terms "symbolic speech" and "symbolic conduct" have
evolved to embrace conduct, such as flag desecration 122 and the wearing of
black armbands,' 23 that, to employ one suggested definition, t'is intended as
expression," "in fact . . . communicates," and in context "becomes a
comprehensible form of expression."' 24 If the Constitution had furnished
protection only against "questioning" or "interrogation," the courts would
have developed the concept of "symbolic interrogation" or "symbolic
questioning" to encompass various kinds of police "remarks," "observa-
tions," and "nonverbal" techniques that imply a question or convey a message
and are likely to be so understood by a suspect.
Unlike the conduct protected by the "freedom of speech" clause, however,
the governmental conduct prohibited by the very language of the self-
incrimination clause commonly connotes far more than the mere "wagging
the tongue or wielding a pen."' 25 The latter clause protects one from being
"compelled" to incriminate himself without limiting the forms or character of
the "compulsion." Thus, there is no need to consider whether placing a pan of
the victim's bones in a suspect's lap, 126 or directing police officers disguised as
witnesses to identify the suspect in a lineup, 127 or pretending to bring in a
suspect's ailing spouse for questioning,128 or confronting a suspect with his
121. Id.
122. See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974) (intent to convey particularized message in
attaching peace symbol to flag; such conduct protected by first amendment); cf. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S.
566, 574 (1974) (statute that failed to distinguish between criminal, nonceremonial wearing of flag and
noncriminal, ceremonial wearing of flag void for vagueness). See generally Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case
Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482
(1975); Loewy, Punishing Flag Desecrators: The Ultimate in Flag Desecration, 49 N.C. L. REV. 48 (1970);
Nimmer, The Meaning of Symbolic Speech Under the First Amendment, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 29, 46-57
(1973).
123. Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505-06, 509-11 (1969). See generally Denno,
Mary Beth Tinker Takes The Constitution to School, 38 FORDHAM L. REV. 35 (1968); Nahmod, Beyond
Tinker: The High School as an Educational Public Forum, 5 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 278 (1970); 39
BROOKLYN L. REV. 918 (1973).
124. Henkin, On Drawing Lines, 82 HARV. L. REV. 63, 80 (1968). See generally W. LOCKHART, Y.
KAMISAR & J. CHOPER, CONSTrUTIONAL LAW 1149-54 (4th ed. 1975) and authorities discussed and
collected therein.
125. Cf. Henkin, supra note 124, at 79.
126. See Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596, 599, 604 (1944). As late as 1930, forcing a murder suspect to
view the grisly remains of his alleged victim was not an uncommon method of inducing the suspect to talk.
See E. HOPKINS, supra note 103, at 243, 254, 257-58, 260.
127. See Caminito v. Murphy, 222 F.2d 698, 700-01 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 896 (1955). See also
note 102 supra.
128. See text at notes 93-95supra.
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effusive accomplice, 129 or showing him an incriminating ballistics report 30 or
a bank surveillance photograph of himself,131 or "creat[ing] a verbal vacuum,"
in the belief that after such a vacuum has been created "he who speaks first is
the loser,"132 or delivering a "Christian burial speech" constitutes or is
tantamount to "interrogation"-"implicit," "constructive," "symbolic," or
otherwise.
It has been said that "there are a thousand forms of compulsion" and that
"our police show great ingenuity in the variety employed."' 33 But "a
confession obtained by compulsion must be excluded whatever may have been
the character of the compulsion."' 134 If the police conduct is designed and
likely to pressure or persuade, or even "to exert a tug on,"' 135 a suspect to
incriminate himself-the obvious purpose and likely effect of the "Christian
burial speech"-then that conduct is "compulsion" as Miranda defines the
self-incrimination clause. Then it augments or intensifies the tolerable level of
stress, confusion, and anxiety generated by unadulterated arrest and detention
to the impermissible level of "compulsion."'' 3 6 Then any resulting statement is
129. In Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 445 Pa. 292, 285 A.2d 172 (1971), as in the Escobedo case, see text
at notes 90-91, the defendant, confronted in the presence of police by another arrestee who accused him of
being the "triggerman," denied the charge, but in the process admitted involvement in the crime. 445 Pa. at
295, 285 A.2d at 174; see note 116 supra. A Philadelphia police officer disclosed on cross-examination in
this case that "such a technique [police arranging confrontations between suspects for the purpose of
obtaining incriminating statements] has been used in 'hundreds' of other cases." 445 Pa. at 296, 285 A.2d at
174.
130. See Combs v. Wingo, 565 F.2d 96, 97-98 (6th Cir. 1972); note 115supra.
131. See United States v. Davis, 527 F.2d 1110, 1111 (9th Cir. 1975); note 115 supra.
132. See R. ROYAL & S. SCHUTr, THE GENTLE ART OF INTERVIEWING AND INTERROGATION 145-46
(1976). Among the techniques that the authors have found to be successful in eliciting admissions are the
following:
Once the various buy signs appear, how does the investigator capitalize on them? There are
two very popular methods: One is by citing all the facts in summary form and diverting the
subject's attention from a breakthrough admission by seeking motive. For example: "I know
how you did 'X, 'Y,' and 'Z'-perhaps it would be in your best interest to tell me why." The
other method is to create a verbal vacuum: "I know that you did this, and I will not allow you
to put yourself in the awkward position of lying to me;-If you are not willing to be
completely truthful with me, then I advise you to say absolutely nothing." This will be
followed by what may seem to be an eternity of silence. The rule is that after a verbal vacuum
has been created, usually he who speaks first is the loser. Wait your subject out, and he will
probably say: "Okay, what do you want to know?"
Id. (emphasis in original).
The Royal-Schutt "professional manual and guide" amply illustrates why a court that takes what an
interrogator says literally may, no less than the suspect, be led astray. See id. at 147 (telling suspect you
"don't want" him "to be nervous about what I am going to say" "in effect, produces the very nervousness
[you have] denied wanting to produce"); id. at 144-45 (suspect induced to confess by being told initially,
"Just sit there and be quiet; I don't believe that you participated in this highjacking anyhow," and then, at
"appropriate intervals": "You could not have done it," "You are too stupid to have done it," etc.) (actual
"interrogation" conducted by one of authors).
133. E. HOPKINS, supra note 103, at 194.
134. Wan v. United States, 266 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1924) (Brandeis, J.) (sick man's statements made after being
subject to "interrogation" for seven days inadmissible).
135. See note 114 supra and accompanying text.
136. See note 112 supra. Note also the quotation from the O'Hara manual in the last paragraph of note
102 supra.
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not "volunteered" 137 or the product of "the unfettered exercise of [the
suspect's] own will.' ' 138 Then it is the kind of police conduct that ought to be
and was meant to be forbidden in the absence of waiver, and certainly after
assertion, of one's Miranda rights. 139
One may, "by way of convenient shorthand,''4° call such police conduct
"interrogation"-and it is, within the meaning of Miranda-but one need not
do so. One need only call it, and it may be more helpful simply to call it
"compulsion" within the meaning of the privilege.
II. Massiah, Williams, AND VARIATIONS THEREON
Until the "Christian burial speech" case was decided a year ago, lasting
fame had eluded Massiah v. United States.'41 It was apparently lost in the
shuffle of fast-moving events that reshaped constitutional-criminal procedure
in the 1960's.
Massiah "extend[ed] the constitutional role of counsel from the traditional
function of preparing for and participating in a trial or trial type proceeding to
the representation and counseling of persons under police investigation where
they are under indictment .. "142 But that same Term, a scant five weeks
later, Escobedo v. Illinois43 further extended the constitutional role of counsel
to the preindictment stage, that is, "when the process shifts from investigatory
to accusatory-when its focus is on the accused and its purpose is to elicit a
137. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 478. ("Any statement given freely and voluntarily without any
compelling influences [other than those inherent in a normal arrest and detention] is, of course, admissible
in evidence. The fundamental import of the privilege while an individual is in custody is not whether he is
allowed to talk to the police without the benefit of warnings and counsel, but whether he can be
interrogated. . . . Volunteered statements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth Amendment and their
admissibility is not affected by our holding today.").
138. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964).
139. Cf. Graham, supra note 41, at 92-93.
140. Cf. Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207 (1960) ("a complex of values underlies the stricture
against use by the state of confessions which, by way of convenient shorthand, this Court terms
involuntary"). See also Bator & Vorenberg, Arrest, Detention, Interrogation, and the Right to Counsel, 66
COLUM. L. Rav. 62, 73 (1966); Kamisar, What Is an "Involuntary" Confession? 17 RUTGERS L. REV. 728,
745-46 (1963).
141. 337 U.S. 201 (1964). Massiah is discussed at length in text at notes 216-86 infra.
142. Enker & Elsen, Counsel for the Suspect: Massiah v. United States and Escobedo v. Illinois, 49
MINN. L. REv. 47,48 (1964). But dissenting in Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371 (1972), Justice Stewart
maintained:
The "retroactivity" of the Massiah decision is a wholly spurious issue. For Massiah marked
no new departure in the law. It upset no accepted prosecutorial practice. . . .In no case
before Massiah had this Court, at least since Powell v. Alabama, ever countenanced the kind
of post-indictment police interrogation there involved, let alone ever specifically upheld the
constitutionality of any such interrogation. . . . [Tihe rule in [Massiah] has been settled law
ever since Powell v. Alabama.
Id. at 381-82 (1972) (Stewart, J., with Douglas, Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting) (lower federal courts
had declined to apply Massiah retroactively; majority of the Court held that any error in admitting
postindictment confession was harmless and thus did not reach retroactivity issue).
143. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
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confession" 144-- or when the process so shifts and one or more of the limiting
facts in Escobedo are also presentl 45
In constitutional-criminal procedure circles, 1964 was the year of
Escobedo, and Massiah was understandably neglected in the hue and cry
raised over the Illinois case. To the extent that Massiah was remembered at
all, it was not so much for its own sake but as a steppingstone to Escobedot 46
and as a case in which Justice Stewart (author of the Court's opinion in
Massiah, but a dissenter in Escobedo), by drawing the line at "the institution
of formal, meaningful judicial proceedings, by way of indictment, informa-
tion, or arraignment," 147 "had painted himself into a corner. . . from which
144. Id. at 492.
145. The factors present in Escobedo that could place limitations on subsequent applications of that case
include situations in which: (1) the investigation has begun to focus on a particular defendant and is no
longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime; (2) the suspect is in police custody; (3) interrogation by the
police is aimed at eliciting incriminating statements; (4) the suspect has requested and been denied an
opportunity to secure advice from counsel; and (5) the police fail to warn the suspect effectively of his
constitutional rights to remain silent. See id. at 490-91. It was unclear whether all these factors would have
to be present in a later case in which the rule of Escobedo would be applicable and, as a result,
commentators disagreed widely over the probable meaning of the case and what it ought to mean. See W.
SCHAEFER, THE SusPEcr AND SOCIETY 19-23 (1967) (written before Miranda; comparison of Escobedo
and Massiah could lead to conclusion that no one on whom suspicion has focused can be interrogated
without having or intelligently waiving assistance of counsel); Enker & Elsen, supra note 142, at 58-79
(Escobedo transformed investigatory process into adversary one; extension of right to counsel to curb police
abuses not least drastic available means); Friendly, supra note 65, at 950-52 (Escobedo right to counsel may
apply only when suspect's case is "ripe for presentation to a magistrate"); Herman, supra note 86, at 471-
81, 485-500 (Escobedo restricts admissible confessions to those obtained voluntarily and under circum-
stances consistent with waiver of effectively conveyed privilege against self-incrimination); Kamisar, supra
note 86, at 50-95 (right to counsel during interrogation exists regardless of suspect's request; only
individual aware of this right can waive privilege against self-incrimination); Murphy, The Problem of
Compliance by Police Departments, 44 TEXAS L. REV. 939, 950-52 (1966) (federal circuit courts apply
Escobedo differently with respect to when assistance of counsel applies); Robinson, Massiah, Escobedo,
and Rationales for the Exclusion of Confessions, 56 J. CRiM. L.C. & P.S. 412 (1965) (author evaluates
rationales that broaden trend toward exclusion of confessions, including deterrence of undesirable police
practices, and suggests alternative means to this end); Traynor, supra note 65, at 668-80 (to determine
when focus on individual should require application of Escobedo rule, one should balance suspect's
privilege to remain silent against community's right to legitimate police investigation). All this speculation
ended when Miranda and its companion cases were decided. See also note 537 infra.
146. Thus, on the eve of Miranda, Chief Justice Roger Traynor referred to "the recent constellation of
cases that include the limelighted Escobedo case extending the right to counsel to the pretrial stage," and
noted that it was against the "background" of Gideon and Massiah that the Escobedo Court "announced a
right to counsel before indictment, and held inadmissible a suspect's damaging statement elicited by police
interrogation in the absence of counsel." Traynor, supra note 65, at 657-58, 668; see W. SCHAEFER, supra
note 145, at 22 (discussion of possible scope of Escobedo through comparison with Massiah); Breitel,
Criminal Law and Equal Justice, 1966 UTAH L. REV. I (speech concerning problem of confessions when
counsel is absent; not even mentioning Massiah). But see Robinson, supra note 145, at 427 (includes
Massiah in discussion of confession cases).
That Breitel, Schaefer, and Traynor, three of our greatest state judges, would all take to the lecture
podium the same month (April 1966, two months before Miranda) to grapple with the cluster of problems
relating to police interrogation and confessions is striking evidence of the "raging controversial process" of
reevaluating constitutional-criminal procedure, Breitel, supra, at 1, in which we were then engaged.
147. Dissenting in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), Justice Stewart so described the basis for
the decision, and his opinion, in Massiah. Id. at 493. See also Justice Stewart's opinion for the Court in
Williams:
Whatever else it may mean, the right to counsel granted by the Sixth and Fourteenth
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he could extricate himself only by a highly formalistic reading of the sixth
amendment."148
It was the kind of a reading that the Escobedo majority was not about to
give the sixth amendment. The interrogation of Escobedo had taken place
before "judicial" or "adversary" proceedings had commenced against him,149
but, as Justice Stewart characterized the majority's reasoning, "[t]he Court
disregards this basic difference between the present case and Massiah's, with
the bland assertion that 'that fact should make no difference."' 150
Escobedo may have seized the spotlight from Massiah, but Escobedo was
soon shoved offstage by that blockbuster, Miranda v. Arizona.15 1 Although
Miranda did not overrule Escobedo as some had feared and others had hoped,
it did not simply reaffirm it either. Miranda was "not simply a bigger and
better (or worse, depending upon your viewpoint) Escobedo."'152 By shifting
from the "prime suspect"-"focal point"-"accusatory state" test or tests of
Escobedo to a "custodial interrogation" standard 153 or, to characterize it
another way, by moving from a right to counsel base in Escobedo to a self-
incrimination base, "Miranda [did] not [enlarge] Escobedo as much as it...
displaced it.' 154
Assuming that Escobedo had not already done so, did Miranda also
displace Massiah? After Miranda, was the institution of judicial proceedings,
by way of indictment or otherwise, no more constitutionally relevant than
Amendments means at least that a person is entitled to the help of a lawyer at or after the time
that judicial proceedings have been initiated against him-"whether by way of formal charge,
preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment." Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S.
682, 689 (1973) [plurality opinion by Stewart, J.].
430 U.S. at 398.
148. Herman, supra note 86, at 491.
149. Dissenting in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), Justice Stewart observed;
Under our system of criminal justice the institution of formal, meaningful judicial proceed-
ings, by way of indictment, information, or arraignment, marks the point at which a criminal
investigation has ended and adversary proceedings have commenced. It is at this point that
the constitutional guarantees attach which pertain to a criminal trial.
Id. at 493-94.
150. Id. at 493.
151. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
152. Kamisar, Miranda's Impact on Police Practices (Panel Evaluation), in A NEw LOOK AT
CONEESSIONs: Escobedo--THE SECOND ROUND 92 (B.J. George ed. 1967).
153. The custodial interrogation standard attached primary significance to the conditions surrounding
or inherent in the interrogation, not to the evidence of guilt available to the police at the time of
questioning.
154. Kamisar, supra note 152, at 93. See Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 344-48 (1976)
(Miranda implicitly redefined "focus" test as individual taken into custody or deprived of liberty in
significant way). Although Beckwith is sometimes criticized as one of the Burger Court decisions
undermining Miranda, "the Warren Court might well have accepted [it]." Israel, Criminal Procedure, the
Burger Court, and the Legacy of the Warren Court, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1320, 1375 n.246 (1977). Indeed, in
holding that Miranda abandoned the "focus" test (as it had generally been understood at the time of
Escobedo) and that its use of "custodial interrogation" marked a fresh start in describing the point at which
a suspect's constitutional protections begin, the Beckwith Court adopted the view of no less staunch a
Miranda supporter than Chief Judge Bazelon, who authored the lower court opinion in Beckwith. See 425
U.S. at 348.
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whether the investigation had "begun to focus on a particular suspect"? After
Miranda, did formal indictment or other adversary litigative proceedings no
longer "absolutize constitutional rights or inexorably rigidify adversary
postures"? 55 Or, regardless of the circumstances surrounding the interroga-
tion-indeed, regardless of whether police efforts to elicit incriminating
statements constituted "interrogation" at all-did indictment, or the initia-
tion of other judicial proceedings, remain an "absolute point at which the
right to counsel attaches"? 156
If one searches the Miranda opinion for answers to these questions, he
discovers that Massiah is never mentioned-not once in Chief Justice
Warren's sixty-page opinion for the Court, nor in any of the three dissenting
opinions, which total another forty-six pages. 57 Yet, very little else even
remotely bearing on the general subject is left out. There are quotations from
or references to scores of confession cases, including such oldtimers as Wan v.
United States,158 Bram v. United States,159 and Hopt v. Utah.160 There are, to
give but a few other examples, discussions of law pertaining to police
155. See United States v. Crisp, 435 F.2d 354, 358-59 (7th Cir. 1971) (failure of agents to notify
defendant's counsel before interviewing defendant does not require reversal when defendant fully warned
of rights). In Crisp the court commented:
Massiah... must be read in light of.. .[Miranda], which expressly recognized the validity
of a knowing and voluntary waiver of rights during the "critical stage" of custodial
interrogation . . . .As Miranda and Escobedo clearly indicate, formal indictment is no
longer the determinative event upon which constitutional safeguards hinge. By the same
token, formal indictment does not absolutize constitutional rights or inexorably rigidify
adversary postures.
Id. at 358.
156. The amicus curiae brief of the ACLU in Miranda and its companion cases (written by Professors
Anthony Amsterdam and Paul Mishkin and, in my judgment, indispensable reading for a full understand-
ing of Miranda), pointed out that a "straight right to counsel approach," one "directed to an inquiry as to
when such right attaches," may "go both too far and not far enough." Brief for Amicus Curiae ACLU at 8
n.2, 10-11. It "may require the provision of counsel under circumstances where counsel is not necessary to
the effectuation of a person's right not to be compelled to incriminate himself' and, on the other hand,
"may result in not providing adequate protection when it is found that the point in time at which the right
to counsel attaches has not yet been reached, although the danger of compelled self-incrimination looms
large." Id. at 10-1I. Thus, the ACLU advocated an approach that would make the providing of counsel
"dependent upon the circumstances of interrogation" and would frame the issue not in right to counsel
terms but in terms of "the effectuation, during the interrogation, of the Fifth Amendment right." Id. at II.
The ACLU brief noted, however, that "[Massiah] apparently holds that indictment is an absolute point
at which the right to counsel attaches" and that such a view is "supportable on the basis of the theory of an
indictment: that the government has prior to that time completed its investigation and made its basic case.
Moreover, the accused's need for trial preparation-and the assistance of counsel therein-has then
become established." Id at n.4.
157. Justice Harlan, joined by Justices Stewart and White, filed a long dissenting opinion in Miranda.
384 U.S. at 504. Justice White, joined by Justices Harlan and Stewart, wrote a separate long dissent. Id. at
526. Justice Clark wrote a third dissenting opinion, although he concurred in the result in one companion
case to Miranda. Id. at 499.
158. 266 U.S. 1, 14 (1924) (that confession not induced by promise or threat does not by itself make it
voluntary in law; it must be voluntary in fact, given under no compulsion, to be admissible), quoted in 384
U.S. at 462.
159.-168 U.S. 532 (1897) (discussed in text at notes 86-89 supra), quoted in 384 U.S. at 461-62.
160. 110 U.S. 574 (1894) (confession must be viewed in context made to see if voluntary), cited in 384
U.S. at 490.
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interrogation and confessions in England, Scotland, India, and Ceylon; 161
quotations from the seventeenth century trial of John Lilburn; 162 and
references to Maimonides and other thirteenth century commentators who
"found an analogue" to the privilege against self-incrimination "grounded in
the Bible." 163 But there is not a single reference to the then two-year-old
Massiah case.
Similarly, there is no mention of Massiah in the lengthy opinion of the Iowa
Supreme Court upholding the admissibility of Williams' post-"initiation of
judicial adversary proceedings" and "Christian burial speech"-prompted
statements.164 Nor, and this seems still more startling, is there any mention of
Massiah in Justice Stuart's "soul searching" dissent.165 It is only in the federal
district court, on habeas corpus, that Massiah is first remembered and held to
be an alternative and independent ground for granting Williams a new trial. 166
WHY DID THE WILLIAMS COURT CHOOSE THE MASSIAH ROUTE OVER A
MIRANDA ONE?
A majority of the Supreme Court in Williams saw "no need" to consider
the applicability of Miranda 67 and affirmed solely on the basis of Massiah.168
Evidently Massiah offered a clearer path to affirmance than Miranda. But
why?
If the "Christian burial speech" delivered to Williams during the drive
back to Des Moines amounted to "custodial interrogation," then the Miranda
route to affirmance would seem no less inviting than the one Massiah
provided. Under the circumstances of the case-Williams asserted both his
right to remain silent and his right to counsel many times earlier that day and
the "Christian burial speech" was not concerned with another crime nor
made by a different officer nor preceded by a new set of warnings-"the
speech," if it can be considered "interrogation," seems to have been delivered
in clear violation of Miranda as clarified, or qualified, by Michigan v.
Mosley. 169
Yet, was "the speech" a "form of interrogation" or tantamount to
"interrogation"? A major attraction of the Massiah route, as I shall dwell
upon below, seems to be that it provided a means of bypassing the
"interrogation" issue completely. Another advantage offered by the Massiah
approach was the application of a higher standard of waiver: the Williams
Court might have held, as had some lower courts, that a "Massiah right to
counsel" could notbe waived in the absence of counsel or without the consent
161. See 384 U.S. at 478 n.46, 486-90 &n.64.
162. See id. at 459 (Lilburn asserted right to remain silent about self in criminal matters before 1637
inquisitorial court, the Star Chamber).
163. See id. at 458 n.27.
164. State v. Williams, 182 N.W.2d 396 (Iowa 1971) (5-4decision).
165. Id. at 406 (Stuart, J., with Mason & Becker, JJ., dissenting).
166. See note 25 supra. It was at this stage of the proceedings that Professor Robert D. Bartels of the
University of Iowa College of Law, Williams' court-appointed counsel, entered the picture.
167. See note 25 supra.
168. Id.
169. 423 U.S. 96 (1975) (discussed at notes 409-61 infra and accompanying text). See also discussion at
note 115 supra.
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of counsel-whether it could was still a debatable question' 70-- or, alterna-
tively, it might have been held that a waiver of Massiah rights "require[d] the
clearest and most explicit explanation and understanding of what is being
given up."' 17 1 Yet it appears that the Williams Court chose the Massiah route
without capitalizing on either of the advantages offered by this approach.
Justice Powell, concurring in Williams, maintained that "the opinion of the
Court is explicitly clear that the [Massiah] right to assistance of counsel may
be waived, after it had attached, without notice to or consultation with
counsel."' 72 In fact, however, the opinion of the Court was not quite so clear.
It may be interpreted as holding only that Williams did not waive his
"Massiah right to counsel" even assuming that one in his situation could do so
without notice to or consultation with counsel. 173 In any event, for the State to
establish a waiver of the "Massiah right to counsel"' 174 "it [is] incumbent upon
[it, according to Johnson v. Zerbst 175] to prove 'an intentional relinquishment
or abandonment of a known right or privilege. ,' "176 and "judged by [this
standard] the record in this case falls far short of sustaining [the State's]
burden. ' 177 But Williams had asserted his "Miranda right to counsel"
numerous times. Was not an alleged waiver of this right to be judged by the
same standard?
According to Miranda, a waiver cannot be presumed because a suspect
fails to request a lawyer, and an effective waiver of the right to counsel during
interrogation can only be recognized after the warnings are given. 178 Even
when the suspect does not assert his right to counsel, Miranda tells us that "a
heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant
170. Lopez v. Zelker, 344 F. Supp. 1050, 1054 & n.3 (S.D.N.Y.) (Frankel, I.) (collecting cases), affd
without opinion, 465 F.2d 1405 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1049 (1972).
171. Id. at 1054; see United States v. Satterfield, 417 F. Supp. 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (Knapp, J.), affd,
558 F.2d 655 (2d Cir. 1977). In Satterfield Judge Knapp stated: "Under our interpretation of Massiah, after
indictment the advice of counsel can be waived only after such warnings and explanations as would justify
a court in permitting a defendant to proceed pro se at trial." Id. at 296. See also United States v. Miller, 432
F. Supp. 382, 387-88 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (adopting strict Satterfield waiver standard when suspect has
retained counsel and indicated that he wished to consult with him prior to answering questions).
Dissenting from the 10-4 decision in United States v. Brown, 569 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1978) (en bane),
Judge Simpson maintained that the language in Brewer v. Williams that the strict standard of waiver
.'applies equally to an alleged waiver of the right to counsel whether at trial or at a critical stage of pretrial
proceedings' [430 U.S. at 404]. . . assumes telling significance in light of the stringent requirements for an
effective waiver of the right to counsel at trial." 569 F.2d at 242 (Simpson, J., with Goldberg, Godbold &
Morgan, JJ., dissenting) (emphasis added by Judge Simpson). "Because a defendant's need for the
assistance of counsel at critical stages prior to trial is in many ways as great as his need at trial, it makes
sense to require a comparable waiver in both situations." Id. at 244.
172. 430 U.S. at 413 (Powell, J., concurring).
173. See id. at 405-06. "The Court of Appeals did not hold, nor do we, that under the circumstances of
this case Williams could not, without notice to counsel, have waived his rights under the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments. It only held, as do we, that he did not." Id. (emphasis in original).
174. This ismy phrase, not the Court's. The Williams Court announced in its opinion that it was putting
the Miranda doctrine aside and affirming "the judgment before us" on Massiah grounds. Id. at 397-98. In
light of this statement, its discussion of waiver seems on its face to be a discussion of waiver of Massiah
rights. But see text at notes 186-210 infra.
175. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
176. 430 U.S. at 404 (quoting from Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).
177. Id.
178. 384 U.S. at 470.
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knowingly and intelligently waived. . . his right to retained or appointed
counsel. . . .This Court has always set high standards of proof for the
waiver of constitutional rights, .. .and we re-assert these standards as
applied to in-custody interrogation."'179 Once a suspect has asserted his right
to counsel, as Williams did, the strict Johnson v. Zerbst standard of waiver
would seem to apply a fortiori; indeed, the Miranda opinion notes that once
"the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease
until an attorney is present."' 180
It may be that the Williams Court did operate on the premise that a heavier
burden rests on the Government to establish a waiver of a "Massiah right to
counsel" than a waiver of Miranda rights,i8l but it never said so. Dissenting
Justice White invited it to do so by maintaining that "[tihe issue in this case is
whether [Williams]-who was entitled not to make any statements to the
police without consultation with and/or presence of counsel-validly waived
[his] rights" 8 2 and by adding in a footnote that "[i]t does not matter whether
the right not to make statements in the absence of counsel stems from
[Massiah] or [Miranda]. In either case the question is one of waiver."183
If it did matter whether the right at stake was based on Massiah or
Miranda, one would think that the Williams majority would have so
indicated. But the majority met Justice White's contention only with silence.
The jettisoning of Miranda by the Williams majority and its reliance on
Massiah becomes even more puzzling when one examines the portion of the
Court's opinion that addresses the issue whether Williams waived his right to
counsel in the course of the drive back to Des Moines. 184 In light of the earlier
discussion by the Williams Court,185 this section of the opinion seems to say
the following: (1) The Iowa courts erred when, relying largely on Williams'
failure to express any desire for the aid of counsel immediately before or at the
time of his disclosures, they held that he had waived his "Massiah right to
counsel"; 186 (2) the federal district court rightly pointed out "that it is the
government which bears a heavy burden [on the waiver issue]. . . .but that
is the burden'which explicitly was placed on [Williams] by the state
courts"; 187 (3) both the district court and the court of appeals were correct in
their understanding of the proper standard to be applied (the Johnson v.
Zerbst standard);188 and (4) judged by this standard the Government did not
meet its burden of showing waiver because it failed to establish "not merely
comprehension but relinquishment" of the right to counsel. 189 When one
studies the language of the Iowa courts and the lower federal courts quoted by
179. Id. at 475.
180. Id. at 474; see notes 430-61 infra and accompanying text.
181. See Israel, supra note 154, at 1385-86 & n.281 (discussion of waiver aspect of Miranda and how
much lighter burden could be placed on Government without overturning Miranda).
182. 430 U.S. at 430 (White, J., with Blackmun & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting).
183. Id. at 430 n.1.
184. See 430 U.S. at 401-06.
185. See text at notes 167-68, 174supra.
186. See 430 U.S. at 401-02.
187. I. at 402 (quoting from Williams v. Brewer, 375 F. Supp. 170, 182 (S.D. Iowa 1974)) (emphasis
added by district court).
188. 430 U.S. at 404; see text at note 176 supra.
189. Id. (referring to Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).
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the Williams majority in its original context, however, one discovers that all of
it was addressed to the issue whether Williams had waived his Miranda
rights, not his "Massiah right to counsel."
The Iowa Supreme Court saw itself as performing its "duty. . . to see that
. . . none of the strict rules of proof set out in Miranda were violated by the
trial court in passing on. . . the issue as to whether the accused waived his
right to remain silent and to have the present assistance of counsel." 90
Because it agreed with the trial court that Williams had voluntarily
"change[d] his mind about talking to the officers" on the return trip,191 it
concluded that, in finding a valid waiver, the trial court had "followed the
approved test for determining compliance with the Miranda mandates." 192
Justice Stuart, who wrote the principal dissent from the Iowa Supreme
Court's decision, "personally believe[d] there is nothing morally or legally
wrong in permitting police officers"' 93 to do what Captain Learning had done
in the instant case, but reluctantly concluded that Miranda had held
otherwise 94 and that "the spirit, if not the letter of Miranda and subsequent
decisions has been violated here."' 95 As noted earlier, 96 neither the Iowa
Supreme Court opinion nor the dissenting opinions ever referred to Massiah;
nor had the Iowa trial court.
Thus, when the federal district court ruled that the Iowa courts had
"applied the wrong constitutional standards" in finding a waiver, 197 it must
have meant, and it is plain that it did mean, that the Iowa courts misunder-
stood and misapplied Miranda. Moreover, unlike the Eighth Circuit and the
United States Supreme Court,198 the district court adhered to the view that
"given the factual context of this case,. . . [Williams] could not effectively
waive his right to counsel for purposes of interrogation in the absence of
counsel (or at least notice to his counsetof the interrogation)."' 199 The portion
of the district couit opinion devoted to waiver,200 the same portion from
which the Williams majority quoted at length with approval,201 therefore
deals only with the waiver of Miranda rights. The "heavy burden rest[ing] on
the government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intel-
ligently waived" his rights,202 which the Iowa courts overlooked and the State
failed to satisfy, is plainly the "heavy burden" imposed by Miranda.
Similarly, the section of the Eighth Circuit's opinion in Williams entitled
"Waiver of Constitutional Rights, ' 203 which the Supreme Court also referred
190. State v. Williams, 182 N.W.2d 396, 401 (Iowa 1971).
191. Id. at 402.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 406 (Stuart, J., with Mason & Becker, JJ., dissentihg).
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. See text at notes 164-65 supra.
197. Williams v. Brewer, 375 F. Supp. 170, 182 (S.D. Iowa 1974), quoted with approval in 430 U.S. at
402.
198. 430 U.S. at 413; see note 173 supra and accompanying text.
199. 375 F. Supp. at 178; see id. at 181.
200. Id. at 181-83 (partV).
201. See 430 U.S. at 402-03.
202. 375 F. Supp. at 182 (quoting from Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 475).
203. Williams v. Brewer, 509 F.2d 227, 231-34 (8th Cir. 1974).
1978]
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to and quoted with approval, 204 deals almost entirely with Miranda rights. 205
Sharing the district court's view that the record "discloses no facts to support
the conclusion of the state court that [Williams] had waived his constitutional
rights other than that [he] had made incriminating statements," 206 the court
of appeals noted, referring to Miranda, that "waiver of one's rights may not
be presumed from a silent record. ' '207 A moment later, after recalling that
Williams had repeatedly asserted his rights, the court of appeals emphasized
the following sentence from Miranda: "If the individual indicates in any
manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain
silent, the interrogation must cease."208
Why the Williams opinion, to borrow a phrase from its author, performed
such "a remarkable job of plastic surgery" 209 on the language of the lower
federal courts it quoted with approval-omitting all their references to
Miranda and to the self-incrimination clause210-is unclear. The courts below
proceeded on the basis that the "Christian burial speech" constituted
"interrogation" within the meaning of Miranda. Thus, the transformation of
204. See 430 U.S. at 403.
205. The Eighth Circuit seemed to concede that an individual "can voluntarily, knowingly, and
intelligently waive his right to have counsel present [even] after counsel has been appointed," but quickly
added that it agreed with the district court that the state had failed to show such a waiver. 509 F.2d at 233.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. (quoting from Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 473) (emphasis added by court of appeals).
209. Cf. Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 153 (1969) (Justice Stewart characterizing
performance of lower court).
210. Thus, in Williams the Supreme Court noted with approval that "[t]he [district] court held 'that it is
the government which bears a heavy burden [on the waiver issue] .... ' "430 U.S. at 402 (emphasis in
original). But the Court omitted the first part of the district court's sentence, which stated that: "Miranda
makes it clear that it is the government which bears a heavy burden ... " 375 F. Supp. at 182. Similarly,
the Court in Williams noted with approval that "the District Court concluded [that] '[T]here is no
affirmative indication. . . that [Williams] did waive his rights. . .' "430 U.S. at 402. But once again the
Supreme Court omitted a key phrase from the district court's opinion, which read: "As noted in the
preceding paragraph, there is no affirmative indication. . . that [Williams] did waive his rights." 375 F.
Supp. at 182. The "preceding paragraph," indeed the two preceding paragraphs, both quote the same
language from Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475: "a valid waiver will not be presumed simply from the silence of
the accused after warnings are given." In the "preceding paragraph" the district court pointed out that the
state trial court's "heavy emphasis. . . on the 'absence. . .of any assertion of [Williams'] right to desire
not to give information absent the presence of his attorney' conflicts directly" with the aforementioned
Miranda language. 375 F. Supp. at 182. The Williams opinion also quoted with approval the district court's
conclusion that "it cannot be said that the State has met its 'heavy burden' of showing a knowing and
intelligent waiver of. . .Sixth Amendment rights." 430 U.S. at 403. But the district court's comment in
full read: "[I]t cannot be said that the State has met its 'heavy burden' of showing a knowing and intelligent
waiver of Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights." 375 F. Supp. at 183. Moreover, although the district court
had earlier quoted the "heavy burden" language from Miranda, indeed put it in italics, id. at 182, the
Williams opinion does not indicate that the source of the "heavy burden" language is Miranda.
The Williams opinion also quoted with approval from the court of appeals decision: "A review of the
record here. . . discloses no facts to support the conclusion of the state court that [Williams] had waived
his constitutional rights other than that [he] had made incriminating statements. . . ... 430 U.S. at 403
(quoting from 509 F.2d at 233). The Williams Court then skipped two sentences from the court of appeals
opinion and resumed: "The District Court here properly concluded that an incorrect constitutional
standard had been applied by the state court in determining the issue of waiver. . . ." Id. The two
sentences omitted by the Supreme Court are: "Although oral or written expression of waiver is not
required, waiver of one's rights may not be presumed from a silent record. Miranda v. Arizona..., 384
U.S. at 475; Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516 (1962)." 509 F.2d at 233.
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Williams from a Miranda case to a Massiah one would have been a good deal
more understandable if the Williams Court found not only "no need to
review" the Miranda doctrine21 ' but no need to consider whether "the
speech" constituted "interrogation" either. Yet the Court chose the Massiah
route and apparently still proceeded to decide (or at least left little doubt that
it was ready and willing to decide) that "the speech" did constitute, or was
tantamount to, "interrogation. ' 212
"[T]he clear rule of Massiah," announced Justice Stewart for the Williams
majority, "is that once adversary proceedings have commenced against an
individual, he has a right to legal representation when the government
interrogates him. '213 This is the clear rule of Miranda when, as was Williams,
the individual being interrogated is in "custody"-regardless of whether
adversary proceedings have commenced-and especially when, as did Wil-
liams, the individual asserts his right to counsel. The clear rule of Massiah, as
I shall discuss below, is that once adversary proceedings have commenced
against an individual, he has a right to legal representation whether or not the
government "interrogates" him. Dissenting Chief Justice Burger com-
pounded the confusion, I venture to say, by contending that "this is a far cry
from Massiah' 214 and that "[h]ere there was no interrogation of Williams in
the sense that term was used in Massiah, Escobedo or Miranda."215 But it is
plain that there was no interrogation of Massiah in the sense that term was
used in Escobedo or Miranda. Indeed, Massiah involved no police "interroga-
tion" at all (as that term is normally used)-certainly none of its "compelling
influences," inherent, informal, atmospheric, or otherwise.
A CLOSE LOOK AT MASSIAH
The various opinions in Williams cannot be intelligently appraised, nor can
the implication of the case be fully explored, without a firm grasp of the
underlying circumstances of, and the Court's reasoning in, Massiah. After he
had been indicted for federal narcotics violations, Massiah retained a lawyer,
pleaded not guilty, and was released on bail.216 A codefendant, Colson, invited
him to discuss the pending case in Colson's car, parked on a city street.217
Unknown to Massiah, the indictment against Colson, "as is not infrequently
the case," "induced" him to cooperate with government agents in their
contiruing investigation of the case.218 A radio transmitter was installed
under the front seat of Colson's car to enable a nearby agent, equipped with a
receiving device, to overhear the Massiah-Colson conversation. 219 As ex-
pected, Massiah made several damaging admissions. 220
211. See text at note 167 supra.
212. See text at note 27 supra.
213. 430 U.S. at 401 (emphasis added).
214. Id. at 426 n.8.
215. Id.
216. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 201 (1964).
217. Id. at 203.
218. Enker & Elsen, supra note 142, at 53. The authors, former assistant United States attorneys,
represented the Government when the Massiah case was before the Second Circuit.
219. 377 U.S. at 202-03.
220. Id. at 203.
1978]
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At the district court level, the judge and lawyers alike thought they were
dealing with a not-too-unusual fourth amendment-"electronic eavesdrop-
ping" case,221 but it turned out to be an oddball sixth amendment-"confes-
sion" case. Too odd to suit a 2-1 majority of the Second Circuit, which could
not bring itself to exclude statements obtained from someone who, at the time,
was "speaking freely and without restraint of any kind. ' 222 Aberrant though
the Massiah facts may have been for a "confession" case, the Court's
holding-that defendant was denied the right to assistance of counsel when
his own incriminating statements, "which federal agents had deliberately
elicited from him after he had been indicted and in the absence of his
counsel," were used against him223-was not. Indeed, it had been anticipated
for some time.
Five years earlier, the Court seemed on the verge of handing down what, by
way of convenient shorthand, may be called the "indictment rule." In two
concurring opinions by Justices Douglas and Stewart in Spano v. New York,224
four members of the Court advanced the view that once a person is formally
charged or adversary proceedings have otherwise been initiated against him,
his right to the assistance of counsel has "begun" or "attached," that is, unless
the person voluntarily and knowingly waives that right, the absence of
counsel under such circumstances is alone sufficient to exclude any resulting
incriminating statements.225 This view was promptly adopted by the New
York courts, 226 and there was reason to think it would soon command-in-
deed, already commanded-a majority of the Supreme Court. Although a
majority of the Spano Court did not reach this question, preferring to exclude
the confession on straight "coerced confession" grounds, 227 Chief Justice
Warren, who wrote the majority opinion, had previously expressed the view
that the right to counsel should begin at an even earlier point.228 It was almost
221. Enker & Elsen, supra note 142, at 56-57 n.32. The authors point out that Massiah's right to counsel
contentions were not even raised at the trial. Id. Judge (now Chief Judge) J. Skelly Wright once
spontaneously confessed at a conference on confessions: "I happened to be the trial judge in Masslah and
the [electronic eavesdropping] was objected to on On Lee grounds. I admitted this tape because under On
Lee it was admissible. Then, when Massiah went to the Court of Appeals, other objections were made with
reference to counsel, which were not even in the record." A NEW LOOK AT CONFEsSIONS: Escobedo-THE
SECOND ROUND 239 (BJ. George ed. 1967). See also On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952)
(testimony of police eavesdropping on conversations of defendant and acquaintance wired for sound that
took place in public part of defendant's business held admissible).
222. United States v. Massiah, 307 F.2d 62, 66 (2d Cir. 1962) (Lumbard, C.J.).
223. 377 U.S. at 206.
224. 366 U.S. 315 (1959).
225. Id. at 324 (Douglas, J., with Black & Brennan, JJ., concurring); id. at 326 (Stewart, J., with
Douglas & Brennan, JJ., concurring).
226. See People v. Meyer, 11 N.Y.2d 162, 182 N.E.2d 103, 227 N.Y.S.2d 427 (1962) (holding that
postarraignment statement should be treated no differently than postindictment statement); People v.
Waterman, 9 N.Y.2d 561, 175 N.E.2d 445, 216 N.Y.S.2d 70 (1961) (holding statement obtained during
postindictment questioning in absence of counsel inadmissible); People v. Di Biasi, 7 N.Y.2d 544, 166
N.E.2d 825, 200 N.Y.S.2d 21 (1960) (same).
227. Spano v. New York, 366 U.S. 315, 323 (1959). Chief Justice Warren, writing for the majority, did
not confine the opinion to these grounds. He also noted that petitioner was already indicted on a charge of
first-degree murder and thus the police were not "merely trying to solve a crime, or even absolve a
suspect." Id.
228. Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 441, 448 (1958) (Douglas, J., with Warren, C.J., Black &
Brennan, JJ., dissenting).
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inconceivable that, when the- occasion arose, Chief Justice Warren would
disagree with Justice Stewart and others that what is true of the trial itself for
an accused's right to a lawyer's help is true of the postindictment proceedings
as well. For but a year earlier the Chief Justice had joined in Justice Douglas'
view that:
[W]hat is true of the trial [for an accused's right to a lawyer's help]
is true of the preparation for trial and of the period commencing
with the arrest of the accused...
The demands of our civilization expressed in the Due Process
Clause require that the accused who wants a counsel should have
one at any time after the moment of arrest.229
A 6-3 majority, consisting of the four concurring Justices in Spano, Chief
Justice Warren, and newly appointed Justice Goldberg, chose Massiah as the
appropriate occasion to announce the new rule. It is hardly surprising,
however, that the dissenters deemed the Massiah facts a "peculiarly inap-
propriate" setting for a major breakthrough on the "police interrogation"-
"confession" front.230
The view advanced by the concurring Justices in Spano and adopted by the
Court in Massiah grew out of the needs to restrain "the coercive power of the
police, ' 231 to minimize both the "temptation" and the "opportunity" to
obtain confessions by coercive means, 232 and to bypass the "seldom helpful"
(at least from the defendant's viewpoint) "trial of the issue of coercion. '233
Yet, the government elicited incriminating statements from Massiah without
resorting to coercive measures. 234 Massiah had no idea that he was being
"interrogated" by the police; he assumed that he was simply talking to a
friend, his partner in crime, who had also been indicted. Nor was there any
dispute as to what was said and done at the Massiah-Colson meeting;235 only
229. I& at 446, 448 (emphasis added).
230. 377 U.S. at 211 (White, J., with Clark & Harlan, JJ., dissenting).
231. Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 443 (1958) (Douglas, J., with Warren, C.J., Black & Brennan,
JJ., dissenting).
232. This was also the main thrust of earlier attempts to grapple with the confession problem-the
McNabb-Mallory rule and the "inherently coercive" approach to protracted questioning adopted in
Ashcraft. In federal courts the McNabb-Mallory rule excluded confessions obtained during a period of
unnecessary delay in bringing a defendant before a judicial officer. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449
(1957); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943). The Ashcraft rule was promulgated to deal with
those situations under which confessions are obtained that are "inherently coercive" because of such
factors as length or type of questioning. Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944). See generally Allen,
The Wolf Case: Search and Seizure, Federalism, and the Civil Liberties, 45 ILL. L. Rav. 1, 28-29 & n.86
(1950); Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the Rights of Suspects in Criminal Cases, 45 N.Y.U. L. Rav.
785, 806-08 (1970); Douglas, The Means and the End, 1959 WASH. U.L.Q. 103, 107, 113-14, 120; Kamisar,
supra note 140, at 739-40; Comment, Prearraignment Interrogation and the McNabb-Mallory Miasma: A
Proposed Amendment to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 68 YALE L.J. 1003, 1006, 1037 (1959).
233. Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 443-44 (1958) (Douglas, J., with Warren, C.J., Black &
Brennan, JJ., dissenting).
234. 377 U.S. at 211 (White, I., with Clark & Harlan, JJ., dissenting).
235. Cf. In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 340 (1957) (Black, J., with Warren, C.J., Douglas & Brennan, JJ.,
dissenting) ("The witness has no effective way to challenge his interrogator's testimony as to what was said
and done at the secret inquisition.").
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as to whether it was permissible for a government agent to do and say what
Colson had under the circumstances.
Why the Supreme Court did not wait for a more normal "police interroga-
tion" case than Massiah to promulgate the "indictment rule" is unclear.
Perhaps it was stung by the Second Circuit opinion, which brushed off Spano
as just another "coerced confession" case and did not even mention the Spano
concurring opinions.236 Perhaps it was impressed by, and moved to vindicate,
Judge Hays' dissent, which gave considerable weight to the Spano concurring
opinions237 and quoted at length from a New York Court of Appeals case that
had adopted the "indictment rule. ' 238 Perhaps the Court was moved to act by
the sharp disagreement that had already broken out among the federal courts
as to the significance of the Spano concurring opinions.239
Whatever the reason or reasons, the Court was determined to wait no
longer to promulgate the "indictment rule," the peculiar facts of Massiah
notwithstanding. That the case did not involve typical police interrogation, as
did Spano and all the post-Spano New York Court of Appeals cases,240 that
Massiah had not even been aware that he was being "interrogated," was of no
great moment to the Massiah Court. The decisive factor was that the
government had been bent on, and had succeeded in, getting incriminating
statements from a person after he was indicted and in the absence of counsel.
It did not matter that in Spano
the defendant was interrogated in a police station, while [in
Massiah] the damaging testimony was elicited from the defendant
Massiah did not testify or produce witnesses to contradict the officer's testimony about the meeting.
United States v. Massiah, 307 F.2d at 65. The Massiah-Colson conversation was not only broadcasted to a
nearby federal agent, but secretly tape-recorded by Colson. Massiah successfully objected to the admission
of these tapes on the grounds that they implicated other defendants and contained privileged matters. See
Brief for United States at 21, Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964). The Government maintained
that the recording would demonstrate that the agent's testimony was reliable and filed it with the Clerk of
the Court. Id. at 21, 23-24.
236. 307 F.2d at 66.
237. Id. at 72.
238. Id. (quoting from People v. Waterman, 9 N.Y.2d 561, 566, 175 N.E.2d 445, 448, 216 N.Y.S.2d 70,
75 (1961) (rule excluding statements obtained from indicted defendant when not made in presence of
counsel)).
239. In Lee v. United States, 322 F.2d 770 (5th Cir. 1963), Judge Wisdom, writing for the majority,
"read Spano as the New York Court of Appeals [read] Spano: the Constitution gives a defendant the
absolute right to counsel, starting no later than after indictment." Id. at 778. He was referring to the line of
cases adopting the indictment rule for the New York courts. See People v. Meyer, 11 N.Y.2d. 162, 164-65,
182 N.E.2d 103, 104, 227 N.Y.S.2d 427, 428 (1962) (holding inadmissible any statement made after
arraignment in absence of counsel); People v. Waterman, 9 N.Y.2d 561, 565-66, 175 N.E.2d 445, 447-48,
216 N.Y.S.2d 70, 74-75 (1961) (accused has absolute right to counsel after indictment). The Wisdom
opinion in Lee evoked a bitter dissent from Judge Hutcheson who characterized the Spano concurring
opinions as "separate opinions presenting differing personal views of individual judges," and felt compelled
to "emphatically condemn and reject the majority's view." See 322 F.2d at 780.
240. One lower court New York case did involve a "jail cell plant" who elicited incriminating
statements from defendant after the initiation of judicial proceedings and at a time when he was
represented by counsel. See People v. Robinson, 16 A. D.2d 184, 224 N.Y.2d 705 (1962). In his Massiah
oral argument, Solicitor General Cox argued that Robinson "was not in keeping with anything the New
York Court of Appeals has held" and that the "philosophy" of that court "does not go beyond formal
interrogation." Transcript of Oral Argument for United States at 28-29 (copy on file at the Georgetown
Law Journal) [hereinafter cited as Massiah Oral Argument].
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without his knowledge while he was free on bail. ... [A]s Judge
Hays pointed out in his dissent in the Court of Appeals, "if [the
rule advocated by the concurring Justices in Spano and adopted by
the New York courts] is to have any efficacy it must apply to
indirect and surreptitious interrogations as well as those conducted
in the jailhouse. In this case, Massiah was more seriously imposed
upon ...because he did not even know that he was under
interrogation by a government agent." 241
Massiah's statements were held to be inadmissible, not because, as the
dissenters in Brewer v. Williams were to suggest,242 he was unaware that a
government agent was talking to him, but despite that fact. The Court had to
overcome Solicitor General Archibald Cox's persuasive argument for the
Government that even if the Spano concurring opinions represented the
prevailing view, Massiah's incriminating statements should still be admissible
because at the time he made them he was neither in "custody," not even in the
loosest sense, nor undergoing "police interrogation." Massiah was under no
"official pressure" 243 to answer questions or even to engage in conversation;
indeed, his conversation with Colson "was not affected by even that degree of
constraint which may result from a suspect's knowledge that he is talking to a
law enforcement officer." 244 Furthermore, Colson, a layman unskilled in the
art of interrogation, did not and probably could not utilize any of the standard
techniques to persuade or otherwise induce Massiah to incriminate himself.
As the Government stressed in its brief:
[T]he Justices who would have gone beyond the majority [in Spano
and Crooker245] reasoned that a confession obtained in the absence
of counsel was inadmissible without a showing of actual coercion
because [such] interrogation so frequently involves
coercion .... 246
. ..Whatever 'the problems incident to interrogation by the
police, that kind of interrogation is not involved here. This case
does not involve either coercion or the potentiality of coercion...
[Massiah] was not questioned by anyone who even appeared to be a
government agent; rather, his "interrogator" was his own partner
in crime, to whom he talked freely. [Massiah] was, of course, under
no police control or restraint at the time and was free to come and
go as he pleased.247
241. 377 U.S. at 206.
242. See 430 U.S. at 440 n.3 (Blackmun, J., with white & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting) (disagreeing with
majority's view that Massiah regards it as constitutionally irrelevant that statements in that case were
surreptitiously obtained and regarding Massiah as case in which defendant was worse off than typical
confession defendant because he was not even aware that he was under police interrogation); id. at 426 n.8
(Burger, C.J., dissenting) (instant case "far cry from Massiah," in part because "Massiah was unaware that
he was being interrogated by ruse").
243. Massiah Oral Argument, supra note 240, at 30; see text at notes 247, 250 infra.
244. Brief for United States at 34.
245. See notes 225, 228 supra.
246. Brief for United States at 29.
247. Id. at 30.
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And in oral argument Cox emphasized:
[T]his is clearly not a problem of police interrogation in the usual
sense. . .. This plainly isn't Spano. . . .[T]here is [no] problem
of physical or psychological compulsion or the threat of coercion;
• ..indeed, and perhaps most important of all, the defendant was
not in custody,. . . not. . . even in the loose and inaccurate sense
in which one may be in custody when he's in the district attorney's
office being questioned even though he's not under arrest.248 He
was free to come and go as he chose .... 249
. ['..T]here was no official questioning, no pressure of any kind
either to stay there or to engage in the conversation or answer
questions; nor could it be said in any sense to be an interrogation by
an expert interrogator .... 250
[T]he agent was cooperating with the Government. But I
shouldn't think this was material where the informer is simply a
layman, someone who is inside the ring and is reporting what goes
on. I would distinguish it very sharply from the case where the
prosecutor himself, say, in some kind of disguise,251 was drawing
out the defendant. . . .[T]his isn't likely to be or fairly thought of
as a problem of the expert on one side questioning [a layman] on
the other, and I think that's another difference from what I
understand to be. . .the true theory of the New York cases. Here,
this is very similar to the situation that might develop if the
Government were investigating an espionage ring, and somebody
had been infiltrated into the ring. . . .[The defendant] later goes
back to attend meetings with the ring-must the Government now
withdraw its counter-espionage agent?. ..252
248. Cf. Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 292 (1977).
249. Massiah Oral Argument, supra note 240, at 26.
250. Id. at 31.
251. See text at note 287 infra and following hypothetical questions.
252. Massiah Oral Argument, supra note 240, at 36-37. Solicitor General Cox devoted a considerable
part of his oral argument to a point touched upon in the text above-the use of Colson was not "obviously
addressed to extracting evidence," not necessarily or even primarily focused upon obtaining evidence
against the particular defendant," and not "centered on ferreting information out against this man." Id. at
32, 44. Rather, he argued, it was part of a continuing investigation of what appeared to be an ongoing
conspiracy:
[Tihe return of an indictment against one member of what may be a conspiracy in the case of
organized crime doesn't terminate the need to press forward the investigation. We're not
dealing here, and I think it's important to bear this in mind, with a single crime of violence, a
murder. . . That's been the case which has frequently come before the Court and there any
questioning. . . is obviously addressed to extracting evidence. That is not typically true in
the kind of case that we're dealing with. There is the rest of the ring to be uncovered; indeed
here Aiken, the big man, was identified and found after this took place. Frequently the
defendant'himself, while out on bail, resumes or continues his criminal activities ....
If [the Government] is gathering evidence against this man, if that's the center of what it's
doing, then it ought to be treated under the [indictment] rule of the New York cases.
Whereas, if the Government is proceeding in normal fashion, as it had been before [the
[Vol. 67:1
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. . . [Spano was] quizzed for the purpose. . . simply of getting
evidence against him (there was no further investigation because
that was a crime of violence) [and he was quizzed] by experts ...
[But Massiah] was not in custody; he was not being interrogated in
the same sense that lawyers or detectives would interrogate, and I
would think, therefore, that our position here was consistent with
the views expressed in the concurring opinions in Spano.253
That Massiah, unlike Spano and the defendants in the various New York
cases,254 was unaware that he was dealing with a government agent was a
distinction without a difference to the Massiah Court. Although Massiah was
less seriously imposed upon than the defendant in the ordinary "confession"
case in one respect-he was not even subjected to the "potentiality of
coercion" 255 -the decisive feature of his case was that after he had been
indicted, "and therefore at a time when he was clearly entitled to a lawyer's
help" 256 and at a time when he was awaiting trial "in an orderly courtroom,
presided over by a judge, open to the public, and protected by all the
procedural safeguards of the law, '257 he had been subjected to an extrajudi-
cial, police-orchestrated proceeding258 designed to obtain incriminating state-
ments from him. Besides, if in one respect-the lack of an inherently or
potentially "coercive atmosphere"-Massiah had been less seriously imposed
upon than the average "confession" defendant, he was more seriously
imposed upon in another respect-he did not, and could not be expected to,
keep his guard up "because he did not even know that he was under
indictment], to carry out an investigation. .. [and] if this testimony comes along, then it
should be admissible like any other testimony that comes along.
Id. at 31-32, 39.
In this respect, too, the case for admitting the statements in Massiah was stronger than the case for
doing so in Williams. Williams was suspected of committing-and completing-a single crime of violence.
The sole purpose of the "visit" in the car was to gather evidence against Williams. There was no ongoing
criminal activity about which to worry. There were no confederates to uncover.
If the Des Moines police had had reason to believe Williams' victim were still alive, then they might
have argued that their efforts were not "centered on ferreting information out against this man." There is
nothing in the record, however, to indicate that they doubted Williams' lawyer's report that the child was
dead when Williams left the YMCA building. Indeed, they were proceeding on the assumption that
Williams had disposed of the body as soon as he possibly could after he left Des Moines. See text at notes
67-70 supra; note 70 supra.
The Massiah Court's response to the Solicitor General's argument was not to "question that in this case,
as in many cases, it was entirely proper to continue an investigation of the suspected criminal activities of
the defendant and his alleged confederates, even though the defendant had already been indicted." 377 U.S.
at 207. Instead, the Court responded: "All that we hold is that the defendant's own incriminating
statements, obtained by federal agents under the circumstances here disclosed, could not constitutionally
be used by the prosecution as evidence against him at his trial." Id. (emphasis in original).
253. Massiah Oral Argument, supra note 240, at 41-42.
254. See notes 226, 243 supra.
255. See text at note 247 supra.
256. 377 U.S. at 204.
257. I&
258. Id.
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interrogation by a government agent. '259 This was a nice point (or counter-
point), but it was hardly the decisive one.
Massiah did not discard the Spano mold; it enlarged its original form or, if
you like, produced a companion mold. The "indictment rule" would not be,
and was not meant to be, limited to cases of "indirect and surreptitious
interrogations" 260 because, as the dissenters in Williams were to suggest,261
these happened to be the Massiah facts. Rather, the "indictment rule" was to
apply even though the "interrogation" was "indirect and surreptitious"
("unapprehended" or "unbeknownst" might be better descriptions). 262
Any doubts that the Massiah doctrine applies whether or not the suspect
was aware that he was talking to the police-and it is hard to see how anyone
who studies the briefs or oral arguments in the case can entertain any doubts
on this scre-were resolved a year later in McLeod v. Ohio.263 In that case the
Ohio courts admitted into evidence statements obtained from a defendant a
week after he was indicted.264 The Supreme Court of the United States
vacated the judgment and remanded the cause "for consideration in light of
[Massiah]."265 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Ohio adhered to its
original position, distinguishing Massiah on the ground, inter alia, that,
unlike Massiah, who "had no knowledge that the conversation was being
overheard by a government agent, ' 266 McLeod made statements "in the
known presence of public officers. '267 As two members of the state court
warned their brethren would happen, 268 the Supreme Court reversed per
curiam.269
Massiah would have been an easier case-and as it turns out a less
significant one-if, after he had been indicted, Massiah had simply been
questioned by police in "an atmosphere of official coercion." Under these
facts Massiah might have been completely displaced by Miranda, as I think
Escobedo was,270 instead of becoming a case that furnishes protection separate
and distinct from Miranda. If Massiah had been a normal "interrogation"
case, it would not represent the "pure" or "straight" right to counsel
259. See text at note 241 supra.
260. Id.
261. See note 242 supra.
262. The Massiah Court quoted with approval from Judge Hay's dissenting opinion: if the rule advanced
by the Spano concurring Justices and adopted by the New York courts "is to have any efficacy it must
apply to indirect and surreptitious interrogations as well as those conducted in the jailhouse." See text at
note 241 supra (emphasis added). It is clear in context that "interrogations. . . conducted in thejajihouse"
means interrogations in the known presence of the police. See id.
263. 381 U.S. 356 (1965) (per curiam).
264. See State v. McLeod, 1 Ohio St. 2d 60, 60, 203 N.E.2d 349, 351 (1964) (state supreme court's
summary of lower court's findings).
265. McLeod v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 582 (1964) (per curiam).
266. 1 Ohio St. 2d at 61, 203 N.E.2d at 351.
267. Id. The Ohio Supreme Court also attempted to distinguish Massiah on the ground that at the time
McLeod incriminated himself he "was not then represented by counsel and had not even requested
counsel." I. That the Ohio court was unsuccessful here, too, is demonstrated by the Supreme Court's
reversal. See notes 527-36 infra and accompanying text.
268. 1 Ohio St. 2d at 63, 203 N.E. 2d at 352 (Gibson, J., with O'Neill, J., dissenting).
269. 381 U.S. at 356.
270. See notes 152-54 supra and accompanying text.
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approach that it does; 271 it might have become, as I think Escobedo did, no
more than a point on an unfinished and probably never-to-be-finished
highway.
But Massiah was not a typical "confession" case. The questioning in that
case did not occur in an "atmosphere of official coercion." And it seems no
more profitable to wonder what the law of confessions would mean
today-and how Williams would have been decided-if Colson had been a
uniformed police interrogator rather than an undercover agent than it is to
speculate about how American history would have been affected if the
Mississippi River had flowed northwest instead of south.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL IRRELEVANCE OF "INTERROGATION" FOR MASSIAH
PURPOSES
Taking the Massiah facts as we find them and reading the Court's opinion
the way it was written, nothing turns on whether Massiah was "inter-
rogated"-surreptitiously or otherwise. Indeed, there is no indication that
Colson did "question" him, surreptitiously or otherwise,272 or that he was
directed to do so.
Colson's instructions, we are told by Chief Judge Lumbard, writing for a
majority of the Second Circuit, "were apparently no more than to induce
Massiah to talk."273 Colson's assignment, as described by Judge Hays,
dissenting from this decision, was to permit a transmitter to be installed in his
car and "to invite Massiah to take a ride with him in the car and to engage
Massiah in conversation relating to the alleged crimes. '274 Massiah's conten-
tion, as summarized by Chief Judge Lumbard, was that inasmuch as he was
already indicted and represented by counsel he "could not legally be
approached by persons acting on behalf of the government in the absence of
his counsel. ' 275 Dissenting Judge Hays, relying heavily on the Spano concur-
ring opinions, would have honored Massiah's claim for the reason that
"federal officers must deal through and not around an attorney retained by a
defendant under indictment. ' 276
Similarly, the Supreme Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Stewart,
described the Massiah case as one in which the government "succeeded by
surreptitious means in listening to incriminating statements" 277 made by an
indicted defendant in the absence of his retained counsel. After disclosing at
the outset that it was going to put fourth amendment problems to one side
and only decide whether Massiah's constitutional rights were violated "by the
271. See note 156 supra.
272. We do not even know, and evidently the Supreme Court did not care, what Colson said or how he
said it. Colson did not testify himself and the agent who overheard the Colson-Massiah conversation was
not permitted to testify to anything Colson said, apparently on the basis of the best evidence rule. Brief for
Petitioner at 19 (App. A); Brief for United States at 7, 22 n. 11. Thus, the record only contained Massiah's
half of the conversation.
273. 307 F.2d at 66 (emphasis added).
274. Id. at 72 (emphasis added).
275. Id. at 64 (emphasis added).
276. Id. at 72 (emphasis added).
277. 377 U.S. at 201 (emphasis added).
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use in evidence against him of incriminating statements which government
agents had deliberately elicited from him"278 under these circumstances, the
Court went on to hold-employing almost identical language-that Massiah
was denied the right to counsel when there was used against him "his own
incriminating words, which federal agents had deliberately elicited from him
after he had been indicted and in the absence of his counsel. '279 The use of the
term "deliberately elicited" seems to be quite intentional.
It takes no great stretch of the imagination to see that a government agent,
whether a "secret agent," as in Massiah, or a known police officer, as in
Williams, can "deal around" rather than "through" an attorney retained by a
defendant under indictment,280 or "induce" him to talk281 or "deliberately
elicit" statements from him282 without asking a single question283-indeed,
without saying anything. Consider the following hypotheticals:
0 Suppose federal agents had told Colson to arrange a meeting with
Massiah, but warned him to be sure not to broach the subject of the
pending case against them. Suppose they had given him the following
instructions:
When Massiah arrives, don't talk about the case. What's
more, don't say anything. Just look very sad and depressed.
278. Id. at 204 (emphasis added).
279. Id. at 206 (emphasis added).
280. 307 F.2d at 72 (Hays, J., dissenting).
281. Id. at 66.
282. 377 U.S. at 204.
283. To the contrary is Wilson v. Henderson, No. 78-2015 (2d Cir. Sept. 20, 1978), a decision handed
down when this article was in galleys. After Wilson, a murder suspect, had asserted his Miranda rights,
been appointed counsel, and apparently been formally charged, he was removed to a detention cell. There
he engaged in a number of conversations with his "cellmate" (who had previously agreed to act as a police
informant). At first Wilson minimized his involvement in the crime, but his "cellmate" told him that his
story did not sound too good. By the end of the third day, Wilson changed his story and admitted his
complicity in the murder. Because the "cellmate" had been specifically instructed not to inquire or
question, but to "just keep[iis] ears open," and had not in fact "interrogated" Wilson, a 2-1 majority
held-over a powerful dissent by Judge Oakes-that Wilson's statements to his "cellmate" were not barred
by the Massiah-Williams rule.
I submit that the facts in Wilson are constitutionally indistinguishable from those presented in Massiah.
There was no finding or any indication that Colson "interrogated" Massiah or asked him a single question.
But the Massiah Court did not seem to think this mattered at all. See note 272 supra. What did matter was
that in Massiah (and in Williams)-and equally so in Wilson-the government "deliberately and
designedly set out to elicit information," Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. at 399, from one who was then
"entitled to the help of a lawyer," id. at 398, and "succeeded by surreptitious means in listening to
incriminating statements made by him," id. at 400. See generally text at notes 272-79 supra.
Because the lower federal courts had relied so heavily on Miranda in holding the "Christian burial
speech" inadmissible and because various members of the Supreme Court could not resist discussing
whether "the speech" constituted or was tantamount to "interrogation," Williams did generate a certain
amount of confusion-one factor that led me to write this article. But Justice Stewart wrote the opinions
for the Court in both Massiah and Williams. I think he would be startled to learn that, although when he
authored the Williams opinion he evidently thought he was revivifying and expanding Massiah, he was
actually restricting its scope-or so the Wilson majority seems to tell us. It is hard to believe that if a fact
situation identical to Massiah arose today, the outcome would be different because a secret agent may now
induce incriminating statements from one who is formally charged and represented by counsel-so long as
he does su by "making conversation," not by asking questions. Yet this is what the Wilson majority seems
to say; this is how it seems to think the Williams case qualifies Massiah.
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Massiah will undoubtedly do one of two things: He will either
try to cheer you up by assuring you that your chances are better
than you think (or remind you that things could be a lot worse),
and in the process mention some incriminating evidence the
Government doesn't know about; or he will share in your
pessimism, making some reference to the strong case the Gov-
ernment will present, and along the way say something that will
strengthen our hand. However Massiah reacts, he is bound to
make some damaging admissions-and Agent Murphy will be
listening. So remember, just don't say anything.
Suppose further that when Massiah arrived, Colson, following instruc-
tions, covered his face with his hands and shook his head in anguish, or,
better yet, burst into tears. Suppose finally that in the course of trying to
console his friend and fellow defendant, Massiah had made some
damaging admissions. Assuming that these hypothetical facts were the
Massiah facts, and that the defense could establish that they had
occurred (which is no small feat), is there any doubt that the result in
Massiah would have been the same?
0 Colson was a busier undercover agent than is generally realized.
Pursuant to government instructions, he held other separate meetings in
his specially equipped car with two of Massiah's coconspirators, Anfield
and Maxwell, and these conversations, too, had been "broadcasted" to
Agent Murphy. 284 Suppose Colson's instructions were to arrange one
meeting in his "bugged" car with both Massiah and Anfield. Suppose
government agents had told him:
We have reason to believe that Anfield and Massiah are
blaming each other for the mess they're in. If we can bring them
face-to-face, they will undoubtedly do one of two things-either
continue to quarrel with each other or try to patch things up. In
either event, damaging admissions are bound to be made, and
Agent Murphy will be listening. It's conceivable, but not very
likely, that Massiah and Anfield won't start talking about the
case. In that unlikely event, Colson, you'll have to prod them.
But we really don't think that will become necessary. We think
that once those two birds are brought together, they'll just
naturally, almost inevitably, get to talking about the case.
Suppose further that as soon as Massiah entered Colson's car and
spotted Anfield, already sitting in the back seat, he became conciliatory,
admitted that he made some mistakes (for example, that after sealing the
cocaine packages with tape, to prevent the contents from evaporation, he
should have gotten rid of what was left of the roll of tape), gently
reminded Anfield that he had also made some mistakes, and then urged
Anfield to stop fighting with him so that they could start working
284. See note 39 supra.
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together to win the case. 285 On these facts, too, I think the result in
Massiah would have been the same.
If the Massiah facts had been those hypothesized above, the government
would still have succeeded by surreptitious means in overhearing incriminat-
ing statements made in counsel's absence by one already indicted and
represented by, or entitled to, counsel. Even if Colson and Massiah had never
addressed each other directly, even if the conversation had taken place
entirely between Massiah and Anfield, the government would still have
induced Massiah to talk about the case by setting up a meeting in circum-
stances in which damaging admissions were reasonably expected and highly
likely to occur.28
6
285. This is close to what Massiah actually told Colson when they met in the latter's car. Brief for
Petitioner at 20-21 (App. A); Brief for United States at 7-8.
286. In both hypotheticals, and in Massiah itself, the idea of the meeting, at which the defendant made
incriminating statements, originated with the government. A forceful argument could be made that if the
meeting is suggested by the defendant himself-especially if the defendant's purpose is to "coach" a witness
or codefendant, who, unknown to the defendant, is a government agent, or to threaten him with harm if he
appears at the trial at all-that the secret agent's willingness to attend the meeting does not constitute
inducing or encouraging a defendant to talk or engaging him in conversation within the meaning of
Massiah. But the Supreme Court's summary reversal of Beatty v. United States, 377 F.2d 181 (5th Cir.),
rev'd per curiam, 389 U.S. 45 (1967), indicates that Massiah reaches even this far.
In Beatty a 2-1 majority, in an opinion authored by Judge Gewin, distinguished Massiah on the ground
that the meeting there was "government sponsored" in its entirety whereas in Beatty the government
agents had not instructed Sirles, a government informer who purchased a machine gun from defendant, to
engage Beatty in conversation or even to associate with him. 377 F.2d at 190. Defendant had contacted
Sirles, requested a meeting, and proposed the time and place of the meeting. Sirles agreed to attend the
meeting when a government agent, McGinnis, told him to do so. The meeting was held in Sides'
automobile, in which McGinnis hid himself in the trunk. Although McGinnis' tape-recording device failed
to work, he did manage to overhear the entire conversation, during which defendant threatened to kill
Sirles if the machine gun turned up in court or if Sines appeared against him.
The majority maintained that Massiah "only renders inadmissible those statements made as a result of
the acts of a secret informer [when such informer] . . . actively and deliberately induced the accused to
make such admissions," and that "sanctioning the presence of an informer at a meeting called by the
accused and even sending an agent to listen in on the conversation cannot be equated with procuring or
deliberately eliciting information from an accused." Id. at 190-9 1. Dissenting Judge Ainsworth argued that
Massiah required exclusion of defendant's statements even though he had originated the idea of the
meeting:
Agent McGinnis' presence secretly in the trunk compartment of Sirles' vehicle was not mere
chance or accident. Though appellant is said to have initiated the meeting with Sides, the
secret eavesdropping setup was the result of deliberate prearrangement by McGinnis with the
secret informer Sirles for possible use at appellant's trial. . . .To deny [appellant his sixth
amendment right] by secret post-indictment and before-trial eavesdropping of conversations
with a secret informer, and then recount the prejudicial incriminating statements of appellant
at his trial, is to deprive [him] of the effective assistance of counsel at a stage when such advice
would have helped him.. . . [O]nce a person is indicted in a criminal case he has a right to
counsel before and during the trial and his voluntary conversations and admissions made out
of court to secret Government informers, overheard surreptitiously by Government agents,
are inadmissible in evidence in the absence of an express waiver by the defendant.
Id. at 193-94.
Evidently the Supreme Court agreed with dissenting Judge Ainsworth; it summarily reversed on the
authority of Massiah. 389 U.S. 45 (1967) (per curiam). The Fifth Circuit now apparently agrees with this
interpretation of the Supreme Court reversal. In a footnote it recently recalled that it "drew another
irrelevant distinction in Beatty" when "[it] declined to apply Massiah on the ground that the defendant had
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VARIATIONS ON BREWER V. WILLIAMS: MASSIAH AND MIRANDA
COMPARED AND CONTRASTED
Despite the obvious similarities between Massiah and Miranda, that each
case is "a law unto itself '287 may be seen, I think, by varying the actual facts in
Brewer v. Williams so that it becomes only a Miranda case, and a simple
Miranda case at that. Suppose that no adversary proceedings had been
initiated against Williams and no defense lawyer had entered the picture.
Suppose further that Williams had neither asserted nor even been advised of
his right to counsel or his right to remain silent. Then suppose one of the
following alternative hypothetical fact situations occurred:
0 The "Mother Powers" Ploy. Williams voluntarily surrenders to
the Davenport police. A police lieutenant takes Williams into his office,
leaves him there alone, and posts a guard outside the door. After a few
minutes, the lieutenant reappears and tells Williams:
I've been trying to phone Captain Leaming of the Des Moines
police to inform him that you've turned yourself in, but so far I
have been unable to contact him (which is true). In the
meantime I have learned that Mrs. Powers, the mother of the
missing little girl, Pamela, is in the building (which is untrue)
and is desirous of having a brief private meeting with you. It
seems that she drove down here when she heard reports that
your car was spotted in this area. Would you mind sparing Mrs.
Powers a few minutes while I get back on the phone and try to
contact Captain Leaming again?
Williams agrees, without much enthusiasm, to meet briefly with "Moth-
er Powers" (who is actually a policewoman, about the same age as
Pamela's mother, equipped with a tape recorder). No sooner are they
alone than "Mother Powers" delivers the following "Christian burial
speech":
Deep down in my bones, I feel that my little girl is dead. All I
want to do for her now is give her a good, decent Christian
burial. I don't think that's too much to ask for your daughter,
when she was taken away from you on Christmas Eve. I feel that
you know where my little girl's body is. But they are predicting
that a lot of snow will fall tonight, and I'm afraid that when it
snows not even you will be able to locate the body ....
initiated the conversation with the government agent." United States v. Anderson, 523 F.2d 1192, 1196 n.3
(5th Cir. 1975) (dictum) (Godbold, J.) (court emphasized that statements here were induced by
government). See also Dix, Undercover Investigations and Police Rulemaking, 53 TEXAS L. REv. 203, 232-
34 (1975) (close discussion of Beatty).
287. Cf Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 97 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) ('The moving picture
screen, the radio, the newspaper, the handbill, the sound truck and the street corner orator have differing
natures, values, abuses and dangers. Each, in my view, is a law unto itself, and all we are dealing with now
is the sound truck.").
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At the end of "the speech," Williams tells a tear-stained "Mrs. Powers"
that 'Pamela's body is located not far from the Mitchellville exit and
assures her that he will show Captain Leaming where it is on the drive
back to Des Moines.
0 The "Weather Forecaster" Ploy. The operator of a service station
located a hundred miles from Des Moines phones Captain Leaming and
reports that a man just walked into his station and told him that he is the
one the police are looking for in connection with the disappearance of
the little Powers girl, that his car has broken down, that he's "tired of
running and hiding," that he's afraid that somebody might kill him, and
that he wants to surrender to the police. Captain Leaming and Detective
Nelson drive immediately to the service station, followed by a second
car, occupied by state agents who have been brought in on the case.
Captain Leaming talks to Williams only long enough for Williams to
identify himself, and Leaming then orders him into the police car.
Leaming and his prisoner head back toward Des Moines. After a few
minutes of "small talk" about matters unrelated to the case, Williams
reveals that he is very fond of the music broadcasted over a certain radio
station and that he listens to that station as often as possible. Learning
responds: "It's a hard, slow drive back to Des Moines in terrible
weather. There's no reason why we can't make you as comfortable as
possible. We'll let you listen to that station on the drive back."
Leaming's car then stops at a service station to check the oil. Learning
walks back to the state agents' car and tells the agent in charge:
As you know, my theory is that Williams disposed of the body
somewhere in the Mitchellville area. The roads are so slippery
and the visibility is so poor that we won't reach the Mitchellville
exit for another two and a half hours or so. Now here's what I
want you to do. Call this radio station and instruct the weather
forecaster to make this weather report two hours from now. [He
hands the agent a piece of paper containing the "Christian burial
speech," which the weatherman is supposed to "work into" his
report.] Don't worry, we'll be tuned in on that station all the way
back to Des Moines.
Some two hours later, as Learning and his prisoner near the Mitchell-
ville exit, still listening to Williams' favorite station, they hear the
following "weather report":
The weather is bad and getting worse, friends. It's twenty-one
degrees above zero at the moment, but the temperature is
expected to fall five degrees an hour until it drops to zero. The
rain and sleet we're getting right now is bad enough, but three to
four inches of snow are predicted for tonight. This is bad news
for all of us-but especially for Mrs. Powers, the mother of the
missing nine-year-old girl, Pamela Powers.
According to law enforcement authorities, Mother Powers
has given up all hope that little Pamela is still alive. Her only
wish now, and it is surely a modest one, is that she will be able to
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give her little girl-snatched away from her on Christmas
Eve-a good Christian burial. But she is afraid, and the
authorities share her fears, that once the predicted heavy snow
falls 'not even the person who knows where poor Pamela is will
be able to find her.
At this point a grim-faced Williams turns to an impassive Leaming
and murmurs: "Turn off at the next exit; I'm going to show you where
the body is."
S The "Waitress" Ploy. Assume the same facts as in the previous
situation with these changes:
After a few minutes of "small talk" about matters unrelated to the
case, Williams asks Leaming whether they can stop "for a bite" before
they get back to Des Moines. Leaming promises Williams that they will
stop at a "nice place" near the Mitchellville exit. Leaming's car then
stops at a service station to replace the windshield wipers. Leaming
walks back to the state agents' car and tells the agent in charge:
We're going to be stopping at Jimmy's Restaurant just before
we get to the Mitchellville exit. I want the "waitress" who takes
Williams' order to be Jennie Jordan, a Des Moines policewoman
who used to be a waitress. I want Jennie to engage in some
"small talk" with Williams about the weather and work in these
comments. [He hands the agent a piece of paper.] Get Jennie on
the police radio. She's a lot closer to Jimmy's Restaurant now
than we are. She ought to be able to get into a waitress' uniform
and do a little "brushing up" before we get there.
Some two hours later, Captain Leaming spots Jimmy's Restaurant
and announces to Williams:
Detective Nelson and I are pretty well-known in these parts.
And everybody knows we've been busting our behinds trying to
find the kidnapper of the little Powers girl. If either one of us
accompanies you into the restaurant, people are liable to figure
out who you are. And then there's no telling what might happen.
So we're going to give you a break, Williams. We're going to
take off your handcuffs, give you five bucks to eat anything you
want, and let you go in alone. There's only one exit, and we'll be
watching it. We'll also be watching you through those big
windows. Don't disappoint us. Don't try anything foolish.
When the "waitress" brings Williams his order, she follows instruc-
tions and launches into her version of the "Christian burial speech":
Gee, Mister, I feel sorry for guys like you who have to be out
on the road on a-night like this. It's sleeting and freezing and the
roads must be slippery as hell. But I tell you who I really feel
sorry for tonight-the mother of that little Powers girl.
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Y'know I got a daughter myself-about the same age as
Pamela Powers. Imagine having a little girl like that snatched
away from you on Christmas Eve-and not even being able to
give her a decent Christian burial. If the searching party doesn't
find Pamela's body in the next few hours, nobody will be able to
find it for a month-if ever. The weatherman's predicting three
to four inches of snow tonight, and once that big snow falls, not
even the guy who knows where poor Pamela's body is will be
able to find her ...
Without finishing his meal, Williams rushes out of the restaurant and
back to the police car, shouting: "Start the car! I'm going to show you
where the body is!"
In all three hypotheticals, it is plain that the police "deliberately elicited" 288
incriminating disclosures from Williams and therefore that if judicial pro-
ceedings had been initiated against him (by hypothesis they had not), the use
of the disclosures would have been barred by Massiah. I submit, however, that
at least in two of the hypotheticals (the "Mother Powers" and "waitress"
ploys) no "custodial police interrogation" occurred within the meaning of
Miranda.2 89 If I am right, then the disclosures evoked in at least these two
hypotheticals would be admissible despite the absence of Miranda warnings.
Unlike the Massiah doctrine, which operates to prevent the government
from "deliberately eliciting" incriminating statements from a suspect or an
accused, the privilege against self-incrimination erects no such legal barrier.
There is no "right not to confess except knowingly and with the tactical
assistance of counsel"; 290 there is only a right not to be compelled to confess.
Massiah, to be sure, raised some doubts about the proposition, 291 but these
doubts were soon laid to rest by the Hoffa case.292
288. See text at notes 272-79 supra.
289. The Miranda opinion begins:
The cases before us raise questions which go to the roots of our concepts of American
criminal jurisprudence. . . .More specifically, we deal with the admissibility of statements
obtained from an individual who is subjected to custodial police interrogation and the necessity
for procedures which assure that the individual is accorded his privilege . . . not to be
compelled to incriminate himself.
384 U.S. at 439 (emphasis added). The Court later stated: "The principles announced today deal with the
protection which must be given to the privilege against self-incrimination when the individual is first
subjected to police interrogation while in custody at the station or otherwise deprived of his freedom of
action in any significant way." Id. at 477 (emphasis added).
290. Cf. Enker & Elsen, supra note 142, at 60-61 (suggesting Escobedo Court created just such a right).
291. See id. at 57, 60-61, 69, 83 (suggesting real issue in Massiah was protection of defendant from
governmental deceit, not right to counsel).
292. See notes 35-38 supra and accompanying text. See also Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323
(1966) (discussed at note 38 supra).
Miranda also confirmed Justice White's observation, dissenting in Escobedo, that a suspect or an
accused has no "constitutional right not to incriminate himself by making voluntary disclosures."
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 497 (1964) (White, J., dissenting). That Miranda leaves the police free to
hear and act upon volunteered confessions even though the "volunteer" neither knows nor is informed of
his rights is clear from the Miranda Court'sopinion. See 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966). But cf. Graham, supra
note 41, at 76-77; Thompson, Detention After Arrest and In-Custody Investigation: Some Exclusionary
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Hoffa argued that his privilege against self-incrimination had somehow
been violated when he unwittingly incriminated himself in the presence of one
Partin, whom Hoffa had thought to be a friend, but who was actually a
government informer. The Court, however, dismissed this contention almost
peremptorily:
[S]ince at least as long ago as 1807 . . . all have agreed that a
necessary element of compulsory self-incrimination is some kind of
compulsion. Thus, in the Miranda case,. . . the Court predicated
its decision upon the conclusion "that without proper safeguards
the process of in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or
accused of crime contains inherently compelling pressures which
work to undermine the individual's will to resist and to compel him
to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely . .. ."
In the present case no claim has been or could be made that...
[Hoffa's] incriminating statements were the product of any sort of
coercion, legal or factual. 293
By the time United States v. White294 was decided in 1971, the self-
incrimination issue lurking in Massiah-"whether law-enforcement officials
may seek evidence from an accused's own mouth when [he] does not realize
that he is talking to such officials and providing them with evidence that will
help to convict him"295-was so well-settled that it no longer called for
discussion. Only respondent's fourth amendment claims were considered, and
rejected. 296
Principles, 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 390, 422 (by allowing volunteered confessions Court fails to take account of
fact that such a statement may be made in ignorance of both privilege and "consequences of foregoing it").
Miranda also allows the police to conduct "[g]eneral on-the-scene questioning" or "other general
questioning of citizens," even though the citizen is neither informed nor aware of his rights. 384 U.S. at
477.
293. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 303-04 (Stewart, J.).
294.401 U.S. 745 (1971) (plurality opinion). On numerous occasions a government informer, carrying a
concealed radio transmitter, engaged defendant in conversations that were electronically overheard by
federal narcotics agents. See id. at 746-47. The admissibility of the eavesdropping agents' testimony was
upheld despite fourth amendment challenge. See id. at 754. There was no opinion of the Court, only a
plurality opinion written by Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and
Blackmun. Id. at 746. The dissenters' fourth amendment objection went not to the fact that the government
had used an apparent colleague or friend to elicit incriminating statements from a suspect, but to the fact
that the secret agent was equipped with an electronic device. See id. at 756 (Douglas, J., dissenting), 768
(Harlan, J., dissenting), 795 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Concurring Justice Brennan and dissenting Justices
Harlan and Marshall seemed to have no quarrel with Hoffa, in which the government informer operated
without any electronic equipment. See id. at 755, 768, 795.
295. Enker & Elsen, supra note 142, at 57.
296. See 401 U.S. at 753. In the principal opinion Justice White observed:
[H]owever strongly a defendant may trust an apparent colleague, his expectations in this
respect are not protected by the Fourth Amendment when it turns out that the colleague is a
government agent regularly communicating with the authorities . ...
Concededly a police agent who conceals his police connections may write down for official
use his conversations with a defendant and testify concerning them, without a warrant
authorizing his encounters with the defendant and without otherwise violating the latter's
Fourth Amendment rights. . . . For constitutional purposes, no different result is required if
the agent instead of immediately reporting and transcribing his conversations with defendant,
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Recognizing that "the Fifth Amendment does not forbid the taking of
statements from a suspect, [but only forbids] compelling them," 297 the
Miranda Court, as one of its leading critics put it, "endeavored to supply the
missing link in its logic by a conclusive presumption": 298 an individual
subjected to custodial police interrogation "cannot be otherwise than under a
compulsion to speak. '299 One may quarrel with this conclusion and protest, as
has Judge Friendly, that "[a] social scientist or logician would never dream of
asserting that any such universal could be inductively proved by reciting the
facts in four confession cases . . . even when these were supplemented by
copious extracts from police manuals. o300 But Miranda does recognize that
the fifth amendment only protects against some kind of compulsion-and not
the kind produced by custody alone. In the absence of police interrogation, the
coercion of arrest and detention does not rise to the level of "compulsion"
within the meaning of the privilege and thus does not give rise to the need for
the Miranda warnings. 301
either (1) simultaneously records them with electronic equipment which he is carrying on his
person. .. (2) or carries radio equipment which simultaneously transmits the conversations
Id. at 749, 751.
297. H. FRIENDLY, A Postscript on Miranda, in BENCHMARKS 266, 271 (1967) (emphasis in original).
298. Id.
299. 384 U.S. at 461. In United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407 (3d. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 837
(1969), Judge Aldisert, writing for the court, stated:
In recent years, the concept of compulsion or coercion has been further refined to delineate
circumstances where even absent active, outward forces of coercion, the mere presence of
certain conditions gives rise to constructive forces capable of negating the voluntariness of a
given utterance.
Thus, Miranda has created a presumption of coercion by the mere presence of the dual
factors of a police-initiated interrogation and the defendant's being in custody. . . . This
presumption. . . may be rebutted by the simple expedients of the defendant's having counsel
present or perfecting a knowledgeable and intelligent waiver of [his rights] ....
[In the instant case, there] is no proof that the admittedly in-custody statement resulted
from any police "interrogation" or "questioning" as contemplated by the Court in Miranda
[It] is inconceivable that the defendant could have experienced the coercion-born type of
fear and intimidation set forth in Miranda, because when he volunteered this incriminatory
statement, he thought that he was conversing with a fellow partner in crime, not a policeman.
Id. at 412, 413.
300. H. FRIENDLY, supra note 297, at 272. But see generally Kamisar, A Dissent from the Miranda
Dissents: Some Comments on the "New" Fifth Amendment and the Old "Voluntariness" Test, 65 MICH. L.
REv. 59 (1966).
301. As Justice White pointed out in his Miranda dissent:
Although in the Court's view in-custody interrogation is inherently coercive, the Court
says that the spontaneous product of the coercion of arrest and detention is still to be deemed
voluntary. [A suspect] may blurt out a confession which will be admissible despite the fact
that he is alone and in custody, without any showing that he had any notion of his right to
remain silent or of the consequences of his admission.
384 U.S. at 533 (White, J., with Harlan & Stewart, JJ., dissenting). See note 299 supra (quotation from
Fioravanti).
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It is the suspect's awareness that he is talking with, and being talked to by,
the police that generates the "inherently compelling pressures" of in-custody
interrogation that the Miranda warnings are supposed to dispel.302 But in the
"Mother Powers" and "waitress" hypotheticals, Williams was unaware that
he was dealing with the police.
The Miranda warnings are also designed to correct the widespread
misconception that "you must answer all questions put to you by a policeman,
or at least that it will be the worse for you if you do not. '303 More generally,
the warnings are supposed to relieve the suspect's uncertainty and confusion
as to what limits his captors are prepared to go to in order to obtain a
confession, and his anxiety that his detention will last until he confesses. 304
But these anxieties and misconceptions do not operate-and thus need not be
dispelled by the warnings-when the suspect is unaware that the police are
talking to him.
The "weather forecaster" ploy is the hardest case of the three. For,
although no police officer said anything, Williams listened to and thought
about the "weather report" in the presence of the police. Furthermore,
Williams must have known, or assumed, that the police shared the view that
the person who knew where Pamela's body was (and Williams knew the
police were convinced he was that person) should disclose this information to
the authorities before the imminent snowfall so that Pamela's parents would
be able to give her a good Christian burial.
In a sense the weather forecaster's remarks constituted a challenge for
Williams "to display some evidence of decency and honor. ' 305 Williams knew
it, and he must have known, or assumed, that Captain Leaming also knew it.
A failure on Williams' part to meet the challenge might incur the wrath of
302. See 384 U.S. at 467. The majority opinion in Miranda stated:
[W]ithout proper safeguards the process of in-custody interrogation of persons suspected
or accused of crime contains inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the
individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so
freely. In order to combat these pressures and to permit a full opportunity to exercise the
privilege against self-incrimination, the accused must be adequately and effectively apprised
of his rights and the exercise of those rights must be fully honored.
Id. Earlier in its opinion the Court noted:
The entire thrust of police interrogation [in Escobedo], as in all the cases today, was to put
the defendant in such an emotional state as to impair his capacity for rational judgment ....
In [Escobedo], as in the cases today, we sought a protective device to dispel the compelling
atmosphere of the interrogation.
Id. at 465.
303. P. DEVLIN, THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IN ENGLAND 27 (1960) (noting general public's
misimpression), quoted with approval in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 468 n.37.
304. See 384 U.S. at 467-68. "It is not just the subnormal or woefully ignorant who succumb to the
interrogator's imprecations, whether implied or expressly stated, that the interrogation will continue until a
confession is obtained or that silence in the face of accusation is itself damning and will bode ill when
presented to a jury." Id at 468; see Enker & Elsen, supra note 142, at 84-85 (written before Miranda) ("So
far as the defendant [who is subjected to custodial police interrogation] is aware. . . the fear of indefinite
detention can be dispelled only by giving the police what they want.").
305. Cf F. INBAU & J. REID, supra note 115, at 61.
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Captain Leaming, who, up to that point, had been nice to him. A forceful
argument can be made, therefore, that under the circumstances postulated the
weather forecaster's remarks were tantamount to "police interrogation," but
not many courts are likely to agree. Indeed, most of the courts addressing the
issue have even held that the response of an arrestee to a question put to
another person in his presence (often the arrestee's wife or a female companion
whom he is trying to protect) is not the product of "interrogation," but is a
"volunteered" remark.306
The "Mother Powers" ploy is an easier case for admissibility because not
only is Williams unaware that he is talking to the police, he does not even
realize the police are listening. To be sure, Williams is being subjected to
considerable pressure, but it is not "police blue" pressure. It cannot even be
argued, as it could in the "weather forecaster" hypothetical, that the pressure
generated by the speech takes on the color of "police blue" from Captain
Learning, who was in the suspect's immediate proximity when the "weather
report" was broadcasted and who, the suspect must have sensed, was waiting
for an appropriate response.
Williams' position in the "Mother Powers" hypothetical is indeed an
uncomfortable one, but for purposes of ascertaining whether there exists a
compelling atmosphere within the meaning of Miranda, as I understand the
case, the situation is the same as if the policewoman were Mother Powers.
Moreover, and more important, for purposes of establishing whether the
conditions surrounding the interrogation are coercive, the situation is the
same as if the real Mother Powers, who Williams thinks she is, were making
the same "Christian burial speech" without any instructions from or prompting
by the police.307
306. See Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 584 (4th ed. 1974).
307. When the private citizen-whether friend or relative of the victim, friend or relative of the suspect,
partner in crime or fellow prison inmate-is not an agent of the government, that is, not an undercover
officer or someone who has agreed to act on behalf of or in cooperation with the authorities, the resulting
statements would seem to be admissible as long as they pass the "voluntariness" test, which operates, inter
alia, to bar statements whose trustworthiness is suspect. See Procunier v. Atchley, 400 U.S. 446 (1971)
(defendant's statement to insurance agent held admissible; agent not cooperating with government when
defendant first gave statement); Milani v. Pate, 425 F.2d 6 (7th Cir. 1970) (prison inmate); Paroutian v.
United States, 370 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1967) (prison inmate); Stowers v. United States, 351 F.2d 301 (9th Cir.
1965) (confederate and prison inmate); State v. Jensen, 111 Ariz. 408, 531 P.2d 531 (1975) (prison inmate);
State v. Miranda, 104 Ariz. 174, 450 P.2d 364 (1969) (retrial and reconviction of Miranda) (woman with
whom defendant was living); People v. Price, 63 Cal. 2d 370, 406 P.2d 55, 46 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1965) (TV
news reporter); People v. Holzer, 25 Cal. App. 3d 456, 102 Cal. Rptr. 11 (2d Dist. 1972) (victim himselo;
Anglin v. State, 259 So. 2d 752 (Fla. 1972) (mother of defendant); State v. O'Kelly, 181 Neb. 618, 150
N.W.2d 117 (1967) (criminology professor pursuing his own professional interest in murder case); People
v. Cardona, 41 N.Y.2d 333, 360 N.E.2d 1306, 392 N.Y.S.2d 606 (1977) (prison inmate); People v. Gunner,
15 N.Y.2d 226, 205 N.E.2d 852, 257 N.Y.S.2d 924 (1965) (airline stewardess); State v. Perry, 276 N.C. 339,
172 S.E.2d 541 (1970) (prison inmate); State v. Knott, 111 R.I. 241, 302 A.2d 64 (1973) (mother of
defendant).
When the private citizen is not a "government agent," Massiah, no more than Miranda, bars the
resulting statements, even though adversary judicial proceedings have already commenced. As Justice
White observed in his Massiah dissent:
Had there been no prior arrangements between Colson and the police, had Colson simply
gone to the police after the conversation had occurred, his testimony relating Massiah's
statements would be readily admissible at the trial, as would a recording which he might have
made of the conversation. In such event, it would simply be said that Massiah risked talking
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To be sure, a relative of the victim may exert strong pressure on a suspect
to confess; but so may a close friend or parent of the suspect.308 Yet this is not
"official" pressure or persuasion, not the kind the Miranda warnings are
designed to combat. Whether or not the friend or business associate or
relative who tries to induce the suspect to confess is doing so on his own
initiative or at the instigation of the police, the pressure on the suspect is the
same. And Miranda focuses on the impact of the "surroundings" and
"atmosphere" on the suspect. Again, whether or not the mother of the victim
is making a spontaneous, unrehearsed appeal or following instructions-or
whether or not she really is the mother-the effects on the suspect are the
same.
The "waitress" ploy is the easiest case of the three hypotheticals for
admissibility. The use of a "waitress" as a police instrumentality will strike
most as a good deal less offensive than the use of the victim's "mother," real
or pretended. Furthermore, the "Christian burial" remarks undoubtedly
generate less pressure, albeit unofficial pressure, when they come from the
mouth of an apparently disinterested waitress rather than from an apparently
grief-stricken mother. Unlike the "Mother Powers" ploy, Williams has no
reason to think that the "waitress" suspects he had anything to do with the
disappearance of Pamela Powers. From Williams' vantage point, the waitress'
remarks are not focused on him at all, but spoken to the world at large."
Moreover, in the "Mother Powers" hypothetical, Williams might worry that
his failure to oblige the "mother" might be reported by her to the police and
cause them to think less of him or become angry with him. In the "waitress"
hypothetical, however, Williams has no reason to think that the officers
waiting for him outside Jimmy's Restaurant have any inkling, or will ever find
out, that the waitress who took his order made some "Christian burial"
remarks in his presence. 309
to a friend who decided to disclose what he knew of Massiah's criminal activities.
377 U.S. at 211 (White, J., with Clark & Harlan, JJ., dissenting).
Whether or not an "agency relationship" with the government does exist, however, is often a difficult
question. See, e.g., Milani v. Pate, 425 F.2d 6 (7th Cir. 1970); Stowers v. United States, 351 F.2d 301 (9th
Cir. 1965); State v. Ferrari, 122 Ariz. 324, 541 P.2d 921 (1975); People v. Holtzer, 25 Cal. App. 3d 456, 102
Cal. Rptr. 11 (2d Dist. 1972); People v. Cardona, 41 N.Y.2d 333, 360 N.E.2d 1306, 392 N.Y.S.2d 606
(1977).
308. Sometimes the same "government agent" may be both a parent or close relative of the suspect and a
parent or close relative of the victim. See People v. Hughes, 203 Cal. App. 2d 598, 21 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1962)
(defendant accused of incest with daughter; wife and daughter talked with him in room they knew was
"bugged"); Commonwealth v. Bordner, 432 Pa. 405, 247 A.2d 612 (1968) (eldest child set fire to family
house, killing seven brothers and sisters; both parents used as "police instrumentalities" in interrogation).
309. An even easier case for admissibility under Miranda-and an even more graphic illustration of how
Massiah and Miranda is each "a law unto itself"'-would be presented by shifting the "weather forecaster"
ploy from the police car to Jimmy's Restaurant. Suppose that, as in the case of the "waitress" ploy,
Williams was permitted to enter the restaurant alone and that when he did so he heard his favorite radio
station being played. Suppose further that while Williams was quietly eating his meal the weather
forecaster, acting pursuant to Leaming's instructions, broadcasted his "Christian burial" weather report.
Under these circumstances, any resulting incriminating disclosures would surely be admissible under
Miranda. Yet, because the "weather forecaster" had been acting as a "police instrumentality" when he
made the broadcast, any resulting disclosures would still be barred by Massiah-although admittedly this
would be carrying the doctrine a long way-if at the time Williams heard the weather report adversary
judicial proceedings had already commenced against him.
1978]
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I do not say that, aside from the trickery or deception inherent in
"undercover" work, a "secret agent" is more free to resort to trickery or
deception than is any other government agent.310 Nor do I mean to suggest
that an undercover officer or government informer is more free to oppress or
coerce a suspect or otherwise employ objectionable tactics than any other
government agent.311 Nor do I deny that some police impersonations may be
unduly offensive. If, for example, a suspect asks for a priest, the authorities
should not be permitted to dispatch a policeman masquerading as a priest.312
Nor, if a suspect asks to place a call to his mother or sister, should a
policewoman impersonating the mother or sister be allowed to take the call
(no doubt complaining about a bad connection in order to explain why her
voice sounds so different).
Moreover, there are undoubtedly limits on the amount and kinds of
pressure the government may exert on a dear friend or close relative of the
suspect who is reluctant to serve as a secret agent, but who may be persuaded
to do so, say, by threats to lodge serious charges or by promises to drop
existing charges against him. Indeed, the courts may well find it "shocking"
for the government to use son against father, brother against brother, even in
the absence of a showing that the close relative was pressed into service as a
secret agent. 3t3
My submission is only that the use of secret agents against one "in
custody" is not per se violative of the privilege against self-incrimination. It
does not without more constitute "compulsion" within the meaning of the
privilege ("inherent," "constructive," "conclusively presumed," or other-
wise), and thus no Miranda warnings need be employed to dispel this
compulsion. I also submit that neither confinement, nor the "subtle influ-
ences" this condition may produce, evokes the Massiah doctrine. It is plain
that once adversary judicial proceedings have commenced, the Massiah
doctrine shields an accused from undercover activity designed to obtain
incriminating statements from him, regardless of whether he is "in custody"
or subjected to "police interrogation" in the Miranda sense (and perhaps the
310. Cf. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 311 (1966) (secret agents not more free from constitutional
restrictions than other government agents).
311. The "jail cell plant" may not threaten defendant with bodily harm. See State v. Atkins, 251 Ore.
485, 446 P.2d 660 (1968) (police placed defendant in cell with reputedly violent codefendant to gain
confession). Nor may the "plant" engage in oppressive tactics. Cf. Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 378-
79 (1972) (Stewart, J., with Douglas, Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting). Nor may she persuade her
cellmate that she would be better offthrowing herself on the mercy of the police than putting her trust in a
lawyer. Cf Miller v. California, 392 U.S. 616, 626-27 (1968) (Marshall, J., with Warren, C.J., Douglas &
Brennan, JJ., dissenting from dismissal of certiorari). Nor, presumably, may a secret agent lead his cellmate
to believe that the invariable practice of the local police, when confronted with a suspect unwilling to
confess, is to bring in the suspect's wife or girlfriend "for questioning." Cf. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S.
534, 535-36 (1961) (discussed in text at notes 93-100supra).
312. See Kamisar, supra note 140, at 747 (though voluntary, confession to officer impersonating priest
constitutionally impermissible). See generally Dix, supra note 286, at 211-12.
313. Professor Dix would prohibit the government from soliciting relatives of the suspect to serve as
undercover agents. Dix, supra note 286, at 224. "Relatives include parents, grandparents, children,
grandchildren, siblings, and spouses." Id. See generally Note, Eavesdropping, Informers, and the Right of
Privacy: A Judicial Tightrope, 52 CORNELL L.Q 975, 994-96 (1967) (need for, but difficulty of, imposing
some due process limitation on use of informers, based on "degree of closeness between the informer and
the informed-upon").
[Vol. 67:1
HeinOnline  -- 67 Geo. L. J.  54 1978-1979
1978] "INTERROGATION" AFTER Brewer v. Williams
Massiah doctrine, or a related one, affords a suspect the same protection when
he is represented by counsel or when he has asserted his right to counsel).
Nevertheless, when none of these events has occurred (and none did in the
"Mother Powers," "waitress," and "weather forecaster" hypotheticals), then
there is either a "Miranda right to counsel" or no right to counsel at all. If the
conditions surrounding or inherent in police efforts to obtain incriminating
statements from a suspect do not put his privilege against compelled self-
incrimination in jeopardy-and the Court has told us that the mere fact that
the suspect is in custody does not do so-then there is no right to counsel at
all.
III. MORE ON THE USE OF "JAIL PLANTS" AND OTHER "SECRET
AGENTS" AGAINST THOSE "IN CUSTODY"
The "custody"-"surreptitious interrogation" issues are not free from
difficulty, and they have not been cleanly resolved by the Supreme Court.314
Some support, but not a great deal, for the view that "custody" per se does not
trigger the Massiah doctrine may be gleaned from Procunier v. Atchley. 315 The
second time he paid respondent a visit in jail, an insurance agent seemed to be
acting as a secret government agent by agreeing to the deputy sheriffs request
that the conversation be electronically recorded. But the Court, in an opinion
by Justice Stewart, dismissed what was arguably a Massiah issue with a brief
footnote-"No charges had been filed against the respondent at the time of
these conversations. Cf. Massiah."316-and proceeded to judge the admissibil-
ity of respondent's statements by the due process standard of "voluntari-
ness."317
314. An opportunity to shed further light on the use ofjail "plants" was lost when, on the last day of the
1967 Term, the Court, with four Justices dissenting, dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently
granted in People v. Miller, 245 Cal. App. 2d 112, 53 Cal Rptr. 720 (4th Dist. 1966). Miller v. California, 392
U.S. 616, 616 (1968) (per curiam). Petitioner was arrested for murder, booked on that charge, and placed in
a cell. Id. at 616-17 (Marshall, J., with Warren, C.J., Douglas & Brennan, JJ., dissenting from dismissal of
certiorari). Not only did defense counsel meet with his client, but in an effort to prevent her from being
questioned, he set up a 24-hour-a-day watch of her cell. Id. at 617. Nevertheless, an undercover agent was
booked into the jail on a fictitious charge and placed in petitioner's cell. Id. Although this occurred before
any formal charges were filed against petitioner, the undercover agent remained in petitioner's cell, eliciting
information from her, for two days after a complaint was filed formally charging her with murder and on
which petitioner was later arraigned. Id. The state court viewed the government's action as "completely
indefensible" and "most inexcusable," but concluded that the admission of petitioner's statements was
"harmless error" and that, in any event, objection to it had not been made. 245 Cal. App. 2d at 144, 53 Cal.
Rptr. at 740. See also Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371 0972) (holding that any error in admitting
postindictment confession to jail "plant" was "harmless error"; merits of petitioner's claim not reached). In
Milton Justice Stewart wrote a forceful dissent, urging that the judgment be reversed. Id. (Stewart, J., with
Douglas, Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting). But the underlying issue was an easy one, once it was
reached, for the officer who entered petitioner's cell, posing as a fellow prisoner, did so only after petitioner
had been indicted and had retained counsel.
315. 400 U.S. 446 (1971).
316. Id. at 447 n.l.
317. As Justice Stewart, writing for the Court, pointed out, respondent's trial had taken place several
years before Escobedo and Miranda, and those decisions had not been given retroactive effect. Id. at 452-52.
But Massiah could not be disposed of so easily. The Court had not held, and Justice Stewart-did not
suggest, that Massiah was not to be applied retroactively. Indeed, the following Term, protesting the
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On the other hand, there is, or at least at first blush there appears to be,
some lower court authority for the view that government efforts to elicit
incriminating statements from one "in custody" do bring Massiah or Miranda
into play. When these "custody"-"surreptitious interrogation" cases are read
closely, however, none of them needs to be viewed as requiring the exclusion
of the statements obtained in the "Mother Powers" and "waitress" hypotheti-
cals, or in the "jail plant" situations; all these cases can be distinguished or
explained away.318
Several opinions of the lower California courts can be read to stand for the
proposition that the right to counsel or the privilege against self-incrimination
or both protect one in custody from undercover investigation, regardless of
whether adversary judicial proceedings have commenced against him or
regardless of whether he is represented by, or has even requested, counsel. 31 9
But these cases were decided before Miranda and they are not on the Miranda
"track." Rather, they are on a Massiah-Escobedo-Dorado320 "track," one that
the Miranda Court largely abandoned. 321 The underlying premise of these
California cases taken together seems to be that the Massiah and Escobedo
cases prohibit any "surreptitious interrogation" of a person once he is
Court's failure to reach the merits in Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371 (1972), Justice Stewart called the
retroactivity of Massiah "a wholly spurious issue," maintaining that "the rule in that case has been settled
law ever since Powell v. Alabama." Id. at 381-82 (Stewart, J., with Douglas, Brennan & Marshall, JJ.,
dissenting); see notes 142, 314 supra (discussion of Milton v. Wainwright).
318. See notes 319-27 infra and accompanying text (discussion of California cases); notes 376, 396-97
infra and accompanying text (cases in other jurisdictions).
319. People v. Bowman, 240 Cal. App. 2d 358, 49 Cal. Rptr. 772 (Ist Dist. 1966) (dictum); People v.
Flores, 236 Cal. App. 2d 807, 46 Cal. Rptr. 412 (2d Dist. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1010 (1966); People
v. Ludlum, 236 Cal. App. 2d 813, 46 Cal. Rptr. 375 (2d Dist. 1965). See also Dix, supra note 286, at 227-36.
320. In People v. Dorado, 62 Cal. 2d 338, 398 P.2d 361, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169 (1965), the court held, at a
time when many other state courts were giving Escobedo a begrudging reception, that the failure of a
suspect to retain or request counsel does not justify the application of a rule different from that established
in Escobedo:
The accused's request for counsel indicates no more than that he, himself, at that point...
perceived the need of legal assistance. The request merely constitutes evidence that the
accused finds himself in an accusatory predicament. Escobedo did not treat the request for
counsel as the reason for the establishment of the right; it points out that the right had
previously crystallized in the accusatory stage.
Id. at 349, 398 P.2d at 368, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 176.
Quite understandably, Dorado relied very heavily on Escobedo, then the dominant United States
Supreme Court confession case, and viewed Escobedo as extending Massiah to critical situations arising
before the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings. In concluding that the facts of the instant case
brought it within the rule of Escobedo, the Dorado court mentioned, without any elaboration, that
defendant was "in custody," but it stressed that the investigation "had ceased to be a general inquiry into
an 'unsolved crime' and had begun to focus on defendant"; that the weight of the evidence available to the
officers "provided reasonable grounds for focusing upon defendant as the particular suspect"; that the
officers "did not merely engage in general questioning but subjected defendant to a process of
interrogations that lent itself to obtaining incriminating statements"; and that defendant had never been
warned of "his 'absolute constitutional right to remain silent.'" Id. at 347, 398 P.2d at 367,42 Cal. Rptr. at
175.
321. See notes 152-56, 290-304 supra and accompanying text.
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formally charged or arrested.3 22 This reading of Massiah and Escobedo was
tenable before Miranda, but not afterwards. 323
Although these California cases happen to involve "custodial" situations,
they do not really seem to turn on "custody" at all, but rather on the fact, if it
can be called a fact, that "the process [had] shift[ed] from investigatory to
accusatory" 324 and "its focus [was] on the accused. ' 325 That is to say, they
seem to proceed on the basis that-whether or not the suspect is "in
custody"-once the investigation has ceased to be "a general inquiry of an
unsolved crime [and] has begun to focus on a particular suspect, '326
constitutional rights come into play.327
322. See People v. Bowman, 240 Cal. A1p. 2d 358, 370-72,49 Cal. Rptr. 772,780-82(1st Dist. 1966). In
Bowman the court stated:
The court [below]. . . did not presage the adoption of the principle enunciated in People v.
Dorado, [62 Cal. 2d 338, 398 P.2d 361, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169 (1965)] that where an investigation
has progressed to the accusatory stage, statements elicited from an accused without informing
him of his [rights]... should not be admitted against him without proof of waiver of those
rights.
* * * [it is clear from Massiah that once a defendant is formally charged and has counsel,
statements which are thereafter surreptitiously obtained may not be used against him ...
Similar considerations whether predicated on Dorado or Massiah preclude use of statements
obtained by the prosecuting authorities from the accused by subterfuge before charges have
been filed but after he has been taken into custody ....
* .* It may be assumed that the surreptitious use of [government agents in various pre-
1964 California cases] to secure statements from the accused after his arrest is now
proscribed, not only because of Massiah [and similar cases], but also because the necessity of
advising the defendant of his right to counsel and right to remain silent precludes the
concealment of the identity of an interrogator who seemingly is not, but in fact is, an agent of
the prosecuting authorities.
240 Cal. App. 2d 370-72, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 780-82.
But if adversary judicial proceedings have not commenced against one in custody and he does not have
and has not requested counsel, then Massiah rights do not attach. Furthermore, if the efforts of a
government agent who "seemingly is not" such an agent to obtain incriminating statements from one in
custody do not constitute "custodial police interrogation"-because the agent "seemingly is not" a
government agent-then Miranda rights do not come into play either. If under the circumstances neither
Massiah nor Miranda rights are called into play, then there are no "rights" of which the person in custody
need be advised, which means that the State may conceal the agent's identity.
323. See notes 152-54 supra and accompanying text.
324. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 492 (1964).
325. Id.
326. Id. at 490.
327. See People v. Flores, 236 Cal. App. 2d 807, 811,49 Cal. Rptr. 412,414 (2d Dist. 1965) ("Except for
the absence of an indictment, we have here a defendant under arrest, on whom the suspicion of the police
had already fastened. . ."), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1010 (1966); People v. Ludlum, 236 Cal. App. 2d 813,
815, 46 Cal. Rptr. 375, 376 (2d Dist. 1965) ("defendant was under arrest for the crime herein involved;
clearly suspicion had 'focused' on him, not only because he had been arrested, but because [the police]
knew, of their own knowledge, that defendant had been in possession of [narcotics]"). See also note 322
supra.
Similar "focal point"-"accusatory stage" language appears in Justice Marshall's dissent from the
dismissal of certiorari in Miller v. California, 392 U.S. 616, 624-25 (1968) (Marshall, J., with Warren, C.J.,
Douglas & Brennan, JJ., dissenting from dismissal of certiorari) (discussed at note 314 supra). But this
language "does not distinguish focused preindictment investigations concerning subjects not in custody."
Dix, supra note 286, at 231. On its facts Miller can be readily distinguished from typical "surreptitious
interrogation" cases because petitioner had retained and met with counsel before being placed in a cell and
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That a court would proceed on such a basis during the turbulent and
unstable post-Massiah-Escobedo and pre-Miranda era (when these California
cases were decided) is understandable. But as far as federal constitutional law
is concerned, 328 it has since become clear that nothing turns on whether the
suspect has "become the accused" or whether the investigation has "begun to
focus" on him.
The Miranda warnings were designed to combat the coercive conditions
surrounding or inherent in "custodial police interrogation" and the mere fact
that one has become the "prime suspect" or "focal point" does not necessarily
have any effect on the conditions surrounding police interrogations. The
Hoffa Court did not care whether petitioner had already been the "focal
point" when he incriminated himself in the presence of his apparent friend,
Partin.319 For even if the investigation had already "focused" on Hoffa, this
would not have rendered his statements any less voluntary.
It is hard to believe that the result in Hoffa would have been any different,
nor is it easy to see why it should be, if (1) petitioner and Partin had been
arrested together and petitioner had made incriminating statements to his
"friend" while in a police vehicle on the way to the stationhouse330 or while
sharing the same cell with him; 331 or if (2) Hoffa alone had been arrested and
Partin had then visited him in his jail cell, at which time Hoffa had
incriminated himself. In these hypothetical variations on the actual case,
Hoffa would still have been "relying upon his misplaced confidence that
Partin would not reveal his wrongdoing," 332 even though he would have done
so in a police vehicle or a jail cell rather than in his hotel suite.333 It could not
her lawyer attempted to prevent questioning of his client by setting up "a 24-hour-a-day watch of her cell."
392 U.S. at 617 (Marshall, J., with Warren, C.J., Douglas & Brennan, JJ., dissenting from dismissal of
certiorari). Furthermore, "it is clear on this record that [the undercover agent] was planted in petitioner's
cell in order to subvert her right to counsel." Id. at 626.
328. Here, as elsewhere, state courts, in construing a state constitutional provision more expansively
than'the Supreme Court has interpreted a parallel or even a textually identical provision of the federal Bill
of Rights, may afford the accused greater protection under state law than that said to be required by the
federal Constitution. See generally Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977); Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Day of the Burger Court,
62 VA. L. REv. 873 (1976); Wilkes, More on the New Federalism in Criminal Procedure, 63 Ky. L.J. 873
(1975); Wilkes, The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure: State Court Evasion of the Burger Court, 62
Ky. L.J. 421 (1974); see also Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE &J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 2-5
(4th ed. Supp. 1978) (collecting cases).
329. See notes 35-38, 292-93 supra and accompanying text.
In Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966), it is plain that the investigation had "focused" on
petitioner by the time two federal judges authorized a tape recorder to be concealed on the undercover
agent's person for his November 11 meeting with petitioner. Id. at 326. The possibility of bribing a juror
had been considered at a November 7 meeting. Id. The same may be said of the investigation in United
States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) (plurality opinion), at least by the second or third time defendant's
conversations with a government informer were electronically overheard by federal narcotics agents. Id. at
746-47.
330. Cf. People v. Ludlum, 236 Cal. App. 2d 813, 46 Cal. Rptr. 375 (2d Dist. 1965) (discussed at note
319 supra).
331. Cf. United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 837 (1969); Stowers v.
United States, 351 F.2d 301 (9th Cir. 1965); State v. McCorgary, 218 Kan. 358, 543 P.2d 952 (1975).
332. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966).
333. As Professor Dix points out, "insofar as Massiah rests on the subject's interest in privacy, it would
seem to have less applicability to the custody situation. The state of prison confinement clearly reduces a
person's reasonable expectation of privacy." Dix, supra note 286, at 230. On the other hand, the use of an
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be said in these hypothetical variations on Hoffa, noimore than'it could in the
actual case, I submit, that "petitioner's incriminating statements were the
product of any sort of coercion, legal or factual. '334
Professor, Dix would surely quarrel with my conclusion. "The subjects'
confinement," he has observed, "is likely to bring into play subtle influences
that will make them particularly susceptible to undercover investigators'
ploys." '335 "Arguably," he concluded, "these dangers would justify imposing a
Massiah-like barrier on all undercover activity directed at an incarcerated
subject. ' 336 I hesitate to disagree with one who has made a most useful,
massive study of the use of undercover investigations, but I must-and on two
fronts.
First, as I have already indicated, in the absence of additional factors, such
as the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings and perhaps representation
by counsel, I do not think Massiah has any bearing on the "custody"-
"surreptitious interrogation" problem. As Professor Dix seems to agree, the
special dangers involved when secret agents seek incriminating statements
from incarcerated subjects, rather than from suspects at large, are "compelled
self-incrimination" 337 dangers. If these dangers justify imposing a barrier
(fourth amendment considerations aside), it would be a "Miranda-like," not a
"Massiah-like," barrier.
Some support for Professor Dix's position may be found in the language of
Supreme Court opinions. In United States v. Ash,338 for example, the Court
viewed Massiah as a case in which "counsel could have advised his client of
the benefits of the Fifth Amendment" and "sheltered him from the over-
reaching of the prosecution, ' 339 and as one in which "the accused was
confronted by prosecuting authorities who obtained, by ruse and in the
absence of defense counsel, incriminating statements. ' 340 In the landmark
lineup case, United States v. Wade,341 the Court suggested that the sixth
amendment guarantee applies to any "critical" pretrial "confrontation" with
the government "where the results might well settle the accused's fate and
reduce the trial itself to a mere formality. ' 342
"old friend" as a secret agent, rather than a mere stranger who happens to share a cell with the defendant,
involves a deeper invasion of the defendant's personal privacy. Id. at 221.
334. See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 304 (1966).
335. Dix, supra note 286, at 230.
336. Id.
337. Id. In his discussion of the "jail plant" problem, Professor Dix uses this very phrase, which makes
his primary reliance on Massiah, rather than Miranda, all the more puzzling.
338. 413 U.S. 300 (1973).
339. Id. at 312. But was Massiah entitled to fifth amendment protection? Was he compelled to speak?
How would counsel's presence at the Massiah-Colson meeting in Colson's car have provided Massiah with
"assistance" at the "confrontation" with the government unless counsel were aware that Colson was a
secret agent? And if counsel were so aware, wouldn't he have prevented the confrontation from taking
place? See Grano, Kirby, Bigger$ and Ash: Do Any Constitutional Safeguards Remain Against the Danger
of Convicting the Innocent? 72 M&CH. L. REV. 717, 762 & n.285 (1974).
340. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 311 (1973).
341. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
342. See id. at 224 ("Moday's law enforcement machinery involves critical confrontations of the
accused by the prosecution at pretrial proceedings where the results might well settle the accused's fate and
reduce the trial itself to a mere formality. In recognition of these realities of modem criminal prosecution,
our cases have construed the Sixth Amendment guarantee to apply to 'critical' stages of the proceedings.").
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It is plain, however, that such language cannot be read literally. Hoffa's
meeting with Partin was a "critical confrontation" with a government agent
that "settled his fate." One of Hoffa's own lawyers, Osborn, was himself
involved in a "critical confrontation" with a government agent, even though
he did not realize it at the time, when he conferred with one Vick, whom he
had hired as an investigator but who was actually working for and reporting
back to federal authorities. 343 Moreover, in United States v. White,344 a
government informer, carrying a concealed radio transmitter, "confronted"
the accused on numerous "critical" occasions, repeatedly enabling "eaves-
dropping" federal agents to obtain incriminating statements "by ruse and in
the absence of defense counsel."3 45
The constitutionally significant difference between the Massiah case and
the Hoffa, Osborn, and White cases cannot be the critical nature of the
confrontation between the defendant and the government. Nor can it be the
measure of the need for the assistance of counsel. The need for a lawyer, at
least one with the wit to realize that his client's meeting with an apparent
friend or associate might turn out to be a confrontation with a secret
government agent, 346 was equally great in all the cases. The critical nature of
the confrontations was also equally great in all the cases, at least from the
perspective of their impact on each defendant's fate. But one is not entitled to
a lawyer's assistance whenever a lawyer "could have sheltered him" from
government agents bent on obtaining evidence against him or whenever a
government confrontation is "critical." Self-incrimination considerations
aside, one only has a right to counsel "at any 'critical stage of the
prosecution.' -347 And as Justice Stewart has expressed it:
The requirement that there be a "prosecution," means that this
constitutional "right to counsel attaches only at or after the time
that the adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated against
[an accused] .. ." "It is this point. . . that marks the commence-
ment of the 'criminal prosecutions' to which alone the explicit
guarantees of the Sixth Amendment are applicable. '348
The only constitutionally significant difference between Massiah and the
other "secret agent" cases letting in the surreptitiously obtained statement
343. Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 326 (1966) (discussed at notes 38, 329 supra).
344. 401 U.S. 745 (1971) (plurality opinion) (discussed at notes 294-96 supra and accompanying text).
345. Id. at 746-47.
346. See note 342 supra.
347. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 690 (1972) (plurality opinion) (Stewart, J., with Burger, C.J.,
Blackmun & Rehnquist, JJ.) (emphasis in original). In Kirby the Court declined to apply the right to
counsel to identification procedures conducted prior to the start of adversary judicial proceedings. Justice
Powell noted simply that he "would not extend" the "per se exclusionary rule" of the original lineup cases.
See id. at 691 (Powell, J., concurring). See also United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 321 (1973) (Stewart, J.,
concurring) ("a defendant is entitled to the assistance of counsel not only at the trial itself, but at all 'critical
stages' of his 'prosecution' ").
348. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 321-22 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring) (quoting from his
plurality opinion in Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688, 690 (1972)). To the same effect is Justice Powell's
opinion for the Court in the recent case of Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 226-27 (1977) (quoting from
Justice Stewart's plurality opinion in Kirby). But cf. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 486-87 (1964);
People v. Dorado, 62 Cal. 2d 338, 349, 398 P.2d 361, 368, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169, 176 (1965).
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must be that in Massiah, unlike the other cases, the meeting with the agent
took place after the initiation of adversary criminal proceedings, and thus
"the explicit guarantees of the Sixth Amendment" had "attached. ' 349 In the
other cases, it may be said, the Court declined to "import into a routine police
investigation an absolute constitutional guarantee historically and rationally
applicable only after the onset of formal prosecutorial proceedings. ' '350 These
other cases may be said to stand for the proposition that, when a person has
not been formally charged with a criminal offense, Miranda-and Miranda
alone-strikes the appropriate constitutional balance. 351 If and when the
conditions surrounding or inherent in a "pre-formal charge" confrontation
are sufficiently coercive, then the "Miranda right to counsel" comes into play.
The right to counsel as such, what might be called the "Massiah right to
counsel," does nqt. At the "pre-charge" stage, at least when the suspect
neither has nor bas expressed a desire for counsel, the right to counsel is
triggered by, and dependent on, forces that "jeopardize" the privilege against
compelled self-incrimination;352 it has no life it can call its own.
Even if I am correct in thinking that the influences at work when a person
shares a jail cell with an undercover agent do not, without more, bring the
Massiah doctrine into play, do they nevertheless evoke the protection of
Miranda? This, I think, is the appropriate question; but again, I would answer
it in the negative.
To be sure, in a sense the mere presence of an undercover agent in the same
cell with an accused, or in an adjoining one, is "itself. . . an inducement to
speak, and an inducement by a police agent. ' 353 But so is the mere presence of
one or more uniformed police officers while a person is arrested or trans-
ported to the stationhouse or brought to the "booking officer." I would be the
last to deny that police custody, without more, generates certain anxieties and
pressures. But how can it be maintained that these anxieties and pressures are
greater when a suspect or an accused is in the presence of a fellow prisoner
than when he is in the midst of the police? Yet, as I have discussed, 354 police
custody without more is not enough to bring the Miranda warnings into play.
Again, I do not deny that the anxieties generated by mere confinement may
lead a person "to seek discourse with others to relieve this anxiety. '355 But it is
by no means self-evident that he is less likely to do so when these others are
police officers rather than fellow prisoners. After all, who will a suspect
assume knows more about "the law" and "the system" in general-and his
predicament in particular-someone who is sharing his cell or the officer who
arrested (or is "booking") him?
I do not deny that one in custody is likely to feel considerable pressure to
blurt out protests of innocence in the presence of his captors; or, without any
349. Cf. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 690 (1972) (plurality opinion).
350. Cf id.
351. Cf. id. at 690-91. See also Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 227(1977).
352. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 478 (privilege against self-incrimination jeopardized when
individual in custody or deprived of freedom in significant way and questioned). See also id. at 439,457-58,
461, 465-67; note 156 supra (discussion of Brief of Amicus Curiae ACLU in Miranda).
353. Miller v. California, 392 U.S. 616,626 (1968) (Marshall, J., with Warren, C.J., Douglas & Brennan,
JJ., dissenting from dismissal of certiorari).
354. See notes 297-304 supra and accompanying text.
355. Dix, supra note 286, at 230.
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prompting, to depict his role in the best possible light; or to protect dear ones;
or to seek information and advice from the arresting or "booking" offi-
cer-and in the process to incriminate himself unwittingly. ("What's going to
happen to me?" "I've never done anything like this before." "My girl friend
had nothing to do with this case." "I did it; my brother wasn't involved." "I
didn't rob that man; he owed me the money." "Did you find the weapon (or
the body)?" "Who put the finger on me?") 356 The temptation to find out more
about one's plight, or how the system works generally, is likely to be even
stronger when, as often occurs, the police, in the course of transporting or
"booking" the suspect, have already engaged him in friendly conversation
about matters unrelated to his case. Yet Miranda does not protect one "in
custody" who turns to an officer for information, advice, or relief-and in the
process incriminates himself unwittingly-simply because he was "in cus-
tody" when he did so. Why, then, should Miranda protect one who turns to
an apparent fellow prisoner for the same reasons simply because he was in
custody when he did so?
In one respect (but not, of course, in several others), the "jail plant"
confession poses a stronger case for exclusion than Massiah: "unlike the
defendant there, who had been released on bail, petitioner [in a "jail plant"
confession situation is] in custody without bail, with a consequent lack of
freedom to choose [his] companions." 3 7 Again, however, this argument
proves too much. One who is arrested, transported, and "booked" usually
lacks freedom to choose his companions-at least during the pressure-packed,
anxiety-ridden first few hours.
In the long drive back to Des Moines, Williams was no doubt "seek[ing]
discourse with others" to relieve his anxiety. But the only persons with whom
he could seek discourse during that five or six hour trip358 were Captain
Leaming and Detective Nelson. Yet if Williams and the companions he did
not choose had ridden in complete silence for fifty or one hundred miles and
then Williams had blurted out: "Look, I know where the body is, and I'm
going to show it to you-but I didn't kill her; she was already dead when I
found her in my room" 359-or even if Williams had said that he did kill
356. See Kamisar, supra note 41 at 335, 352-56 (illustrative cases decided within two years after
Miranda).
Whether, once an arrestee volunteers a statement, the officer may ask some questions in order to clear
up some points, or whether such follow-up questions constitute "interrogation" within the meaning of
Miranda, is a difficult issue. I think follow-up questions seeking to enhance defendant's guilt or raise the
offense to a higher degree (for example, by getting at the defendant's state of mind, "why did you do it?" or
"how long did you think about it?") do constitute "interrogation," but follow-up questions merely designed
to clarify just what the defendant said or meant to say may well not be. Compare People v. Sunday, 275 Cal.
App. 2d 473, 481, 79 Cal. Rptr. 752, 756 (1969) (original assertion of rights by defendant does not require
permanent application of no-interrogation rule when defendant volunteers statement) with People v.
Mathews, 264 Cal. App. 2d 557, 566,70 Cal. Rptr. 756, 764 (1968) (interrogation exists when police officer
begins questioning). See generally Kamisar,,supra note 41, at 351-54, 379-82.
357. Miller v. California, 392 U.S. 616, 624 (Marshall, J., with Warren, C.J., Douglas & Brennan, JJ.,
dissenting from dismissal of certiorari).
358. Because of the freezinfg rain, slippery roads, and various stops along the way, the trip took this
long-and the drive to the Mitchellville area, where the body was buried, probably took three or four
hours. See Kamisar, supra note 2, at 210 n.4.
359. In fact this turned out to be Williams' contention, at least at his second trial. See Kamisar, supra
note 2, at 210 n.4.
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her-it can hardly be doubted that these statements would have been
admissible.360 Nor would the admissibility of any incriminating statements by
Williams have posed any serious problem if they had been preceded by
conversation-as long as the topics had been limited to "intelligence of other
people. . . , organizing youth groups, singing..., playing an organ, and
this sort of thing. '361
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE "INTERPLAY" BETWEEN "POLICE CUSTODY"
AND "POLICE INTERROGATION"
As Massiah itself illustrates better than any other case, the sixth amend-
ment guarantee prevents the government from eliciting or inducing incrimi-
nating statements from one against whom adversary judicial proceedings have
commenced, whether or not he is in custody and whether or not he is aware
that he is dealing with a government agent. As I have argued at length,
however, even though a person is in custody, "surreptitious interrogation" is
insufficient to bring Miranda into play. For unless a person realizes he is
dealing with the police, their efforts to elicit incriminating statements from
him do not constitute "police interrogation" within the meaning of Miranda.
But perhaps the manner in which I have proceeded, up to this point, has been
too "one-dimensional." Perhaps I can state my position more effectively, and
concomitantly summarize that position, by dwelling on the interplay between
the two dimensions of Miranda-"police custody" and "police interroga-
tion."
The inherent or potential impact of government activity on the mind or
"will" of the suspect has nothing to do with the application of Massiah, but
has everything to do with the invocation of Miranda. It is the impact on the
suspect's mind of the interplay between police interrogation and police
custody-each condition reinforcing the pressures and anxieties produced by
the other-that, as the Miranda Court correctly discerned, makes "custodial
police interrogation" so devastating. It is the suspect's realization that the
same persons who have cut him off from the outside world, and have him in
their power and control, want him to confess, and are determined to get him
to do so, that makes the "interrogation" more menacing than it would be
without the custody and the "custody" more intimidating than it would be
without the interrogation.
It is this combination of "custody" and "interrogation" that creates-and,
in the absence of "adequate protective devices, ' 362 enables the police to
exploit-an "interrogation environment" designed to "subjugate the individu-
al to the will of his examiner. 3 63 It is this combination-more awesome,
because of the interplay, than the mere sum of the "custody" and "interroga-
360. In response to a specific question along these lines by one of the Justices, Williams' able court-
appointed counsel, Professor Robert D. Bartels of the University of Iowa College of Law, conceded as
much. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 35 (copy on file at the Georgetown Law Journal).
361. Kamisar, supra note 2, at 215. According to Captain Leaming's testimony, these in fact were most
of the topics covered-before he launched into his famous "Christian burial speech." Id.
362. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 458, 465 (adequate protective devices dispel compulsion
inherent in police custodial questioning).
363. Id. at 457.
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tion" components-that produces the "interrogation atmosphere, ' 364 "inter-
rogation .. .in a police dominated atmosphere, ' 365 that "carries its own
badge of intimidation," 366 that "exacts a heavy toll in individual liberty and
trades on the weakness of individuals, ' 367 and that is so "at odds" with the
privilege against compelled self-incrimination. 368
In the "jail plant" or other "undercover" situations, however, there is no
integration of "custody" and "interrogation," no interplay between the two, at
least none where it counts-in the suspect's mind. So far as the suspect is
aware, he is not "surrounded by antagonistic forces"; 369 "[tihe presence of an
attorney, and the warnings delivered to the individual" are not needed to
"enable [him] under otherwise compelling circumstances to tell his story
without fear, effectively, and in a way that eliminates the evils in the
interrogation process. '370 He simply is not in the "compelling circumstances"
that require Miranda warnings to be given; he is not being subjected to the
"interrogation process."
So far as the suspect is aware, his fellow prisoner neither controls his fate
nor has a professional interest in his case. So far as the suspect is aware, his
fellow prisoner does not care whether he confesses, and thus has little cause to
become abusive by trying to "bully" him if he does not.371 Moreover, even if
the fellow prisoner did care, and cared a great deal, there is no reason to think
that he possesses the power over the suspect or the necessary skills and
training to press demands and to weary the suspect with contradictions of his
assertions until the case "is brought to a definite conclusion. '372
A fellow prisoner may, of course, communicate his determination to get
answers to his questions by wielding a knife or clenching his fist, but that is a
different case. There is nothing inherently compelling about talking with, or
being talked to by, a prisoner in the same or an adjoining cell. For the suspect
thinks he is dealing with an equal, not with his captors.
Why would the suspect doubt that he could end the conversation, or at
least change the subject, whenever he pleased? Why would he fear that his
companion would not let him end the "interrogation"? Why would he worry,
if he does not answer all questions put to him by his companion, that "it will
be the worse for him"?373
364. Id. at 456.
365. Id. at 445 (emphasis added). See also id. at 456, 465.
366. Id. at 457.
367. Id. at 455.
368. Id. at 457-58.
369. Id. at 461.
370. Id. at 466.
371. Cf Project, Interrogations in New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE. L.J. 1519, 1545 (1967)
(observations of tactics actually used by police to interrogate suspects). See generally 8 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE 309 (3d ed. 1940).
372. See Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 2 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 6
(1943) (hearings on bill to repeal McNabb rule) (testimony of Major Edward T. Kelly, then Superintendent
of Police of the District of Columbia) ("I believe that every person should be guaranteed [his constitutional
rights], but at the same time I believe, and I am confident, that when a person is charged with the
commission of a serious crime, there should not be any interference with the police or detectives until such
case is brought to a definite conclusion.").
373. See text at note 303 supra.
[Vol. 67:1
HeinOnline  -- 67 Geo. L. J.  64 1978-1979
"INTERROGATION" AFTER Brewer v. Williams
When a suspect is arrested and brought downtown for police questioning,
at least in the case of a major felony, he will often be in "a crisis-laden
situation. The stakes for him are high-often his freedom for a few or many
years-and his prospects hinge on decisions that must be quickly made: to
cooperate and hope for leniency, to try and talk his way out, to stand
adamantly on his rights." 374 But why, when he thinks he is merely conversing
with a fellow prisoner, when he has no notion that he is confronting the
police, would a suspect worry about "how much leniency cooperation may
earn, how likely fast talk is to succeed, and how much a steadfast refusal to
talk may contribute to a decision by the police, prosecutor or judge to 'throw
the book' at him"? 375
One can deliberately elicit incriminating statements from a person without
having him realize it-that is what happened in Massiah. But how can one
envelop someone in a "police-dominated atmosphere" without having him
realize it? How can one produce an "interrogation environment" well-
calculated to "subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner" when the
individual is not even aware that he is in the presence of "his examiner"? That
is why, I submit, whatever may lurk in the heart or mind of the fellow
prisoner (or apparent friend or colleague), if it is not "custodial police
interrogation" in the eye of the beholder, then it is not such interrogation
within the meaning of Miranda.
CAN THE GOVERNMENT DO INDIRECTLY WHAT IT MAY NOT DO
DIRECTLY?
I can already hear the howls of protests: "What you are saying is that the
government can do indirectly what it may not do directly!" 376 Am I? What
exactly is it that the government may not do directly?
374. Project, supra note 371, at 1613-14.
375. See id. at 1614.
376. See State v. Smith, 107 Ariz. 100, 102, 104,482 P.2d 863, 865, 867(1971) ("What the State may not
do directly, it cannot do indirectly.") (but when defendant made incriminating disclosures to "jail plant" he
had already been appointed counsel); State v. Daugherty, 221 Kan. 612, 618, 623, 562 P.2d 42, 47, 50
(1977) (McCorgary statement, infra, quoted with approval and applied) (but "bugged" conversation
between defendant and codefendant, cooperating with the prosecution, occurred two days before trial and
when defendant represented by counsel); State v. McCorgary, 218 Kan. 358, 359, 363, 543 P.2d 952, 955-
56, 958 (1975) ("The whole purpose of the state in using a secret informer is to avoid that which is required
of a police officer [informing an in-custody suspect of his rights and not proceeding without a valid waiver].
What the state may not do directly to secure evidence, it cannot do indirectly.") (but "jail plant" obtained
incriminating statements from defendant after he had appeared before a magistrate and been appointed
counsel); State v. Travis, 116 R.I. 678, 679-83, 360 A.2d 548, 549, 551 (1976) ("The police were not
allowed to interrogate defendant directly. There is no authority in these circumstances for the police to do
indirectly what they may not do directly.") (but the undercover agent became defendant's "cellmate"
shortly after defendant had expressed a desire to consult with a lawyer and refused to say anything until he
did). See also United States v. Brown, 466 F.2d 493, 494, 495 (10th Cir. 1972) (pointing out that when
defendant's friend visited him in his cell, with police "permission," and obtained incriminating statements
from him, as the police had "requested" him to do, "he was functioning as an instrument of the police" and
"doing that which the police themselves could not do.") (but defendant had told the police earlier, when
given his Miranda warnings, that he did not wish to make any statements and that he did want an
attorney).
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What Massiah Allows. Massiah, as clarified by Williams, makes clear
that once adversary proceedings have commenced against an individual,
government efforts to elicit incriminating statements, whether done openly in
the police station or "indirectly and surreptitiously, ' 377 violate the individu-
al's right to counsel. But When the government attempts to elicit incriminat-
ing statements from an individual before adversary proceedings have com-
menced against him, it is not necessarily violating his right to counsel. For in
the absence of other factors, such as an inherently compelling interrogation
environment, an individual is not entitled to counsel whenever he is subjected
to an "interrogation," but only when such interrogations take place at or after
the commencement of adversary proceedings. 378
As I have discussed, Colson deceived not only Massiah, but his codefen-
dant, Anfield, as well. He deceived Anfield in the same way-by arranging a
meeting in the same specially equipped car, which enabled the same narcotics
agent to overhear the conversation. 379 As far as I am aware, nobody argued
that Anfield's right to counsel had been violated; nor would such an argument
have much prospect for success. For the electronically overheard Colson-
Anfield meeting, occurred before adversary proceedings had been initiated
against Anfield.380 Thus, it could not be said, as it could in Massiah, that the
377. See note 262 supra.
378. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. at 401; Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. at 204-05; cf. United
States v. Hayles, 471 F.2d 788, 791 (5th Cir. 1973). In Hayles the court stated:
[In one important respect [Massiah] retains its vitality and stands as a supplement to
Miranda; Massiah teaches that. . . after [a defendant] has been indicted [or, more generally,
adversary proceedings have been initiated against him],[the government] may not nullify the
protection Miranda affords a defendant by using trickery to extract incriminating statements
from him that otherwise could not be obtained without first giving him the required warnings.
Today Massiah simply means that after indictment [or the commencement of judicial
proceedings] and [or?] counsel has been retained the Fifth Amendment [the Sixth Amend-
ment?] prevents law enforcement authorities from deliberately eliciting incriminating state-
ments from a defendant by the surreptitious methods used in that case.
Id. (emphasis added).
The initiation of judicial proceedings without more probably activates the "Massiah right to counsel."
See text at notes 511-36 infra. Whether representation by counsel without more does so as well is a more
difficult question. See notes 537-43 infra and accompanying text.
379. See text at note 284 supra; note 39 supra.
380. When the Massiah case reached the Second Circuit, all three judges agreed that evidence obtained
from the Anfield-Colson meeting was admissible against Anfield; dissenting Judge Hays argued only that
the eavesdrop evidence obtained from Massiah should be barred. See United States v. Massiah, 307 F.2d
62, 69 (2d Cir. 1962). But Anfield's conviction was reversed on other grounds. See id. at 64.
Five years after Anfield and Massiah were tried, other coindictees, including one Maxwell, were
brought to trial. Maxwell had also made the mistake of talking with Colson in the latter's "bugged" car, but
did so before judicial proceedings had commenced against him. See note 39 supra. On appeal, as the Second
Circuit noted, Maxwell did not press his claim that the recording and broadcasting of his conversation with
Colson violated his right to counsel. United States v. Maxwell, 383 F.2d 437, 442 (2d Cir. 1967). "In any
event," added the court, this point "is meritless." Id. The court cited Molinas v. Mancusi, 370 F.2d 601 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 984 (1967), in which defendant's claim that his constitutional rights were
violated when a secretly tape-recorded conversation between him and a coconspirator, who was
cooperating with the government, was rejected on the ground, inter alia, that at the time the conversation
took place an indictment had not yet been returned against defendant. Id. at 603. "Although the state may
have had sufficient evidence to indict Molinas, that is immaterial." Id.
HeinOnline  -- 67 Geo. L. J.  66 1978-1979
"INTERROGATION" AFTER Brewer v. Williams
government had "indirectly" violated Anfield's right to counsel. Anfield was
not yet "entitled to a lawyer's help." 381 He had no "Massiah right to counsel"
that could be violated. No more than did Messrs. Hoffa, Osborn, and White.
What Miranda Allows. Miranda makes clear that the privilege applies
both to "informal compulsion" exerted during custodial interrogation and to
the more formal variety meted out in court proceedings. 382 But when the
government employs an undercover agent, rather than a readily identifiable
police officer, it is not doing indirectly what Miranda forbids it to do. It is not
compelling an individual to incriminate himself-informally, inherently, or
indirectly. It is not dealing with a prisoner under circumstances in which (in
the absence of warnings designed to clarify a confusing situation that the
police too often have exploited) a person is likely to assume or be led to believe
that there is a legal, or at least an extralegal, sanction for contumacy.383
When the government employs a secret agent posing as a fellow prisoner,
the suspect does not feel "at the mercy of. . .custodians who have strong
incentives for seeking a quick solution. . . by pressing him to acknowledge
his guilt. ' 38 4 Rather, the suspect thinks he is dealing only with someone "in
the same boat," as well as the same cell. The government agent's words do not
"take on color from [his] uniform, badge, gun and demeanor"3 85 when the
agent carries neither badge nor gun and wears not "police blue," but the same
prison gray as the defendant.
Under Miranda, the government may not rely on an "interrogation
environment," which "carries its own badge of intimidation" and is "created
for no purpose other than to subjugate the individual to the will of his
examiner. '386 But when a government agent conceals his true identity-in-
deed, because he does-the government is not relying on an "interrogation
environment" at all. Rather, it is relying on the suspect's "misplaced
381. "[Flour concurring Justices pointed out [in Spano] that the Constitution required reversal of the
conviction on the sole and specific ground that the confession had been deliberately elicited by the police
after the defendant had been indicted, and therefore at a time when he was clearly entitled to a lawyer's
help." Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. at 204 (emphasis added). "We hold that [Massiah] was denied
the basic protections of [the sixth amendment] guarantee when there was used against him at his trial
evidence of his own incriminating words, which federal agents had deliberately elicited from him after he
had been indicted and in the absence of his counsel." Id. at 206 (emphasis added). See also Brewer v.
Williams, 430 U.S. at 398 ("Whatever else it may mean, the right to counsel ... means at least that a
person is entitled to the help of a lawyer at or after the time that judicial proceedings have been initiated
against him . . .") (emphasis added).
382. "We are satisfied that all the principles embodied in the privilege apply to informal compulsion
exerted by law-enforcement officers during in-custody questioning." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 461.
See also id. at 467 ("there can be no doubt that the Fifth Amendment privilege is available outside of
criminal court proceedings and serves to protect persons in all settings in which their freedom of action is
curtailed in any significant way from being compelled to incriminate themselves"). See text at notes 103-07
supra.
383. See Kamisar, supra note 86, at 31-32.
384. Cf J. MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT 109 (1959) (confessions usually given when speaker feels at
mercy of those holding him in custody).
385. Cf. Foote, The Fourth Amendment: Obstacle or Necessity in the Law of Arrest? in POLICE POWER
AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDoM 29, 30 (C. Sowle ed. 1962).
386. See text at notes 363-66supra.
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confidence that [his companion will] not reveal his wrongdoing. '' 387 Under
such circumstances, the government is deceiving the suspect-as "Agent"
Partin deceived Hoffa and as "Agent" Vick deceived Osborn-but such
deception "[does] not tend to show either actual coercion or a potentially
coercive setting."388
When the government utilizes a "secret agent" to induce a prisoner to
incriminate himself, it does not necessarily "trick" him into "waiving" his
constitutional rights: findings of "trickery" and "waiver" depend on the
particular circumstances and the particular constitutional right. When adver-
sary judicial criminal proceedings have already commenced, then, under
Massiah, the government cannot send an "undercover agent" against the
defendant. But the Massiah doctrine does not turn on the existence of a
"police-dominated atmosphere" or an "interrogation environment." Perhaps
when the suspect has already retained counsel, 389 or perhaps even when he has
simply asserted his Miranda rights,390 I think that the government may not be
permitted to approach him, directly or indirectly-under Massiah and
perhaps under Miranda as well. But when adversary proceedings have not yet
commenced and the suspect is not yet represented by counsel, and has not
even asserted his Miranda rights, then-unless and until he is subjected to
"custodial police interrogation," that is, interrogation under inherently
compelling circumstances-he has no fifth or sixth amendment rights to
"waive": those rights have not yet come into play.
When an arrestee volunteers his version of the events, and the police, well
aware that the arrestee is unwittingly incriminating himself, let him talk, they
do not thereby violate the person's Miranda rights or "trick" him into
"waiving" them because, under the circumstances, the person does not have
any Miranda rights.391 Miranda tells us, in effect, that "a statement may be
volunteered in ignorance of the privilege against self-incrimination and 'of the
consequences of foregoing it.' "392 Similarly, when the police interview a
person in his home or office, especially when they do so in the presence of a
relative or friend, and the questioning takes place in a context that does not
restrict the person's freedom to terminate the meeting, the police are not doing
indirectly what they may not do directly. Rather, they are doing what
Miranda permits them to do-indeed, one might say, recommends that they
do.393 They are dealing with the suspect in a situation that lacks "the indicia
of coercion that motivated the Miranda scrutiny" of in-custody interroga-
387. See text at note 332 supra.
388. Cf. Procunier v. Atchley, 400 US. 446, 454 (1971) (discussed at notes 315-17 supra and
accompanying text).
389. See notes 453-61, 504-08, 537-43 infra and accompanying text.
390. See text at notes 453-61 infra; note 461 infra.
391. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 478 (rights apply to one taken into custody, deprived of
freedom in significant way, and questioned).
392. Thompson, supra note 292, at 422 (Professor (now Governor) Thompson criticizes Miranda Court
for failing to take account of this fact). But see Kamisar, Kauper's "Judicial Examination of the Accused"
Forty Years Later-Some Comments on a Remarkable Article, 73 MICH. L. RaV. 15,30-31 n.59 (1974).
393. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 477-78 & n.46 (police may visit suspect at home or office, but
may not subject him to "custodial interrogation").
[Vol. 67:1
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tion394 and that lacks "the elements which the Miranda Court found so
inherently coercive as to require its holding." 395
The same may be said, I submit, for the "pure" "jail plant" case, that is,
one in which an apparent fellow prisoner induces his cellmate to confess when
adversary judicial proceedings have not yet been initiated against the
individual, when he is not yet represented by counsel, and when he has not
even asserted his Miranda rights. Except for the California cases, 396 I have
found no case excluding statements obtained from a prisoner by a "jail plant"
that did not include one or more of the above factors. 397 These factors aside, I
submit that in the "jail plant" situation the government has not "create[d] the
kind of atmosphere that . . . triggers Miranda.'398
To be sure, if the suspect had known his cellmate was a government agent,
he would not have talked freely in his presence. But then neither would Hoffa,
Osborn, or White, if they had realized they were dealing with undercover
agents. In this sense, the government can do "indirectly" what it would be
unable to do "directly" (as a practical matter, not as a matter of law). Put
another way, by concealing its agents' true identities the government can
gather evidence that it would not be able to acquire if these agents had to go
unmasked. But this will necessarily be the case as long as "[a] law enforce-
ment officer performing his official duties cannot be required always to be in
uniform or to wear his badge of authority on the lapel of his civilian clothing"
or "to proclaim himself an arm of the law. ' 399
IV. SOME FINAL THOUGHTS
Inspector Gregory: Is there any other point to which you wish to
draw my attention?
Sherlock Holmes: To the curious incident of the dog in the night-
time.
The Inspector: The dog did nothing in the night-time.
Holmes: That was the curious incident ...
-Silver Blaze4°°
The curious thing about the treatment of Miranda in Brewer v. Williams is
that neither Justice Stewart, who wrote the majority opinion, nor Justices
394. United States v. Beckwith, 510 F.2d 741, 742 (D.C. Cir. 1975), aff d, 425 U.S. 341 (1976).
395. Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 347 (1976) (Burger, C.J.).
396. See notes 319-27 supra and accompanying text.
397. See cases discussed in note 376 supra. See also United States v. Holmes, 452 F.2d 249, 269 (7th Cir.
197 1) (statement, unilluminated by any discussion that Massiah's rationale applies to postarrest, as well as
postindictment, surveillance, but at time statements obtained defendant represented by counsel and
released on bond); People v. Robinson, 16 A.D.2d 184, 224 N.Y.S.2d 705 (1962) (discussed at note 240
supra).
398. See United States v. Hall, 421 F.2d 540, 545 (2d Cir. 1969) (Friendly, J.).
399. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 315 (1966) (Warren, C.J., dissenting). "It blinks the realities
of sophisticated, modem-day criminal activity and legitimate law enforcement practices," added Warren,
"to argue the contrary." Id. See also Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 209 (1966) (Warren, C.J.)
(companion case to Hoffa).
400. A.C. DOYLE, Silver Blaze, in THE MEMOIRS OF SHERLOCK HOLMES 1, 24 (1894).
1978]
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Marshall, Powell, and Stevens, who filed concurring opinions, made any use
of it. Unlike most Miranda cases, the issue in Williams was neither the
adequacy of the warnings nor the effectiveness of the suspect's alleged waiver
in immediate response to the warnings. Rather, Williams involved "second
level" Miranda safeguards, those "procedures [Miranda] had indicated
should be followed when a defendant asserts his rights."'4 1 It is because these
"second level" rights seem to have been so utterly disregarded in Wil-
liams-especially if the "Christian burial speech" is viewed as "interroga-
tion"-that the Court's avoidance of Miranda is at least puzzling and at worst
(for supporters of Miranda, at any rate) downright ominous.
If the issue in Williams had been simply whether, after being advised of his
Miranda rights, the defendant had effectively waived them before or at the
time he revealed the whereabouts of the body, the considerable pains the
Court took to treat Williams as a Massiah, and not as a Miranda, case402
would have been more understandable. In that event, the Williams case could
be viewed as one in which the Court chose the Massiah, rather than a
Miranda, route because it was ready and willing to "[adopt] a rather rigorous
view of waiver as applied to a defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel,"
but inclined to "grant the prosecution more leeway in establishing waiver of
the privilege against self-incrimination. ' 403
The trouble with this explanation is that when Williams' alleged waiver
occurred he had already asserted his right to counsel numerous times.404 It
may be my shortcoming, but I fail to see why an alleged waiver of a
specifically and repeatedly asserted "Miranda right to counsel" should not be
judged by the same strict Johnson v. Zerbst standards applicable to a
"Massiah right to counsel." Indeed, if one must choose, a right to counsel
designed to meet a specific need-"dispel[ling] the compelling atmosphere of
the interrogation" 405-would seem more deserving of protection than the
401. People v. Grant, 45 N.Y.2d 366, 371-72, 380 N.E.2d 257 260, 408 N.Y.S.2d 429, 432 (1978)
(Wachtler, J.).
402. See text at notes 184-215supra.
403. See Israel, supra note 154, at 1386 n.281. See also id. at 1381-82 n.268; note 171 supra and
accompanying text (discussion of lower court cases that have adopted very strict standard for effective
waiver of "Massiah right to counsel").
404. See text at notes l1-17supra.
405. At one point in its opinion, the Miranda Court commented:
[In Escobedo], as in the cases today, we sought a protective device to dispel the compelling
atmosphere of the interrogation. . . . The presence of counsel, in all the cases before us
today, would be the adequate protective device necessary to make the process of police
interrogation conform to the dictates of the privilege.
384 U.S. at 465-66. The Court later added:
Even preliminary advice given to the accused by his own attorney can be swiftly overcome by
the secret interrogation process. . . . Thus, the need for counsel to protect the Fifth
Amendment privilege comprehends not merely a right to consult with counsel prior to any
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more abstract Massiah right, which applies whether or not "the privilege
against [compelled] self-incrimination is jeopardized. '406
If, as the Williams Court apparently recognized 407 -and considered the
State of Iowa to have in effect conceded 408 -Captain Leaming's speech
constituted, or was tantamount to, Miranda "interrogation," then Williams
emerges as a relatively easy Miranda case. This, I think, may be seen by
contrasting the Williams facts with those in Michigan v. Mosley.409
Although language in Miranda-that once an in-custody suspect "in-
dicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he
wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease" 410-could be read as
creating a per se rule against any further questioning of one who has invoked
his "right to silence," 411 Mosley held that interrogation may be resumed at
least in the following circumstances: (1) The original interrogation is prompt-
ly terminated;412 (2) the questioning is resumed only "after the passage of a
significant period of time";413 (3) the suspect is given "full and complete
Miranda warnings at the outset of the second interrogation"; 414 (4) a different
officer resumes the questioning;415 and (5) the second interrogation is
"restricted . .. to a crime that had not been the subject of the earlier
interrogation." 416
406. Id. at 478 ("when an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the
authorities and is subjected to questioning, the privilege against self-incrimination is jeopardized").
Massiah applies whether or not an individual is deprived of his freedom and whether or not he is
subjected to the inherently coercive police questioning that must be preceded by Miranda warnings.
Moreover, although the "Miranda right to counsel" was specifically invoked in Williams, the "Massiah
right" need not be. See McLeod v. Ohio, 1 Ohio St.2d 60, 62,203 N.E.2d 349, 351 (1964), rev'd per curiam,
381 U.S. 356 (1965); notes 263-69 supra and accompanying text.
407. See note 27 supra.
408. See id.
409. 423 U.S. 96 (1975) (Stewart, J.).
410. 384 U.S. at 473-74.
411. But the Miranda language cannot "sensibly" be so read, maintained the Mosley majority. Michigan
v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 102-03 (1975).
412. Id. at 104, 106.
413. Id. at 106.
414. Id. at 104; see id. at 106.
415. Id. at 104-05; see note 416 infra.
416. Id. at 106. The Mosley Court offered the following reasons for allowing a resumption of questioning
in the fifth situation:
The subsequent questioning [by Detective Hill] did not undercut Mosley's previous decision
not to answer Detective Cowie's inquiries [at the first interrogation session]. Detective Hill
did not resume the interrogation about [the two robberies that were the subject of the earlier
interrogation], but instead focused exclusively on the Leroy Williams homicide [a homicide
that had occurred in the course of a third robbery], a crime different in nature and in time and
place of occurrence from the robberies for which Mosley had been arrested and interrogated
by Detective Cowie. . . .[Hill's] questioning of Mosley about an unrelated homicide was
quite consistent with Mosley's earlier refusal to answer any questions about the robberies.
Id. at 105.
I am operating on the premise that the Mosley facts were as the Supreme Court perceived them to be;
but there is reason to doubt that this is so. Professor Geoffrey Stone, who has studied the Mosley record,
indicates that the police testimony provides only shaky support for the view that after declining to discuss
certain robberies at the initial interrogation Mosley was subsequently questioned about "an unrelated"
robbery-murder. See Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 Sup. Cr. REv. 99, 134. He
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The Mosley Court seems to have assigned considerable weight to the fact
that the second interrogation was restricted to a separate and "unrelated"
crime, one "different in nature and in time and place of occurrence from the
robberies for which Mosley had been. . . [earlier] interrogated. ' ' 417 Indeed, it
has been argued that "this fact seems critical, for in its absence one is left only
with a renewed effort to question by a different member of the same police
force, in a different room in the same building, only two hours after Mosley's
assertion of his right not to be questioned. '41 8 Of course, this fact, significant
if not critical in Mosley, is missing in Williams.
Doubts have been raised whether, once a suspect has asserted his Miranda
rights, "a fresh set of warnings" at the outset of the second session is
"sufficient to dissipate the coercion inherent in the continuing custody and
the renewed questioning. '419 But surely under such circumstances a fresh set
of warnings is a minimal requirement for the resumption of questioning. Yet
nothing resembling a fresh set of Miranda warnings was given between the
time Williams last exercised his Miranda rights and the time Captain
Leaming delivered his "Christian burial speech." Upon arriving in Davenport
to bring Williams back to Des Moines, Captain Leaming advised Williams of
his rights-and Williams asserted them. He asked, and was allowed, to meet
alone with his Davenport lawyer.420 When Leaming was about to handcuff
him and start the journey back, Williams again asserted his rights. Again he
asked (this time on his own initiative), and was permitted, to confer alone
with his lawyer.421 Less than an hour later, apparently only a short time after
they had left the Davenport area and entered the freeway,422 Leaming
launched into his now famous speech. At no point between Williams' last
meeting with his lawyer and the time he became the recipient of Leaming's
remarks on "Christian burials" can it even be argued that Williams was
"reminded again that he could remain silent and consult with a lawyer. '423
also points out that the Michigan courts never found-indeed, the Michigan Court of Appeals voiced
skepticism-that the initial interrogation did not concern the robbery-murder. Id.
417. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 105 (1975).
418. Stone, supra note 416, at 134. But see Note, Fifth Amendment, Confessions, Self-Incrimina-
tion-Does a Request for Counsel Prohibit a Subsequent Waiver of Miranda Prior to the Presence of
Counsel? 23 WAYNE L. REV. 1321, 1333-34 (1977). The Supreme Court of California recently held that
assuming arguendo that the "circumstances" relied on by the Mosley Court "are essentially the same as
those of the [instant case]," they are "inadequate to protect defendant's privilege against self-incrimination
under the California Constitution." People v. Pettingill, 21 Cal. 3d 231, -_, 578 P.2d 108, 117-18, 145
Cal. Rptr. 861, 870-871 (1978).
419. Chase, The Burger Court, the Individual, and the Criminal Process: Directions and Misdirections, 52
N.Y.U. L. REV. 518, 559 (1977) (emphasis added). Concern about the coercion inherent in the continuing
custody as well as the renewed questioning contributed to California's decision to reject Mosley as a matter
of state constitutional law. See People v. Pettingill, 21 Cal. 3d 231,..... 578 P.2d 108, 114-15, 119,
145 Cal. Rptr. 861, 867-68, 872 (1978).
420. Brief for Petitioner, Joint App. at 75 (testimony of Captain Leaming).
421. Id. at 76 (testimony of Captain Leaming).
422. See id. at 55, 63, 74-76, 104 (testimony of Captain Leaming and Detective Nelson). But cf. id. at 81
(testimony of Captain Leaming) (discussed at note 437 infra).
423. Cf. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104-05 (1975). The Mosley Court described the facts in that
case as follows:
A review of the circumstances leading to Mosley's confession reveals that his "right to cut off
questioning" was fully respected in this case. . . . When Mosley stated [at the first
[Vol. 67:1
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Assuming arguendo that the "Christian burial speech" did not amount to
"interrogation," Miranda would still seem to prohibit Leaming's tactics. For
whether or not the captain engaged in "interrogation," he surely engaged in
efforts "calculated 'to persuade [one who had earlier asserted his Miranda
rights] to reconsider his position,' "424 and such persuasion is seemingly
forbidden by Miranda and Mosley.425 Moreover, and more generally, even if
the "Christian burial speech" did not amount to "interrogation" within the
meaning of Miranda, how can it be said that a detective who "deliberately and
designedly set[s] out to elicit information" 426 from one who has exercised his
Miranda rights is "fully respect[ing]" 427 or "scrupulously honor[ing]" 428 those
rights? And if the claim is made that, although Williams had earlier asserted
his rights, he somehow waived them somewhere on the road to Des Moines,
how can it be maintained that the "Christian burial speech" does not
constitute "any evidence" that he was "tricked or cajoled into a waiver"? 429
There remains, of course, one significant, or at least potentially significant,
distinction between Mosley and Williams: Mosley only invoked his right to
silence, but Williams repeatedly asserted his right to counsel as well. And, as
both Justice Stewart, who wrote the majority opinion in Mosley,430 and Justice
interrogation session] that he did not want to discuss the robberies, Detective Cowie
immediately ceased the interrogation and did not try either to resume the questioning or in
any way to persuade Mosley to reconsider his position. . . .[Mosley] was given full and
complete Miranda warnings at the outset of the second interrogation. He was thus reminded
again that he could remain silent and could consult with a lawyer, and was carefully given a
full and fair opportunity to exercise these options.
Id.
424. See People v. Grant, 45 N.Y.2d. 366, 373, 380 N.E.2d 257, 262, 408 N.Y.S.2d 429, 434 (1978)
(quoting from Mosley passage set forth in note 423 supra); cf. People v. Jackson, 41 N.Y.2d 146, 152, 359
N.E.2d 677, 682, 391 N.Y.S.2d 82, 87 (1976) (once defendant has asserted rights, waiver obtained after
continued and unbroken harrassment invalid).
425. Forbidden, that is, at least when, as in Williams, the persuasion is: (1) resorted to by the same
officer before whom the suspect had earlier asserted his rights; (2) neither accompanied nor preceded by a
fresh set of warnings; and (3) not restricted to a crime "different in nature" or "in time and place of
occurrence" from the crime or crimes for which the suspect had been arrested or earlier interrogated. See
Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 105 (1975).
426. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. at 399.
427. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 105 (1975).
428. Id. 103-04 ("A reasonable and faithful interpretation of the Miranda opinion must rest on the
[Miranda Court's intention) to adopt 'fully effective means. . . to notify the person of his right of silence
and to assure that the exercise of the right will be scrupulously honored ....... ... The admissibility of
statements obtained after the person in custody has decided to remain silent depends under Miranda on
whether his 'right to cut off questioning' was 'scrupulously honored.' ") (quoting from Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. at 479). See also 384 U.S. at 467 ("In order to combat [the inherently compelling pressures of in-
custody interrogation] and to permit a full opportunity to exercise the privilege against self-incrimination,
the accused must be adequately and effectively apprised of his rights and the exercise of those rights must
be fully honored.").
429. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 476.
430. Rejecting the dissenters' argument that Miranda established a requirement that once a suspect has
asserted his right to remain silent, questioning may be resumed only when counsel is present, Justice
Stewart observed:
But clearly the Court in Miranda imposed no such requirement, for it distinguished between
the procedural safeguards triggered by a request to remain silent and a request for an attorney
and directed that "the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present" only "[i]f the
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White, who concurred in the result in that case,431 recognized, by providing
that "[i]f the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation
must cease until an attorney is present, '432 Miranda may have created a per se
rule against further "interrogation" after assertion of the right to counsel.
Justice White's observation in Mosley that "when [the Miranda Court]
wanted to create a per se rule against further interrogation after assertion of a
right, it knew how to do so"'433 (referring to the assertion of the right to
counsel) came back to haunt him in Williams. He offered two reasons for the
inapplicability of the "rigid prophylactic [Miranda] rule' 434 (with respect to
the assertion of the right to counsel) to the Williams case. The first seems
quite strained:
[A]t no time did respondent indicate a desire not to be asked
questions outside the presence of his counsel-notwithstanding the
fact that he was told that he and the officers would be "visiting in
the car." . . . [Williams] did [assert his right to counsel], but he
never, himself, asserted a right not to be questioned in the absence
of counsel. 435
individual states that he wants an attorney."
Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104 n.10 (1975).
The lower courts are split over whether an in-custody suspect's request for counsel imposes a per se rule
prohibiting the resumption of police questioning until an attorney is present. See People v. Grant, 45
N.Y.2d 366, 375 n.1, 380 N.E.2d 257, 262 n.l, 408 N.Y.S.2d 429, 434 n.1 (1978) (collecting cases).
431. Justice White agreed with the Mosley majority that "the statement in Miranda, 384 U.S., at 474,
requiring interrogation to cease after an assertion of the 'right to silence' tells us nothing because it does not
indicate how soon this interrogation may resume." Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 109 (1975) (White, J.,
concurring). Justice White added:
The [Miranda] Court showed in the very next paragraph, moreover, that when it wanted to
create a per se rule against further interrogation after assertion of a right, it knew how to do
so. The court there said "ilf the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation
must cease until an attorney is present."
Id. at 109-10 (quoting from 384 U.S. at 474) (emphasis added by Justice White). Justice White then added
in a footnote:
The question of the proper procedure following expression by an individual of his desire to
consult counsel is not presented in this case. It is sufficient to note that the reasons to keep the
lines of communication between the authorities and the accused open when the accused has
chosen to make his own decisions are not present when he indicates instead that he wishes
legal advice with respect thereto. The authorities may then communicate with him through
an attorney. More to the point, the accused having expressed his own view that he is not
competent to deal with the authorities without legal advice, a later decision at the authorities'
insistence to make a statement without counsel's presence may properly be viewed with
skepticism.
Id. at 110 n.2.
432. See note 431 supra.
433. Id.
434. 430 U.S. at 436 n.6 (White, J., with Blackmun & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting).
435. Id. Justice White's reference to Captain Leaming's disclosure that he and Williams would be
"visiting" on the return trip to Des Moines is baffling. There is no reason to think that Williams had any
idea that "visiting" is a "term of art" for a low-keyed "interrogation." Presumably he thought Leaming
meant that they would engage in "small talk" unrelated to the case. If so, what would Justice White have
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Although here, as elsewhere, the police testimony is not as clear as it ought
to be,436 the most plausible reading of the record is that shortly after Captain
Leaming and his prisoner had begun the return trip to Des Moines-and
shortly before the rendering of the "Christian burial speech"-Williams
informed the captain that he would tell him "the whole story" after he got
back to Des Moines and met with his lawyer.437 This was a clear expression by
Williams himself that he did not wish to be questioned outside the presence of
his Des Moines lawyer, or at least not until he had conferred with him.438 But
this point is not crucial. Assuming arguendo that Williams made no statement
immediately prior to the "Christian burial speech," the record is clear that
after Leaming announced that they would be "visiting" during the ride back
had Williams do? Reject Leaming's invitation to visit, which he might well have interpreted as an invitation
to be nice to him? Insist that they spend the four or five hours driving back in stony silence? Exact a
promise from Leaming that while they were "visiting" he would not try to trick Williams into
incriminating himself? Williams was in no mood to displease or irritate Leaming. Thefirst thing he asked
the captain on the drive back was whether Leaming "hated him" and "wished to kill him." Brief for
Petitioner, Joint App. at 79, 94 (testimony of Captain Leaming). Earlier, when he had phoned his Des
Moines lawyer from Davenport, Williams had expressed fear that somebody was "going to hit him in the
head." Id. at 96.
436. See generally Kamisar, supra note 2.
437. Detective Nelson, who drove the car on the drive back to Des Moines, testified that the "Christian
burial speech" was delivered only a short time after they left the Davenport area and entered the freeway.
Brief for Petitioner, Joint App. at 104. At one point, Captain Leaming testified to the same effect. Id. at 63
(testimony of Captain Learning). But at another point, when Leaming testified more extensively on this
subject, he stated that "eventually"-after considerable talk on various topics, such as religion, organizing
youth groups, playing an organ, intelligence of other people, police procedures--"as we were travelling
along there," he delivered the "Christian burial speech." Id. at 80-81. The first time Williams told Leaming
he would reveal "the whole story" after he conferred with his Des Moines lawyer was "not too long after
we got on the freeway, after we had gassed up and started-gotten on the freeway and started toward Des
Moines." Id. at 65-66.
Moreover, Leaming conceded at another point that even though Williams had stated that he would tell
him "the whole story after I see [Des Moines lawyer] McKnight," he "kept getting" what he "could get"
from Williams before they got back to Des Moines. Id. at 60-61. As Williams' able court-appointed
counsel, Professor Robert D. Bartels of the University of Iowa College of Law, put it, either this effort by
Leaming
to get as much information as he could before they reached Des Moines. . . included the
"Christian burial" speech, or Detective Leaming engaged in further efforts to acquire
information that he did not divulge in detail during his testimony. Although the former
alternative is the more likely one, for purposes of this case it does not matter which is true.
Brief for Respondent at 17 n.9.
The federal district court did not specifically find that Leaming delivered "the speech" before the first
time Williams told Learning that he would talk to the captain after he consulted with his Des Moines
lawyer. The court, however, did find:
Petitioner indicated that he did not wish to talk on the trip by stating that he would talk after
he got back to Des Moines and spoke with Mr. McKnight. . . . Detective Leaming carried
on a conversation with Petitioner during the trip concerning religion. . . and various other
topics, including. . . the intelligence of other people, police procedures, organizing youth
groups . ...
See Williams v. Brewer, 375 F. Supp. 170, 174 (S.D. Iowa 1974) (finding of fact number 14). As I have
discussed, according to Leaming the discussion of these topics preceded the "Christian burial speech."
438. 430 U.S. at 405.
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to Des Moines, Williams requested, and was permitted, to confer with his
Davenport lawyer two more times.439 And the Davenport lawyer, presumably
with the concurrence, if not at the urging, of his client, (1) advised Learning
that "it was his understanding that [Williams] was not to be questioned until
he got to Des Moines," 440 and (upon Leaming's expression of some reserva-
tions) "stated that that understanding should be carried out";441 and (2)
requested, but was refused permission, to ride along with his client on the trip
back to Des Moines.442 Presumably the Davenport lawyer made the request to
accompany his client on the return trip in Williams' presence. In any event,
Williams soon knew that his lawyer's request had been denied.
It is true that Williams himself did not-in so many words-assert "a right
not to be questioned in the absence of counsel." 443 What of it? Earlier in the
same Miranda passage that arguably creates a per se rule against further
"interrogation" after assertion of the right to counsel, the Miranda Court
observed: "If the individual indicates in any manner . . . that he wishes to
remain silent, the interrogation must cease." 444 It is hard to believe that
Miranda requires that the right to counsel be asserted with a greater degree of
clarity than the right to silence, especially when Miranda elsewhere states that
if an individual "indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that
he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no
questioning." 445 As the Supreme Court of California has observed:
To strictly limit the manner in which a suspect may assert [his
Miranda rights], or to demand that it be invoked with unmistaka-
ble clarity (resolving any ambiguity against the defendant) would
subvert Miranda's prophylactic intent. Moreover, it would benefit,
if anyone, only the experienced criminal who, while most adept at
learning effective methods of coping with the police, is least likely
to find incarceration and police interrogation unnerving. 446
Moreover, why does it matter, as Justice White evidently thinks it does,
that Williams himself, as opposed to his lawyers, did not specifically assert a
right not to be questioned in the absence of counsel?447 "Williams had
effectively asserted his right to counsel by having secured attorneys at both
ends of the automobile trip, both of Whom, acting as his agents, had made
clear to the police that no interrogation was to occur during the journey."' 448
439. Brief for Petitioner, Joint App. at 75-76 (testimony of Captain Learning).
440. 375 F. Supp. at 173; see id. at 176.
441. Id. at 173.
442. Id.; see id. at 176.
443. 430 U.S. at 436 n.6 (White, J., with Blackmun & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting); see note 435 supra.
444. 384 U.S. at 473-74 (emphasis added).
445: Id. at 444-45 (emphasis added).
446. People v. Randall, 1 Cal. 3d 948, 955, 464 P.2d 114, 118, 83 Cal. Rptr. 658, 662 (1970) (in absence
of compelling evidence to contrary, suspect's phone call to his attorney during "booking process"
tantamount to assertion of Miranda rights); see People v. Buxton, 44 N.Y.2d 33, 37, 374 NE.2d 384, 386,
403 N.Y.S.2d 487, 489 (1978) (it would be "an absurd formality" to hold that defendant's request, in
presence of police, that his employer call his lawyer did not sufficiently indicate to police his desire for
counsel).
447. 430 U.S. at 436 n.6 (White, J., with Blackmun & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting); see note 435 supra.
448. 430 U.S. at 405.
[Vol. 67:1
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Isn't that enough? Why, after retaining two lawyers, and while isolated from
them, should an obviously frightened murder suspect-Williams expressed
fear on the return trip that the police might kill him449-be required to assert
his rights himself, and in a particular manner to boot? Wasn't Williams
entitled to assume that his lawyers were more adept at asserting legal rights
and dealing with the police than he was? Wasn't that why he hired them?
The second reason Justice White gave for not applying the "rigid prophy-
lactic [Miranda] rule" concerning assertion of the right to counsel was that
Williams had not been "questioned." 450 I have maintained at considerable
length that the "Christian burial speech" should be viewed as "interrogation"
within the meaning of Miranda,451 and have pointed out that the Williams
majority apparently so regarded it.452 Nevertheless, Williams need not have
prevailed on this issue to have had his incriminating disclosures excluded on
Miranda grounds. Once the suspect has exercised his right to counsel, and
thus brought the "second level" Miranda safeguards into play,453 the issue is
no longer simply whether "interrogation" then occurred, but whether "the
exercise of the right" was "scrupulously honored. ' 454 When Leaming deliv-
ered the "Christian burial speech" he was admittedly "playing upon Wil-
liams' religious conscience." 45 5 More generally, he was disregarding Williams'
449. See note 435 supra. Williams was also an escapee from a mental hospital, black, and a resident of
the state for only a few months.
450. 430 U.S. at 436 n.6 (White, J., with Blackmun & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting).
451. See text at notes 42-140supra.
452. See note 27 supra.
453. See text at notes 401-02supra.
454. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 479. That Learning "honored" Williams' exercise of his right
earlier, by permitting him to confer with his Davenport lawyer, is insufficient. In Miranda the Court
observed:
Even preliminary advice given to the accused by his own attorney can be swiftly overcome by
the secret interrogation process. . . .Thus, the need for counsel to protect the Fifth
Amendment privilege comprehends not merely a right to consult with counsel prior to
questioning, but also to have counsel present during any questioning if the defendant so
desires.
Id. at 470.
Assuming arguendo that Williams did not reiterate, just before the "Christian burial speech," that he
would tell the police "the whole story" after he met with his Des Moines lawyer, "[a]t no time during the
trip"--certainly at no time prior to the delivery of the speech--"did Williams express a willingness to be
interrogated in the absence of an attorney." 430 U.S. at 392. But see note 437 supra and accompanying text
(most plausible reading of record indicates that Williams reiterated his intent to tell police everything after
meeting with his lawyer). Moreover, after "Williams had effectively asserted his right to counsel by having
secured attorneys at both ends of the automobile trip," Leaming "made no effort-at all to ascertain whether
Williams wished to relinquish that right." Id. at 405. Finally, although he need not have done so to
preserve this right, Williams specifically asserted his right to have counsel present during the return trip;
his Davenport attorney, acting as his agent, sought but was denied permission to accompany him on the
return trip. See note 442 supra and accompanying text.
455. Brief for Petitioner at 13.
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decision to remain silent456 and trying to "con" 457 or "sweet talk"458 him into
changing his position. Whether or not Leaming's efforts to get as much
information as he could from his prisoner before they reached Des Moines 459
amounted to "interrogation," such tactics surely "did not honor, scrupu-
lously or otherwise, ' 460 Williams' exercise of his right to counsel and his right
to cut off questioning.461
If the Williams Court did not bury Miranda, as some had feared and others
had hoped, it surely did not honor it either. Indeed, by "studiously avoiding
reliance on Miranda"462 in Williams, the Court maintained its record of not
holding "a single item of evidence inadmissible on the authority of Miranda"
since the present Chief Justice assumed his post in June of 1969.463 But the
456. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 474 (if suspect "indicates that he wants" counsel "before
speaking to the police, they must respect his decision to remain silent").
457. See Bator & Vorenberg, supra note 140, at 73 ("Deception in police interrogation. . . may consist
of 'conning'-seeking to offset the suspect's reluctance to incriminate himself by displays of apparent
sympathy, friendship, or moral indignation."). Leaming admittedly addressed Williams as "Reverend" "to
win his friendship and confidence." Brief for Petitioner at 13. Leaming also led Williams to believe that he
was Williams' protector and sympathizer, indicated that he (Leaming) was a sensitive, religious person,
and suggested (not very subtly) to Williams that the only decent and honorable thing for him to do was to
reveal the whereabouts of the body on the way back to Des Moines. See Kamisar, supra note 2, at 218-19,
228 (discussion of Williams record).
458. See text at note 1 supra.
459. See note 437 supra.
460. Brief for Respondent at 39.
461. A forceful argument can be made that once a suspect has specifically asserted his "Miranda right to
counsel" he is essentially in the same position as one whose "Massiah right to counsel" has attached. For
even though attempts to "induce" a suspect to talk or to "elicit" statements from him may not amount to
"interrogation" within the meaning of Miranda, they may nevertheless constitute a failure to "respect" or
"honor" the exercise of Miranda rights-or amount to "trick[ing]" or "cajol[ing]" one who has asserted
his rights into waiving them. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 476. Thus, the argument would run, once
a suspect has asserted his right to counsel, the "second level" Miranda safeguards shield him from "secret
agent" activity designed to obtain incriminating statements from him, such as the "jail plant," "Mother
Powers," and "waitress" ploys, just as much as the Massiah doctrine does once adversary judicial
proceedings have commenced against a suspect. See United States v. Brown, 466 F.2d 493 (10th Cir. 1972)
(discussed in note 376 supra); State v. Travis, 116 R.I. 678, 360 A.2d 548 (1976) (same).
Whether this is so is a nice question, but the Court need not have reached it to have held Williams'
incriminating disclosures inadmissible on Miranda grounds. Even if we assume arguendo that some
compulsion, subtle or otherwise, must be exerted on a suspect before it may be said that the exercise of his
rights was not honored or respected, and that such compulsion is lacking when a suspect is unaware that he
is dealing with a government agent, these were not the factual circumstances in Williams. For Williams
knew full well that Learning was a police captain, and Leaming did exert pressure. As previously
mentioned, there is ample reason to believe Williams feared that physical harm might come to him before
he ever got back to Des Moines. See note 435 supra. Furthermore, Leaming led his prisoner to believe that
he was Williams' protector and sympathizer. See note 457 supra. Under the circumstances, Williams would
not take lightly the captain's desires and preferences, which the captain expressed quite emphatically: "I
feel that you yourself are the only person that knows where this little girl's body is. ... I feel. . .that the
parents of this little girl should be entitled to a Christian burial for the little girl who was snatched away
from them on Christmas [E]ve. . . .Ifeel we should stop and locate it on the way. ... 430 U.S. at 392-93
(emphasis added).
462. 430 U.S. at 436 n.6 (White, J., with Blackmun & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting).
463. See Stone, supra note 416, at 100-01. Professor Stone noted:
[T]he Court, in the years since Warren Burger assumed the role of Chief Justice, has handed
down eleven decisions concerning the scope and application of Miranda. In ten of these cases,
the Court interpreted Miranda so as not to exclude the challenged evidence. In the remaining
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Court did reaffirm and revivify Massiah, which has now emerged as the other
major decision by the Warren Court in the area.464 Should the defendant-
minded, disappointed and troubled by the dimunition of Miranda's vigor and
significance, 465 take comfort from the fact that Massiah "is 'alive and
well' "9466
Today, no doubt, the defendant-minded are a good deal more tolerant
of-one might even say, grateful for-the Massiah doctrine than they used to
be. It was easy in the mid-1960's for the defendant-minded to criticize the
Massiah doctrine as too "formalistic" or "formulistic. ' 467 Then the momen-
tum was on their side; then "the doctrines converging upon the institution of
police interrogation [were] threatening to push on to their logical conclu-
sion-to the point where no questioning of suspects will be permitted. 4 68
case [Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976)], the Court avoided a direct ruling on the Miranda
issue, holding the evidence inadmissible on other grounds [namely, that it is fundamentally
unfair to allow an arrestee's silence to be used to impeach his explanation that is subsequently
offered at trial].
Id. at 100.
464. When they were first handed down-a mere five weeks apart-in the spring of 1964, Escobedo was
considered a much more important case than Massiah, but Escobedo was more or less displaced by
Miranda. See notes 141-54 supra and accompanying text.
465. See generally Stone, supra note 416; Chase, supra note 419, at 555-60. But cf. Israel, supra note '154,
at 1373-87 (although ramifications of Miranda narrowed, Court still adheres to basic premise that right
against self-incrimination applies to custodial interrogation).
466. Israel, supra note 154, at 1382. As Professor Israel points out, even the Williams dissenters "did not
question the basic premise of Massiah." Id. Dissenting Justices Blackmun, Rehnquist, and White
"indicate[d] that they clearly had no difficulty with Massiah's recognition of a defendant's right to counsel
during interrogation," but "contended only that [Williams]. .. had waived it." Id. at 1382 n.269. "Chief
Justice Burger's dissent," continues Professor Israel, "concentrated primarily on the point that per se
exclusion of evidence should not be required even if there is a constitutional violation, and therefore the
Chief Justice presumably would not accept Massiah insofar as it automatically requires exclusion of
statements obtained in violation of the right to counsel." Id.
467. See Herman, supra note 86, at 490-91; Kamisar, supra note 86, at 44-45; Traynor, supra note 65, at
673 (lecture delivered seven weeks before Miranda); Developments in the Law-Confessions, 79 HARV. L.
REV. 935, 1006 (1966) (three months before Miranda); Note, The Right to Counsel During Police
Interrogation: The Aftermath of Escobedo, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 337, 349 n.66 (1965). Justice Traynor's
criticism and rejection of what came to be known as the Massiah doctrine, but was then known as the "New
York rule" or the "Di Biasi rule" (after People v. Di Biasi, 7 N.Y.2d 544,166 N.E.2d 825, 200 N.Y.S.2d 21
(1960), which adopted the view of the Spano concurring opinions and presaged Massiah) is set forth more
fully in his concurring opinion in People v. Garner, 57 Cal. 2d 135, 156-66, 367 P.2d 680, 693-99, 18 Cal.
Rptr. 40, 53-59 (1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 929 (1962). See text at notes 483-84 infra.
468. W. SCHAEFER, supra note 145 (lecture delivered 10 weeks before Miranda); see Massiah v. United
States, 377 U.S. 201, 208 (1964) (White, J., with Clark & Harlan, JJ., dissenting) ("today's rule promises to
have wide application well beyond the facts of this case"); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 495 (1964)
(White, J., with Clark & Stewart, JJ., dissenting) (today's decision is "another major step in the direction of
the goal which the Court has in mind-to bar from evidence all admissions obtained from an individual
suspected of crime, whether involuntarily made or not"); Enker & Elsen, supra note 142, at 60-61, 69, 83
(1964) (Court may be shaping "a novel right not to confess except knowingly and with the tactical
assistance of counsel"); Traynor, supra note 65, at 669 ("Court's reliance on the sixth amendment...
apparently makes available to any suspect a full-blown right to counsel [assigned or retained] at the
incipient accusatory stage when police interrogation shifts from general inquiry to a probe focusing upon
him"); Vorenberg, Police Detention and Interrogation of Uncounselled Suspects: The Supreme Court and
the States, 44 B.U. L. REV. 423, 433-34 (1964) (author would "not be surprised if the Supreme Court
should lay down a flat rule barring confessions obtained from suspects-indigent or not-who have not
been furnished with an opportunity to talk to a lawyer"; Court may hold that "even a warning is not
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Although it was unclear just how far the Court's momentum would carry,
most commentators recognized that Massiah and Escobedo were only steps
along the way to the final destination.469 But the winds of change have shifted
sharply.470 "Miranda has fallen into disfavor with the present majority of the
Court"471 and is in danger of being "dismantle[d] ...piecemeal" 472-or
worse. 473 Under these circumstances, the defendant-minded are un-
derstandably reluctant to find fault with Massiah, as resurrected and ex-
panded by Williams. For an invigorated Massiah doctrine could become the
major doctrine-even the only one-standing in the way of a return to the
loosely defined and largely illusory "voluntariness"-"totality of the circum-
stances" test.474
Nevertheless, the shortcomings of Massiah have not disappeared with the
passage of time. If, as Justice Stewart pointed out in Massiah, the failure to
vouchsafe the aid of counsel to "an indicted defendant under interrogation by
the police in a completely extrajudicial proceeding . . . might deny [him]
'effective representation by counsel at the only stage when legal aid and advice
would help him,' ",475 how or why is this less true of the unindicted prisoner?
Or one against whom judicial proceedings have not yet been initiated? Under
our system of justice, an arrest-no less than an indictment or a first
appearance before a magistrate-is supposed to be "followed by a trial, 'in an
orderly courtroom, presided over by a judge, open to the public... ,' 476
and not by a secret extrajudicial proceeding, presided over by the police. Why
is a "kangaroo court procedure whereby the police produce the vital evidence
in the form of a confession which is useful or necessary to obtain a conviction
[and thus] in effect deny [an individual] effective representation by counsel" 477
any less a "kangaroo court procedure" because the judicial proceedings have
not yet commenced against the individual?
enough").
469. See note 468 supra and authorities cited therein.
470. See, e.g., Allen, The Judicial Quest for Penal Justice: The Warren Court and the Criminal Cases,
1975 U. ILL. L.F. 518, 538-39; Amsterdam, supra note 232, at 801-03; Chase, supra note 419, at 518-19,
594-95. Both Professors Allen and Amsterdam indicate that the Court's loss of impetus in the criminal
procedure field would have occurred without any change in its personnel.
471. Stone, supra note 416, at 100.
472. Id. at 169.
473. Some foresee the overruling of Miranda. See F. INBAU, J. THOMPSON, J. HADDAD, J. ZAGEL & G.
STARKMAN, CASES AND COMMENTS ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 355 (1974). Others, whose view I share,
suggest that this is unlikely to occur. See Israel, supra note 154, at 1383-87; Stone, supra note 416, at 169.
The Court has demonstrated its ability to "shrink" and "chip away" at Miranda and will probably be quite
content to continue to do so.
474. See A. BEISEL, CONTROL OVER ILLEGAL ENFORCEMENT OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 70-107 (1955);
Amsterdam, supra note 232, at 806-08; Dession, The New Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: 1, 55 YALE
L.J. 694, 708 (1946); Enker & Elsen, supra note 142, at 84-85; Kamisar, supra note 300, at 94-104;
Developments in the Law-Confessions, supra note 467, at 954-84; 72 YALE L.J. 1434, 1438 (1963).
475. 377 U.S. at 204.
476. Cf. id. "Under our system ofjustice the most elemental concepts of due process of law contemplate
that an indictment be followed by a trial, 'in an orderly courtroom, presided over by a judge, open to the
public....' " Id. See also Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 327 (1959) (Stewart, J., with Douglas &
Brennan, JJ., concurring) ("Under our system of justice an indictment is supposed to be followed by an
arraignment and a trial.").
477. Id. at 325 (Douglas, J., with Black & Brennan, JJ., concurring).
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The right to counsel should not "turn on a moment arbitrarily fixed as the
beginning ofjudicial proceedings, ' 478 a point that can often be manipulated by
law enforcement authorities. Rather, it should accommodate both the
government's need for evidence479 and a suspect's need for "a lawyer's
help," 480 which may be as great, or greater, before the commencement of
judicial proceedings as afterwards. It should concern itself with the "overall
fairness" of the "interrogation" 48' and the inherent coercion or potential for
coercion in the situation. The Massiah- Williams doctrine is not substantially
related to these needs and concerns; it provides only "an unduly tenuous
'fit.' "482 As Justice Traynor said of the Massiah doctrine, even before it had
acquired its name:483
It is a formalistic assumption that indictment is the point when a
defendant particularly needs the advice and protection of counsel.
Often a defendant is arrested under highly suspicious circum-
stances and from the time he is apprehended his guilt is a foregone
conclusion in the minds of the police ...
In some cases the evidence against the accused may be stronger
at the moment of arrest than it may be in other cases when the
indictment is returned [or, to update this rule in light of Brewer v.
478. Traynor, supra note 65, at 673.
479. In People v. Waterman, 9 N.Y.2d 561, 175 N.E.2d 445,216 N.Y.S.2d 70 (1961), Judge Fuld noted:
Since the finding of the indictment presumably imports that the People have legally sufficient
evidence of the defendant's guilt of the crime charged, the necessities of appropriate police
investigation "to solve a crime, or even to absolve a suspect" cannot be urged as justification
for any subsequent questioning of the defendant.
Id. at 565, 175 N.E.2d at 447-48, 216 N.Y.S.2d at 74-75. This is not always so. See text at note 484 infra.
But to the extent that it usually is, the "indictment rule" is subject to the criticism that it is tilted too
heavily in favor of the government and would have little practical impact on police interrogation practices.
See Herman, supra note 86, at 484-85. See also Developments in the Law-Confessions, supra note 467, at
1011 (view that sixth amendment protection comes into play only after crime is "solved" in sense of
amassing enough admissible evidence to convict "would trivialize Escobedo by bringing its safeguards into
play only after conviction had been assured"). Brewer v. Williams, however, reemphasizes the Massiah rule;
the initiation ofjudicial proceedings--"whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment,
information, or arraignment"-now triggers the right to counsel. 430 U.S. at 398 (quoting from Kirby v.
Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972) (plurality opinion)). Depending on just when judicial proceedings are
now deemed to be initiated, the rule may be less responsive to the government's needs.
Brewer v. Williams itself is a good illustration of the problem. Apparently because he surrendered in
Davenport and awaited the arrival of the Des Moines police to bring him back, Williams was "arraigned"
on the arrest warrant before a Davenport judge and committed by that judge to confinement in a
Davenport jail. These proceedings were unrelated to the need of the Des Moines police for information.
480. Under the Massiah-Williams rule, a suspect is "entitled to a lawyer's help" when judicial
proceedings have been initiated against him. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. at 398-401; Massiah v.
United States, 377 U.S. at 204. There is, however, a very weak congruence, if any, between the initiation of
judicial proceedings and a suspect's need for a lawyer's help. Not only may there be as strong a need for a
lawyer's help before the commencement of judicial proceedings as afterwards, but it may be too late for a
lawyer's help afterwards.
481. Traynor, supra note 65, at 673.
482. Cf. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 202 (1976) (small statistical difference between 18-to-20-year-old
male and female drunk driving arrests provides an "unduly tenuous 'fit' " for any drinking age
classification based on gender).
483. See note 467 supra.
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Williams, judicial proceedings have commenced]. It is hardly
realistic to assume that a defendant is less in need of counsel an
hour before indictment [or the initiation of judicial proceedings]
than he is an hour after ...
It may be argued that if [the rule] is adopted, the police will still
have time to interrogate and encourage confessions before an
indictment is returned [or judicial proceedings have commenced].
In some cases, however, as in [Spano and Di Biasi], an indictment
may be returned in advance of the defendant's apprehension. In
such cases there could be no interrogation of the suspect at all,
except in the presence of his attorney [or a waiver meeting the
rigorous Johnson v. Zerbst standards]. Moreover, if the suspect is in
custody before indictment [or the initiation of judicial proceed-
ings], the police could easily frustrate the rule by delaying the
indictment [or the commencement of judicial proceedings]. Thus,
the rule would operate only occasionally and arbitrarily.484
The Massiah doctrine and its New York counterpart do reflect the view
that" '[t]o maintain the integrity of the judicial process in its use of evidence
of criminal guilt'. . . 'congruence' must be maintained throughout the course
of a formally instituted criminal action .... -485 But why not maintain
"congruence" "between the judicial and the non-judicial, pre-trial pro-
484. People v. Garner, 57 Cal. 2d 135, 160, 164, 367 P.2d 680, 695, 697-98, 18 Cal. Rptr. 40, 55, 57-58
(1961) (Traynor, J., concurring), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 929 (1962).
485. People v. Waterman, 9 N.Y.2d 561,567, 175 N.E.2d 445, 448,216 N.Y.S.2d 70,76(1961). Because
the defendant confessed under police questioning during the period between the return of the indictment
and his arraignment thereon, there was no need for the court to establish "congruence" beyond the course
of a formally instituted prosecution, but the court did observe, with apparent approval: "It has been urged
that, 'To maintain the integrity of the judicial process in its use of evidence of criminal guilt, congruence
must be maintained between the judicial process and the non-judicial, pretrial processes with respect to the
methods by which evidence of criminal guilt is secured.' "Id. (quoting from A. BEISEL, supra note 474, at
102) (emphasis added). It is plain that Professor Beisel had urged that congruence be maintained between
the proceedings in the courtroom and those in the police station-regardless of whether a "criminal
prosecution" has begun. Thus, in the very next paragraph following the one quoted in part in Waterman,
Professor Beisel continues:
Should not, therefore, the privilege against self-incrimination control police and prosecutive
officers in securing confessions or other incriminating statements at the police station? Should
not an accused, or a witness under proper circumstances, have a right to privilege of silence at
the police station? Under the principle of congruence which was just explained, the answer
would have to be in the affirmative, since there is no accepted principle which would
justifiably demarcate the police or prosecutor from other executive or administrative officials
to whom the privilege does apply ...
Since the doctrine of waiver is interpreted in a manner which gives an accused real
protection for his right of silence in the courtroom, should not the Supreme Court maintain
congruence between standards of judicial waiver and those which are applied at the police
station, so that an accused can have real protection for his right to silence at the police
station? Unless the doctrine of waiver at the police station is made congruent with that of the
courtroom, extension of the privilege against self-incrimination into the police station loses
most of its practical significance ...
Id. at 102-14.
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cesses"? 486 It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that those judges unmoved by
"kangaroo court" proceedings in the nonjudicial, pretrial stages, but stirred to
action when these same proceedings are held after the formal institution of a
criminal action, are responding chiefly to a violation of the symbol of a fair
trial487 and conveying "symbolic reassurance. ' 488 When the issue is forced
into the open, it seems that the rule of law prevails. Then the "psychological
need for the appearance of justice" is satisfied489 and the importance of the
right to counsel is dramatized. 490 This is all to the good as far as it goes, but it
does not go nearly far enough.
More than a decade ago, Justice Traynor saw "[t]he logical corollary [to
the Massiah doctrine], to forestall evasion of the rule, .. just around the
corner. The right to counsel should now logically materialize whenever the
accused was not, but should have been, brought before a judicial officer. '491
However logical this development may seem to some, and it does to me, it is
not likely to occur. The Court has extended the sixth amendment right to
counsel, as opposed to the Miranda right, backwards from the trial through
the indictment to the initiation of judicial proceedings, presumably the first
appearance before a judicial officer. But, as Justice Stewart's fierce resistance
to the application of Massiah to the Escobedo facts demonstrates,4 92 the Court
is unlikely to extend the right any further.
486. See note 485 supra.
487. Cf. T. ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT 130 (Harbinger Books ed. 1962) (criminal trial
overshadows all other ceremonies as dramatization of values of our spiritual government). "[T]he cultural
value of the ideal of a fair trial is advanced as much by its failure as it is by its success. Any violation of the
symbol of a ceremonial trial rouses persons who would be left unmoved by an ordinary nonceremonial
injustice." Id. at 142.
488. Cf. M. EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC USES OF POLrTcs 4 (1964). See also id. at 37, 178-79.
489. See Arnold, The Criminal Trial as a Symbol of Public Morality, in Y. KAMISAR, F. INBAU & T.
ARNOLD, CRIMINAL JusrICE IN OUR TIME 140 (A. Howard ed. 1965) ("[Procedural] restrictions are
unquestionably handicaps in the enforcement of the law . . . .Nevertheless, there is a tremendous
psychological need for the appearance of justice which a fair trial creates in the public mind.").
490. Cf T. ARNOLD, supra note 487, at 128-30, 156.
491. Traynor, supra note 65, at 673; cf. Friendly, supra note 65, at 950 (Escobedo "can well be read as
requiring the assistance of counsel only when the police elicit a confession at the station house from a
suspect, already long detained, whose case is ripe for presentation to a magistrate-in other words, that the
police, by unduly deferring such presentation, may not postpone the assistance of counsel that would then
become available.").
492. The Court in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), in an opinion by Justice Goldberg,
maintained that because petitioner had, at the time of interrogation, "for all practical purposes already
been charged with murder," "it would exalt form over substance to make the right to counsel, under these
circumstances, depend on whether at [this time] the authorities had secured a formal indictment." Id. at
486. Thus, the "fact [that] ...the interrogation here was conducted before petitioner was formally
indicted. . . should make no difference." Id. at 485. But dissenting Justice Stewart insisted that " 'that
fact' . . . makes all the difference." Id. at 493. Justice Stewart continued:
[The vital fact remains that this case does not involve the deliberate interrogation of a
defendant after the initiation of judicial proceedings against him. The Court disregards this
basic difference between the present case and Massiah's ....
[T~he court today converts a routine police investigation of an unsolved murder into a
distorted analogue of a judicial trial. It imports into this investigation constitutional concepts
historically applicable only after the onset of formal prosecutorial proceedings. By doing so,
[it] perverts those precious constitutional guarantees, and frustrates the vital interests of
society in preserving the legitimate and proper function of honest and purposeful police
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Moreover, Justice Traynor's "logical corollary" smacks too much of the
McNabb-Mallory rule493 to have much prospect. That rule, fashioned "[q]uite
apart from the Constitution" 454 and in the exercise of the Court's "superviso-
ry authority over the adminstration of [federal] criminal justice,"495 operated
to exclude from federal prosecutions all incriminating statements obtained
during prolonged, and hence illegal, prearraignment detention. Even before
congressional dissatisfaction with the rule culminated in legislation that badly
crippled it,496 the rule met a hostile reception in the lower federal courts. 497
Nor was it warmly received by the states. Although "the need for something
like a McNabb-Mallory rule to govern state [confession] cases was appar-
investigation.
Id. at 493-94 (emphasis added); see notes 147-50 supra and accompanying text.
In Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972) (plurality opinion), in which the Court held that a suspect is not
entitled to counsel at a showup conducted before the initiation of adversary criminal proceedings, Justice
Stewart observed:
In a line of constitutional cases in this Court stemming back to. . .Powell v. Alabama,. .. it
has been firmly established that a person's. . . right to counsel attaches only at or after the
time that adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated against him ....
The only seeming deviation from this long line of constitutional decisions was Escobedo
• .. [which] is not apposite here for two distinct reasons. First, the Court in retrospect
perceived that the "prime purpose" of Escobedo was not to vindicate the constitutional right
to counsel as such, but, like Miranda, "to guarantee full effectuation of the privilege against
self-incrimination ...." Secondly, and perhaps even more important for purely practical
purposes, the Court has limited the holding of Escobedo to its own facts ....
Id. at 688-89. But see Grano, supra note 339, at 726-30 (powerful criticism of Justice Stewart's views in
Kirby, especially his retrospective view of Escobedo).
493. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
494. McNabb v. United States, 518 U.S. 332, 341 (1943).
495. Id.
496. Title II of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 provides that a confession
"shall not be inadmissible solely because of delay" in bringing an arrestee before a commissioner if such
confession is "made voluntarily," if the weight to be given it is left to the jury and if it "was made or given
...within six hours immediately following [the defendant's] arrest or other detention." 18 U.S.C. §
3501(c) (1976). In Johnson v. State, 282 Md. 314, 384 A.2d 709 (1978), Chief Judge Murphy observed:
While it is possible to construe this legislation as restricting the McNabb-Mallory rule to
delays in excess of six hours, the federal courts have generally construed the statute in a more
liberal manner, rejecting McNabb-Mallory completely, and holding that a delay in arraign-
ment greater than six hours "merely -constitutes another factor to be considered by the trial
judge in determining voluntariness ....
Id. at _ 384 A.2d at 726 (Murphy, C.J., with Smith & Orth, JJ., dissenting). See also United States v.
Gaines, 555 F.2d 618, 623 (7th Cir. 1977) (that defendant held 46 hours by city officials before being turned
over to federal officials and presented did not invalidate involuntary admission because no evidence of
collusive arrangement between federal and city officials); 53 NOTRE DAME LAW. 545 (1978) (criticism of
Gaines).
497. See generally Hogan & Snee, The McNabb-Mallory Rule: Its Rise, Rationale, and Rescue, 47 GEo.
L.J. 1, 5 (1958); see also Murphy, Lower Court Checks on Supreme Court Power, 53 AM. POLITICAL SCh
REV. 1017, 1023-26 (1956); Rothblatt & Rothblatt, Police Interrogation: The Right to Counsel and to
Prompt Arraignment, 27 BROOKLYN L. REV. 24, 40-42 (1960); Developments in the Law-Confessions,
supra note 467, at 988-94.
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ent" 49 8-bypassing conflicts over the nature of the secret interrogation and
minimizing both the "temptation" and the "opportunity" to obtain confes-
sions by impermissible means499-the Court never imposed such a rule on the
states500 and only a handful of states adopted it or its equivalent on their own
initiative.501 The chance, in the foreseeable future, of the Court traveling
down this road again-by finding something akin to this much-criticized and
much-resisted rule of procedure for federal courts mandated by the "minimal
historical safeguards. . . summarized as 'due process of law' "502-appears to
be quite small. 03
498. Amsterdam, supra note 232, at 808; see Broeder, Wong Sun v. United States: A Study in Faith and
Hope, 42 NEB. L. REV. 483, 564-94 (1963) (McNabb-Mallory rests, or should be regarded as resting, on
constitutional grounds).
499. See, eg., Allen, supra note 232, at 28-29; Douglas, supra note 232, at 107, 113-14, 120;
Developments in the Law--Confessions, supra note 467, at 988-94; Comment, supra note 232, at 1021-24
(1959). See also People v. Pettingill, 21 Cal.3d 231,, 578 P.2d 108, 116, 145 Cal. Rptr. 861, 869 (1978)
(discussion of other important functions served by prompt presentment requirement); Johnson v. State, 282
Md. 314, , - 384 A.2d 709, 713-14, 719 (1978) (Levine, J.) (same).
500. Justice Frankfurter, the author of the McNabb and Mallory opinions, took note of this in Culombe
v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961), by calling the McNabb case an "innovation which derived from our
concern and responsibility for fair modes of criminal proceeding in the federal courts." Id. at 600-01.
501. It was not until 1960 that the states' unanimity in refusing to follow the Supreme Court's lead in the
NcNabb-Mallory line of cases was broken. See People v. Hamilton, 359 Mich. 410, 415-17, 102 N.W.2d
738, 741-42 (1960); Rothblatt & Rothblatt, supra note 497, at 42-44. On the eve of Miranda, Justice
Traynor reported that a second state, Connecticut, had adopted by legislation an equivalent of the
McNabb-Mallory rule. Traynor, supra note 65, at 666 & n.44; see State v. Vollhardt, 157 Conn. 25, 39, 244
A.2d 601, 607 (1968) (subsequent case construing statute). Justice Traynor was evidently unaware that
Delaware had also adopted a McNabb-Mallory rule. See Webster v. State, 59 Del. 54, 59, 213 A.2d 298, 301
(1965); Vorhauer v. State, 59 Del. 35, 46, 212 A.2d 886, 892 (1965). Since then, at least three more state
courts--Maryland, Montana, and Pennsylvania-have adopted some equivalent of the McNabb-Mallory
rule. See Johnson v. State, 282 Md. 314, _ 384 A.2d 709, 714-18 (1978); State v. Benbo, 570 P.2d 894,
899-900 (Mont. 1977); Commonwealth v. Davenport, 471 Pa. 278, 286, 370 A.2d 301, 306 (1977);
Commonwealth v. Smith, 463 Pa. 393, 396-98, 344 A.2d 889, 890-91 (1975); Commonwealth v. Tingle, 451
Pa. 241, 246, 301 A.2d 701, 703 (1973); Commonwealth v. Futch, 447 Pa. 389, 391-94, 290 A.2d 417, 418-
19 (1972). It is still true, however, as the most recent state court to adopt the rule readily conceded, that
"the vast majority of state courts passing on the question have rejected McNabb-Mallory outright, opting
instead for a traditional due process voluntariness test of the admissibility of confessions." See Johnson v.
State, 282 Md. at _ , 384 A.2d at 715.
502. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943) ("Judicial supervision of the administration of
criminal justice in the federal courts implies the duty of establishing and maintaining civilized standards of
procedure and evidence. Such standards are not satisfied merely by observance of those minimal historic
safeguards for securing trial by reasons which are summarized as 'due process of law'....").
503. In Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975), the Court held that "the Fourth Amendment requires a
judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended restraint of liberty following arrest
[without a warrant]." Id. at 114. Nevertheless, the majority held that this determination can be and
"traditionaly has been decided by a magistrate in a nonadversary proceeding on hearsay and written
testimony." Id. at 120. Although many states are likely to incorporate the "probable cause" determination
into some existing procedures, such as the procedure for setting bail or advising a suspect of his right to
counsel, the constitutional need for such a postarrest judicial determination of probable cause could be
satisfied, it seems, without the presence of the arrestee-as it is when a magistrate issues a warrant on the
basis of a complaint or an officer's affidavit. Moreover, it is unclear whether the government must obtain a
judicial determination of probable cause as quickly as some courts required the police to bring an arrestee
before a judicial officer to satisfy the McNabb-Mallory rule. Nor is it clear whether and under what
circumstances a failure to comply with the Gerstein v. Pugh requirement will lead to the exclusion of an
otherwise admissible confession.
The Gerstein v. Pugh holding that neither the appointment of counsel nor other "adversary safeguards"
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The odds are better, if the Supreme Court is inclined to supplement or to
complement the Massiah doctrine, that it will be attracted to a rule related to
but distinct from Massiah-New York's Donovan-Arthur-Hobson rule,504
which, regardless of whether judicial proceedings have yet commenced, bars
virtually all police interrogation once a defense attorney enters the picture.
Judge Scileppi, writing for the New York Court of Appeals in Arthur,
explained the protection this rule affords the attorney-client relationship:
[I]n [Donovan] ... Judge Fuld, speaking for the court, stated
[that] ". . . quite apart from [the federal Constitution], this State's
constitutional and statutory provisions pertaining to the privilege
against self-incrimination and the right to counsel . . . , not to
are required for the probable cause determination strongly implies that this judicial determination, like the
issuance of an arrest warrant, does not mark the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings. See Id. at 120,
122. There is, however, some authority for the view that the filing of a complaint or the issuance of an
arrest warrant does mark the commencement of judicial proceedings within the meaning of Kirby v.
Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1971) (plurality opinion). See Burton v. Cuyler, 439 F. Supp. 1173, 1181 (E.D. Pa.
1977) (issuance of arrest warrant along with circumstances surrounding lineup indicates initiation of
judicial proceedings); Commonwealth v. Richman, 458 Pa. 167, 171, 320 A.2d 351, 353 (1974) (initiation of
judicial proceedings in Pennsylvania at arrest). But Richman relied in part on the views of a divided panel
in Robinson v. Zelker, 468 F.2d 159, 163 (2d Cir. 1972) (arrest warrant initiates judicial proceedings),
which was later repudiated by another, unanimous panel of the same court in United States v. Duvall, 537
F.2d 15, 22 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 950 (1976). Indeed, Richman goes so far as to say that a
warrantless arrest marks the initiation of judicial proceedings, an untenable interpretation of Kirby in my
view, but a position that a state court may take as a matter of state law (and that some members of the
Richman court explicitly did take). 458 Pa. at 172, 320 A.2d at 353. The views of the federal district court
in Burton v. Cuyler seem to conflict with two opinions of its own court of appeals. See Government of the
Virgin Islands v. Navarro, 513 F.2d 11, 18 (3d Cir. 1975) (dictum) (lineup after arrest not initiation of
judicial proceedings); United States v. Coades, 468 F.2d 1061, 1063 (3d Cir. 1972) (preliminary hearing
initiates judicial proceedings). But the result in Burton is quite understandable on its facts. The challenged
lineup was not held until three positive photographic identifications had been made, and by the time the
lineup was conducted it seemed plain that the government was committed to prosecuting and was simply
amassing further evidence for that purpose.
I-think it is no accident that in Burton, Richman, and Robinson, all of which indicate that judicial
proceedings are initiated by an arrest warrant, the issue arose in a pretrial identification-not a police
interrogation-context. Although the Supreme Court and courts generally seem to have treated the
question of when judicial proceedings commence within the meaning of (1) Massiah and (2) Kirby as the
same question, the different procedural contexts may have at least a strong subliminal impact on some
courts. As a policy matter, it seems considerably more difficult to resist the presence of counsel at a lineup
than in the interrogation room. When he can do so, a defense lawyer will usually prevent all police
questioning, but he is unlikely-indeed, not empowered-to disrupt pretrial identification proceedings.
Moreover, unlike the Warren Court "confession" cases, which arguably "furthered societal values not
usually related to guilt or innocence," the Warren Court pretrial identification cases "explicitly sought to
protect the innocent from wrongful conviction." Grano, supra note 339, at 722.
504. People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 348 N.E.2d 894, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1976); People v. Arthur, 22
N.Y.2d 325, 239 N.E.2d 537, 292 N.Y.S.2d 663 (1968); People v. Donovan, 13 N.Y.2d 148, 193 N.E.2d
628, 243 N.Y.S.2d 841 (1963); see People v. Pinzon, 44 N.Y.2d 458, 377 N.E.2d 721, 406 N.Y.S.2d 268
(1978). See generally W. RICHARDSON, EVIDENCE §§ 545, 546 (J. Prince 10th ed. 1973); Lewin, Criminal
Procedure, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 381, 396-400 (1971); Paulsen, The Winds of Change: Criminal Procedure
in New York 1941-1965, 15 BUFFALO L. REV. 297, 30405 (1966); Uviller, The Judge at the Cop's Elbow, 71
COLUM. L. REV. 707, 715-18 (1971); 30 BROOKLYN L. REV. 366 (1964); 51 CORNELL L.Q. 356 (1966); 5
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 401 (1977). As a general matter, New York's Donovan rule has not received a warm
reception elsewhere. See State v. Smith, 294 N.C. 365, _, 241 S.E.2d 674, 680-81 (1978) (collecting
cases). Nevertheless, a model code for prearraignment procedure has adopted the New York rule, both as
matter of policy and because the rule was deemed required by Escobedo and Miranda. MODEL CODE, supra
note 112, § 140.7(1); see id. at 363-66 & n.3 (commentary to § 140.7). But see note 537 infra.
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mention our own guarantee of due process . . . , require the
exclusion of a confession taken from a defendant, during a period
of detention, after his attorney had requested and been denied
access to him. '505
[I]n [Gunner] ...it was argued that Donovan. . .[was]
not applicable because Gunner's attorney had not physically
appeared at the police station and asked to see his client as had
Donovan's [but had simply phoned the police chief to advise him
that he had been retained by defendant's parents to represent him
and "didn't want any statements taken from [him]"]. 506 The court
rejected this contention holding. . . that a defendant's right to
counsel is not dependent upon "mechanical" and "arbitrary"
requirements.5 07 Thus, the principle which may be derived from
[the New York] cases is that, once the police know or have been
apprised of the fact that the defendant is represented by counsel or
that an attorney has communicated with the police for the purpose
of representing the defendant, the accused's right to counsel
attaches; and this right is not dependent upon the existence of a
formal retainer.
Nor is it significant that [the defense attorney] did not, im-
mediately upon his arrival at Police Headquarters, instruct the
police not to take any statements from the defendant. . . .Once an
attorney enters the proceeding, the police may not question the
defendant in the absence of counsel unless there is an affirmative
waiver, in the presence of the attorney, of the defendant's right to
counsel. . . .There is no requirement that the attorney or the
defendant request the police to respect this right of the defend-
ant.508
505. People v. Donovan, 13 N.Y.2d 148, 151, 193 N.E.2d 628, 629, 243 N.Y.S.2d 841, 843 (1963).
506. People v. Gunner, 15 N.Y.2d 226, 205 N.E.2d 852, 257 N.Y.S.2d 924 (1965). The defense lawyer
phoned the Nassau County Chief of Police. There was no point in his physically appearing at the Nassau
County police station for at the time his client was in custody thousands of miles away in Los Angeles. The
court barred all statements made by the defendant after his lawyer's phone call to the Nassau County
police, including two he made during the plane flight back to New York. Id. at 230-31, 205 N.E.2d at 853-
54, 257 N.Y.S.2d at 926-27.
507. More recently, a lawyer's phoning the police department central switchboard and informing the
civilian operators that he wished to speak to his client and did not want him questioned has been held
sufficient to invoke the Donovan rule. People v. Pinzon, 44 N.Y.2d 458, 464, 377 N.E.2d 721, 725, 406
N.Y.S.2d 268, 271 (1978). In Pinzon the defense attorney was misinformed (but apparently uninten-
tionally) that the police department did not "have" his client, and none of his calls were put through to the
police. Id. at 460, 462, 377 N.E.2d at 722, 723, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 268, 269.
508. People v. Arthur, 22 N.Y.2d 325, 328-29, 239 N.E.2d 537, 538-39, 292 N.Y.S.2d 663, 666 (1968).
In People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 348 N.E.2d 894, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1976), the court commented:
[r]he rule of the Arthur case is not absolute. Thus, the fact that a defendant is represented by
counsel in a proceeding unrelated to the charges under investigation is not sufficient to invoke
the rule. . . .The rule applies only to a defendant who is in custody. . . .Moreover, the
rule. . . does not render inadmissible a defendant's spontaneously volunteered statement.
Id. at 483, 348 N.E.2d at 897, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 421-22.
1978]
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Unlike the New York courts, which have developed two discrete extra-
Miranda rules-() the "postarraignment, postindictment" rule which pres-
aged the Massiah doctrine, and (2) the Donovan-Arthur-Hobson rule, which
"prohibit[s] the State from interfering with the attorney-client relationship"
by questioning the client in the absence of counsel "with respect to matters
encompassed by the representation" 5 9-the Supreme Court has not isolated
the "initiation of judicial proceedings" and "attorney-client relationship"
components and dwelt on their independent significance. In Spano, which
evoked the influential concurring opinions that ultimately prevailed, as well
as in Massiah and Williams, at the time the challenged statements were
obtained the defendant had already retained counsel and judicial proceedings
had already been initiated against him.510
There is ample cause to believe, however, that the commencement of
adversary judicial proceedings without more is decisive and that what counts
is not whether the confession was elicited at a time when the suspect was
already represented by counsel, but whether the confession was obtained "at a
time when he was clearly entitled to a lawyer's help."511 Noting that "[e]ver
since this Court's decision in the Spano case, the New York courts have
unequivocally followed [the] constitutional rule" advocated by the concurring
Justices in Spano,5 12 the Massiah Court then quoted with approval from
People v. Waterman,513 an early post-Spano New York case: "Any secret
interrogation of the defendant, from and after the finding of the indictment,
without the protection afforded by the presence of counsel, contravenes the
basic dictates of fairness in the conduct of criminal causes and the fundamen-
tal rights of persons charged with crime." 514 First, this statement of the rule
tends to support the view that it is the right to counsel, not actual
representation by counsel, that is decisive. Second, and even more important,
Waterman had not yet retained or been appointed counsel when the
challenged statements were obtained from him,515 and the New York court
had held that this did not matter: the right to counsel is actuated by "the
formal commencement of the criminal action"; it is not "limited. . .to the
situation where the defendant already has an attorney. ' 516 Third, the Massiah
Court also cited with approval another New York case, People v. Meyer,517 in
which the suspect neither had nor, when informed of his rights, had he
509. People v. Ramos, 40 N.Y.2d 610, 622-23, 357 N.E.2d 955, 963-64, 389 N.Y.S.2d 299, 307-08
(1976) (Jasen, J., dissenting) (excellent exposition of reasoning behind New York rule with which Ramos
majority would agree; dissent disagreed with majority on application of rule to facts of case).
510. Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 317, 319 (1959).
511. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. at 204 ('[Four] concurring Justices pointed out [in Spano] that
the Constitution required reversal of the conviction upon the sole and specific ground that the confession
had been deliberately elicited by the police after the defendant had been indicted, and therefore at a time
when he was clearly entitled to a lawyer's help.") (emphasis added); see Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. at 398
("T]he right to counsel. . . means at least that a person is entitled to the help of a lawyer at or after the
time that judicial proceedings have been initiated against him. ... ) (emphasis added).
512. 377 U.S. at 204-05.
513. 9 N.Y.2d 561, 175 N.E.2d 445, 216 N.Y.S.2d 70 (1961).
514. 377 U.S. at 205 (quoting from People v. Waterman, 9 N.Y.2d 561, 565, 175 N.E.2d 445, 448, 216
N.Y.S.2d 70, 75 (1961)) (emphasis added).
515. See People v. Waterman, 9 N.Y.2d 561, 564-65, 175 N.E.2d 445, 447, 216 N.Y.S.2d 70, 74 (1961).
516. Id.
517. 11 N.Y.2d 162, 182 N.E.2d 103, 227 N.Y.S.2d 427 (1962).
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requested any counsel.518 This, the New York court held, did not matter
either: "While an accused may waive a fundamental right, he did not do so
here, nor is he estopped because he had made no request when informed of his
rights. . . . [A]ny statement made by an accused after arraignment not in the
presence of counsel as in Spano . . . and Waterman is inadmissible." 519
The Massiah Court then stated that the view expressed in People v.
Waterman "no more than reflects a constitutional principle established as
long ago as Powell v. Alabama,. . . where the Court noted that'. . from the
time of their arraignment until the beginning of their trial,. . the defendants
. . . [were] as much entitled to such aid [of counsel] during that period as at
the trial itself.' ",520 Since Spano, added the Court, "the same basic constitu-
tional principle has been broadly reaffirmed. . . [in] Hamilton v. Alabama
[and] White v. Maryland."521 But in Powell, "from the time of their
arraignment until the beginning of their trial,. . . the defendants did not have
the aid of counsel in any real sense. ' 522 Nor, of course, did the petitioners in
Hamilton and White have counsel (in any sense at all) at arraignment or the
preliminary hearing.523 Evidentiary use at trial of the guilty plea White
entered at the preliminary hearing but subsequently changed-"a problem
not greatly different from the use at trial of [a] . . . confession given to the
police rather than to a judge"524-was barred because he was entitled to, but
had not yet procured or been appointed, counsel at the time of the preliminary
hearing. If Massiah and Williams "no more than reflect a constitutional
principle established. . . [in] Powell" and applied in Hamilton and White, if
Massiah and Williams only move the time when the right to counsel accrues
back from arraignment or preliminary hearing to the initiation of judicial
proceedings, then the establishment of (and interference with) an attorney-
client relationship would seem to be constitutionally irrelevant.
We need not limit ourselves, however, to close analyses of Massiah and
earlier Supreme Court precedents. We can do better than speculate about
whether Massiah and Williams would have been decided the same way if the
defendants had not been represented by counsel, or whether Gideon525 and the
518. Id. at 162, 182 N.E.2d at 104, 227 N.Y.S.2d at 428.
519. Id.
520. 377 U.S. at 205 (quoting from Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932)) (emphasis added). The
same passage from Powell is quoted with approval in Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. at 398.
521. 377 U.S. at 205 (referring to Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961), and White v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 59 (1963)).
522. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932) (emphasis added).
523. White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 60 (1963); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 53 (1961).
524. Enker & Elsen, supra note 142, at 51.
525. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
1978]
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Griffin-Douglas "equality" principle526 would have required the same result if
they had not been. We can turn to McLeod v. Ohio.527
At the time McLeod voluntarily confessed to law enforcement authorities
riding with him in a police vehicle, he was under indictment for murder, but
he was not represented by, nor had he even requested, counsel. 528 McLeod's
confession was admitted into evidence, and he was convicted. 529 The state
supreme court dismissed his appeal because it could find "no debatable
constitutional question" presented. 530 But the United States Supreme Court,
invoking the newly decided Massiah case for the first time, vacated the
judgment and remanded the cause "for consideration in light of Massiah.' '5 31
On remand, the state supreme court did not take the hint, although two
dissenting judges urged it to do so.532 Instead, the court reaffirmed itsjudgment, distinguishing the facts in McLeod from those in Massiah. It
pointed out, inter alia, that McLeod, unlike Massiah, had confessed before he
had procured or been appointed or "even requested counsel. ' 533 This
distinction failed to impress the two dissenting state judges. They recognized
the "possibility" of a waiver of the Massiah right to counsel in some
postindictment cases, but not in this one because McLeod had never been
advised of his right to counsel. 534 In their view, the concurring justices in
Spano would have reversed and Massiah required reversal
on the sole and specific ground that the confession had been
deliberately elicited by the police after the defendant had been
indicted, and therefore at a time when he was clearly entitled to a
lawyer's help. True, in Massiah the defendant had counsel who was
absent when defendant made statements against his interest. But if
the use of such statements after indictment of an accused Whose
counsel is absent is, under the Constitution, prohibited, as Massiah
526. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355 (1963) (indigent has right to appointed counsel on
appeal of right); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956) (indigent has right to free transcript on appeal).
See generally Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 306, at 68-80 (discussion of applications
and implications of Griffin and Douglas); Gerard, The Right to Counsel on Appeal in Missouri, 1965 WASH.
U.L.Q. 463, 479-80 (questioning extent to which state must go to comply with Douglas); Israel, supra note
154, at 1331-39 (Burger Court has not undermined equality theme established by Warren Court); Kamisar
& Choper, The Right to Counsel in Minnesota: Some Field Findings and Legal-Policy Observations, 48
MINN. L. REV. 1, 4-14 (1963) (discussion of application and limitations of Douglas and Griffin). There are
different views as to the impact on the equality principle of Ross v. Moffit, 417 U.S. 600 (1974), which
declined to extend the Douglas right to appointed counsel on first appeal to application for discretionary
review in state supreme courts. Compare Hartman, The Burger Court-1973 Term: Leaving the Sixties
Behind Us, 65 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 437, 442-44 (1974) and Kamisar, Poverty, Equality, and
Criminal Procedure, in NAT'L COLLEGE OF DIST. ATTORNEYS, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW DESKBOOK 1-97
to 1-110 (1977) with Israel, supra, at 1334-39.
527. 381 U.S. 356 (1965) (per curiam) (summary reversal of State v. McLeod, 1 Ohio St. 2d 60, 203
N.E.2d 349 (1964), on authority of Massiah); see text at notes 263-69 supra (discussion of other aspects of
case).
528. State v. McLeod, 1 Ohio St. 2d 60, 60, 203 N.E.2d 349, 350 (1964).
529. Id. at 60, 203 N.E.2d at 350.
530. 173 dhio St. 520, 520, 184 N.E.2d 101, 101 (1962).
531. McLeod v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 582 (1964) (per curiam).
532. 1 Ohio St. 2d at 64, 203 N.E.2d at 353 (Gibson, J., with O'Neill, J., dissenting).
533. Id. at 62, 203 N.E.2d at 351 (per curiam).
534. Id. at 65, 203 N.E.2d at 353.
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holds, there can be no question that the plain import of the opinion
is that the Constitution prohibits the use of statements against
interest by a defendant who has not even been advised of his right
to counsel.535
Evidently the Supreme Court of the United States agreed with the dissenting
state judges. Certiorari was again granted, and this time the Supreme Court
summarily reversed on the authority of Massiah.536
Although I deem it clear that the "beginning" of a "criminal prosecution"
activates the right to counsel, regardless of whether the suspect is represented
by counsel at the time, the converse-the legal effect of representation by
counsel when the criminal prosecution has not yet begun-is much less
clear.537 But if I am correct in my belief that the Massiah doctrine is in no
535. Id. (emphasis supplied by dissent).
536. See note 527 supra. See also Hancock v. White, 378 F.2d 479 (1st Cir. 1967) (holding, on the basis
of McLeod, that Massiah doctrine required exclusion of statements taken from defendant during
automobile trip with New Hampshire officers, which followed indictment and extradition proceedings in
Vermont, even though defendant did not have, and had not requested, counsel in criminal proceeding
pending against him in New Hampshire).
537. After recalling that by denying Escobedo's request for counsel "the police did not relieve [him] of
the anxieties which they had created in the interrogation rooms," the Miranda Court dropped a footnote:
"The police also prevented [Escobedo's] attorney from consulting with his client. Independent of any other
constitutional proscription, this action constitutes a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to the
assistance of counsel and excludes any statement obtained in its wake. See People v Donovan. ... 384
U.S. at 465, 465-66 n.35.
It has been forcefully argued that this footnote means literally what it says. See Breitel, supra note 146,
at 13 & n.25; Rothblatt & Pitler, supra note 52, at 492-96. See also MODEL CODE, supra note 112, §
140.7(1); id. at 363-66, 365 n.3 (commentary to § 140.7). I cannot agree. It is hard to believe that in the
course of writing a sixty-page opinion based on the premise that police-issued warnings can adequately
protect a suspect's rights the Court would say in the next breath that such warnings are insufficient when,
but only when, a suspect's lawyer is not allowed to consult with him-that even though a suspect has been
emphatically and unequivfcaliy advised of his rights and insists on talking, what he says is inadmissible
when, as in Donovan and several post-Donovan cases, a lawyer whose services he has not requested has,
unbeknownst to him, entered the picture. See notes 556-57 infra and accompanying text. Moreover, as the
Donovan dissenters noted, the Donovan rule, which the Miranda Court is said to have adopted in footnote
35 of its opinion, "hold[s] that a defendant with a lawyer has greater rights than one not so favored,"
People v. Donovan, 13 N.Y.2d 148, 158, 193 N.E.2d 628, 633, 243 N.Y.S.2d 841, 849 (1963) (Burke, J.,
dissenting), and typically operates "only in the cases where the suspect, or his family, have means to
employ counsel," id. at 162, 193 N.E.2d at 636, 243 N.Y.S.2d at 852 (Foster, J., dissenting). Such a rule
seems hard to square with "the equal protection argument, a ground bass that resounds throughout the
Miranda opinion." Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional Change, 37 U.
CIN. L. REv. 671, 711 (1968).
Although the police did not advise Escobedo of any of his rights, "he repeatedly asked to speak to his
lawyer." Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 481 (1964). At one point the Escobedo opinion states that
"when petitioner requested, and was denied an opportunity to consult with his lawyer, the investigation
had ceased to be a general investigation of'an unsolved crime' [and] [p]etitioner had become the accused."
Id. at 485. Indeed, the opinion begins: "The critical question in this case is whether, under the
circumstances, the refusal by the police to honor petitioner's request to consult with his lawyer during the
course of an interrogation constitutes a denial of'the Assistance of Counsel'...." Id. at 479. At another
point the opinion suggests that the decisive factor may be simply whether the investigation has "focused"
on the suspect or, put another way, whether he has "for all practical purposes" become the "accused"
(although this test is anything but simple in application). Id. at 486: At still other points the opinion
indicates that some combination of factors (such as police failure to advise the suspect of his right to remain
silent, "a process of interrogation that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements") may activate the
right to counsel, but a lawyer's attempt, or police denial of that attempt, to confer with his client is not
listed as one of these factors. See id. at 490-91,492.
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small part a "symbolic response" to the violation of the symbol of a fair trial,
then the Court is likely to respond similarly to police interferences with the
attorney-client relationship. I do not claim that the Court will adopt the
Donovan rule "bag and baggage," 538 but I do believe that it will adopt the
basic concept of the rule. I think that it, too, will be struck by the
"incongruity" of permitting the state's attorney or the state's "badged and
uniformed representative[s]" 539 "to extract a confession from the accused
while his own lawyer, seeking to speak with him, [is] kept from him by the
police."5 40
Thus, although the Escobedo opinion does quote from Donovan at one point, the refusal of the police to
allow petitioner's lawyer to meet with him seems to have no bearing on Escobedo's rationale. If this factor
has any relevance, it is only because Escobedo became aware of the fact that the police were preventing his
lawyer from talking to him, and this realization may well have underscored the police dominance of the
situation and the gravity of his plight. See id. at 480 & n.1, 481-82. Escobedo had unsuccessfully argued in
the Illinois Supreme Court that his conviction should be reversed on the ground, inter.alia, that the trial
judge had improperly excluded evidence of the effect on him of seeing his lawyer turned away at the police
station. See Note, An Historical Argument for the Right to Counsel During Police Interrogation, 73 YALE
L.J. 1000, 1003 n.3 (1964).
I do not deny that at least some members of the Escobedo majority may have been greatly offended by
the fact that for several hours, and at least on five separate occasions, various police officers denied
Escobedo's lawyer permission to see his client. See id. at 480-81. Nor do I discount the possibility that even
if Escobedo had not asked to see his lawyer, the persistent and systematic way in which the police rebuffed
his lawyer may have led the Supreme Court to reverse for that reason alone. Indeed, one thrust of this part
of the article is that the Court is likely to do just that if presented with such a question in the near future. I
contend only that the issue cannot be regarded as settled either by Escobedo, especially when it seems to
have been stripped of its sixth amendment dimension, see the extract from Kirby in note 492 supra, or by a
brief footnote to a discussion of Escobedo in the Miranda opinion, especially when the footnote refers to a
New York case that explicitly declined to rely on the federal Constitution, see the extract from Donovan in
text at note 505 supra.
I must add, however, that in Mathies v. United States, 374 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1967), after expressing
concern over police questioning of a suspect who was represented by counsel without notifying the lawyer,
"not[ing] that in other cases the United States Attorney has stated a policy to have counsel for accused
persons advised of all interrogation sessions," and "assum[ing] that the episode will not arise again in the
future," Judge (now Chief Justice) Burger observed for a unanimous panel: "The prospective application of
[Miranda] plainly will require that such interviews can be conducted only after counsel has been given an
opportunity to be present." Id. at 316 & n.3 (Judge Burger referred to no page or footnote in Miranda
opinion).
538. Cf Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 213 (1968) (Fortas, J., concurring).
539. "Of course, it would not be rational, logical, moral or realistic to make any distinction between a
lawyer acting for the State who [by seeking a waiver of the right to counsel from a suspect in the absence of,
and without notification to, his lawyer] violates [the Code of Professional Responsibility] lirectly and one
who indirectly uses the admissions improperly obtained by a police officer, who is the badged and
uniformed representative of the State." People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 485, 348 N.E.2d 894, 898, 384
N.Y.S.2d 419, 423 (1976) (Breitel, C.J.). See also United States v. Springer, 460 F.2d 1344, 1354-55 (7th
Cir.) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (FBI agents referred to as "agents of prosecutor," and their attempts to obtain
statements from one already represented by counsel without notifying counsel, "unethical and unfair" in
civil context, violates due process in criminal context), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 873 (1972); People v.
Patterson, 39 Mich. App. 467, 478, 198 N.W.2d 175, 181 (Levin, J., dissenting) (police practice of
questioning suspect without obtaining consent of his lawyer "so notorious" that prosecutors must be aware
of, and "deemed to have authorized," it), appeal denied, 387 Mich. 795 (1972). But in Massiah, dissenting
Justice White stressed that aside from the fact that they "are not of constitutional dimensions," the canons
of legal ethics deal with "the conduct of lawyers and not with the conduct of investigators." 377 U.S. at 210-
11 (White, J., with Clark & Harlan, JJ., dissenting). See generally Note, Interrogation and the Sixth
Amendment: The Case for Restriction of Capacity to Waive the Right to Counsel, 53 IND. L.J. 313, 320 n.42
(1978).
540. People v. Donovan, 13 N.Y.2d 148. 152. 193 N.E.2d 628. 629. 243 N.Y.S.2d 841. 843 (1963), quoted
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The Court is even more likely to be offended when law enforcement
officials treat the defense lawyer deceitfully or disdainfully, such as when they
send an undercover agent against the suspect after his lawyer has done his
best to prevent him from talking;54' mislead the defense lawyer as to where his
client is being detained or about to be questioned; 542 or "assure" the lawyer, or
"agree" with him, that his client will not be questioned, but then do so "under
deceptive auspices." 543 Such police tactics are likely to rouse many members
in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 487 (1964).
Even those courts that have permitted it, finding no violation of the sixth amendment, "have denounced
the 'practice of talking to a represented defendant behind his attorney's back' as 'suspect,' 'not
commendable,' and a source of 'unease' that threatens 'erosion' of the 'relationship between lawyer and
client.' "Note, supra note 539, at 313. See also Vorenberg, supra note 468, at 432-33. In the wake of
Escobedo, Professor Vorenberg commented:
I suggest that even the strongest critics of this decision must feel somewhat uneasy at the
contrast between the protections with which we surround a defendant in court and the
situation in which Danny Escobedo found himself when he made his statement.
I think it is hard indeed to justify keeping a lawyer engaged from talking to his client,
because we are afraid he will impress on him his right not to talk if that should be in his best
interests.
Id.
541. See note 376 supra (Smith, Daugherty, and McCorgary cases). People v. Miller, 245 Cal. App. 2d
112, 53 Cal. Rptr. 720 (4th Dist. 1966), is as shocking a case of"jail plant" interference with the attorney-
client relationship as one is ever likely to come across. See note 314 supra. I cannot believe the conviction in
that case would have been affirmed if the Supreme Court had reached the merits. See also Milton v.
Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371 (1972) (discussed in note 314 supra).
542. See United States v. Crookston, 379 F. Supp. 487, 488 (W.D. Tex. 1974); Commonwealth v.
McKenna, 355 Mass. 313, 319-20, 244 N.E.2d 560, 563 (1969). See also People v. Ressler, 17 N.Y.2d 174, 216
N.E.2d 582, 269 N.Y.S.2d 414 (1966). In Ressler the court noted:
The misleading answer given by the Chief of Detectives [when contacted by a law clerk from
the firm retained to represent defendant] that there was nothing wrong and no need for a
lawyer threw defense counsel off guard, and the consequence is the same as though the police
had been instructed by an attorney for defendant that he was not to be interrogated in the
absence of counsel.
Id. at 178, 216 N.E.2d at 583-84, 269 N.Y.S.2d at415.
Consider, too, People v. Pinzon, 44 N.Y.2d 458, 377 N.E.2d 721, 406 N.Y.S.2d 268 (1978), in which
police department central switchboard operators misinformed the defense lawyer (but apparently
unintentionally) that the department did not "have" his client. Id. at 460, 377 N.E.2d at 722,406 N.Y.S.2d
at 268. The Donovan rule applied, held the Pinzon court, even though the lawyer had not spoken to any
police officers. Id. at 465, 377 N.E.2d at 725, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 271. "[C]onfusion or lack of communication
within the law enforcement agencies cannot impair the defendant's rights." Id.
543. See United States v. Wedra, 343 F. Supp. 1183, 1184, 1188 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (Weinfeld, J.); cf. State v.
Weedon, 342 So. 2d 642, 644 (La. 1977) (relying on assurance that client would not be questioned about
crime during booking procedure, counsel instructed client that he could answer any questions); State v.
Johns, 185 Neb. 590, 596, 177 N.W.2d 580, 584 (1970) (county attorney failed to convey promptly defense
attorney's request that client not be questioned in his absence). "If it is offensive to permit police to defy
attorney instructions, it is even more so to permit them to break an agreement not to question." Note, supra
note 539, at 320 n.42.
Although the record in Williams is shaky on this point, the Iowa trial court found (and the other courts
passing on the case assumed) that the Des Moines police and Williams' Des Moines attorney had "agreed"
that Williams would not be questioned on the return trip. See 430 U.S. at 394; Kamisar, supra note 2, at
212 n.23. As the Supreme Court's opinion is written, there is no reason to think that Williams would have
been decided differently (nor should it have been) if there had been no "broken agreement." Nevertheless.
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of the bench and bar who are normally complacent about stationhouse goings
on-not unlike the way the destruction of the Redwoods and the Everglades
would stir those with only a passing interest in protecting the environment.
Does the Donovan-Arthur-Hobson rule, or something like it, go to the heart
of the "police interrogation"-"confession" problem? Or is it more appearance
than substance? Are the lines it draws too fine, too mechanical? Does the rule
have too much "the quality of a chess tournament"544 to it?
The defendant-minded are, understandably, inclined to throw bouquets at
the New York Court of Appeals. For even "in the best of times"5 45 (for
defense lawyers and many criminal law professors, at any rate)-at a time
when the Warren Court strove "to alter significantly the nature of American
criminal justice in the interest of a larger realization of the constitutional ideal
of liberty under the law" 546-the New York Court of Appeals "led the way"
in protecting suspects' rights. 547 And after the "revolution" in criminal
procedure had lost its impetus, the New York court (along with several other
state courts on this and other fronts) demonstrated by its resurrection of the
Donovan rule548 "a determination to keep alive the Warren Court's philosoph-
ical commitment to protection of the criminal suspect. '549 Nevertheless,
criticize the Donovan rule I must.
In the Gunner and Arthur cases, the New York Court of Appeals refused to
confine Donovan to its facts and emphasized the "mechanical and arbitrar-
this factor may have exerted a strong emotional or subliminal influence.
Dissenting from the Iowa Supreme Court decision upholding the admissibility of Williams' disclosures,
Justice Stuart noted that he "personally would have no objection" to the "psychological campaign" waged
by Captain Learning on the return trip--"[i]f it were not for the agreement made with defendant's
counsel." State v. Williams, 182 N.W.2d 396, 408 (Iowa 1970) (Stuart, J., with Mason & Becker, JJ.,
dissenting). "The aspect of the case" that gave Justice Stuart "the most concern was the obvious effort of
the police officers to evade the good faith attempt of defendant's counsel to cooperate with the police
department." Id. Dissenting from the Eighth Circuit ruling that Williams was entitled to a new trial, Judge
(now FBI Director) Webster commented: "I cannot but assume that the alleged 'broken promise' of
Captain Learning is at the root of the result reached in this case." Williams v. Brewer, 509 F.2d 227, 237
(8th Cir. 1974). In the Supreme Court of the United States, Justice Stevens closed his concurring opinion by
stressing that "[i]f in the long run, we are seriously concerned about the individual's effective
representation by counsel, the State cannot be permitted to dishonor its promise to this lawyer." 430 U.S. at
415.
544. Cf H. FRIENDLY, On Entering the Path of the Law, in BENCHMARKS 22, 30 (1967).
545. Cf Amsterdam, supra note 232, at 810.
546. Allen, supra note 470, at 525.
547. See Vorenberg, supra note 468, at 430 (Donovan first clear and authoritative decision barring
confession from defendant denied opportunity to confer with counsel); Uviller, supra note 504, at 716
(Donovan foretold reasoning of Miranda "with uncanny clairvoyance"); 5 FORDHAM URn. L.J. 401, 405
(1977) (Donovan preceded in time and exceeded in scope Escobedo and Miranda holdings).
548. The Donovan rule had been badly crippled. See People v. Lopez, 28 N.Y.2d 23, 26, 268 N.E.2d 628,
629, 319 N.Y.S.2d 825, 826-27 (rule inapplicable when defendant without retained counsel waived all
rights without being informed that he was indicted), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 840 (1971); Peoples v. Robles, 27
N.Y.2d 155, 159, 263 N.E.2d 304, 305, 314 N.Y.S.2d 793, 795 (1970) (rule applicable only when
affirmative acts by police intended to outwit attorney or victim), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 945 (1971). The rule
was rescued and revivified in 1976. See People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479,484-85, 348 N.E.2d 894, 898-99,
384 N.Y.S.2d 419, 422 (1976) (extracted in text at note 561 infra). See generally 5 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
401, 407-11 (1977).
549. Wilkes, More on the New Federalism in Criminal Procedure, 63 KY. L.J. 873, 873 (1975). See
generally Brennan, supra note 328; Howard, supra note 328, at 891-907; Wilkes, The New Federalism In
Criminal Procedure: State Court Evasion of the Burger Court, 62 KY. L.J. 421 (1974).
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y" 550 nature of a rule that would turn on "the existence of a formal
retainer 551 or on whether an attorney "presents himself at the place where
the suspect is in physical custody and expressly requests the opportunity to
consult with him." 552 Consequently, all an attorney need do to invoke
Donovan is to apprise the police that he has "enter[ed] the proceeding. '553 I
fail to see how this makes the Donovan rule in essence any less mechanical or
less arbitrary than it was before Gunner and Arthur were handed down.
There is not even a weak congruence-indeed, there is no congruence at
all-between a defense lawyer's entry into the proceeding and a suspect's need
for "a lawyer's help" or the government's need for evidence. Whatever its
symbolic value, a rule that turns on how soon a defense lawyer appears at the
police station or how quickly he "spring[s] to the telephone" 554 hardly seems a
rational way of reconciling the interests of the accused with those of society.
The Donovan rule might be more understandable, although still vulnerable
to criticism, 555 if it turned on a suspect's request for counsel. But it does not.
Even if a suspect asks, and is allowed to contact a lawyer, he may not be able
to locate one quickly enough, or for one reason or another his lawyer may not
win the race to the station or to the phone. On the other hand, a suspect's
failure to ask for a lawyer need not prove fatal. A lawyer who previously
represented the client may learn of his former client's plight and come to the
rescue on his own initiative.556 Or a suspect's family may retain a lawyer on
his behalf, without his knowledge or even his request for a lawyer, and this
lawyer may "enter the proceeding" in the nick of time.557
To the extent that this rule favors the suspects who, or whose families, have
the money and the connections to bring a lawyer swiftly into the fray, it "runs
counter to society's efforts to accord the indigent the same rights and
privileges as the affluent. ' 558 At worst, such a rule would seem to favor the
550. People v. Gunner, 15 N.Y.2d 226,232,205 N.E.2d 852, 855, 257 N.Y.S.2d 924, 928 (1965), quoted
in People v. Arthur, 22 N.Y.2d 325, 329, 239 N.E.2d 537, 539, 292 N.Y.S.2d 663, 666 (1968).
551. People v. Arthur, 22 N.Y.2d 325, 329, 239 N.E.2d 537, 539, 292 N.Y.S.2d 663, 666 (1968).
552. People v. Gunner, 15 N.Y.2d 226, 232, 205 N.E.2d 852, 855, 257 N.Y.S.2d 924, 928 (1965).
553. People v. Arthur, 22 N.Y.2d 325, 329, 239 N.E.2d 537, 539, 292 N.Y.S.2d 663, 666 (1968).
554. Uviller, supra note 504, at 718.
555. As pointed out several months before Miranda, one possible argument for limiting Escobedo to
instances in which the suspect has explicitly asked for an attorney was that "such a request may be
regarded as a symptom of psychological distress," a condition that would be "heightened" by a denial of
the request. See Developments in the Law-Confessions, supra note 467, at 1002. "But the factual premise
behind this analysis is questionable: a request for a lawyer probably indicates intelligence and presence of
mind; the failure to ask for one may be due to ignorance, confusion or intimidation. Besides, to interpret the
significance of a request and its denial in terms of intimidation appears to be a reworking of the
voluntariness test. ... Id. at 1002-03.
556. See People v. Arthur, 22 N.Y.2d 325, 327, 239 N.E.2d 537 538, 292 N.Y.S.2d 663, 664 (1968).
557. See People v. Pinzon, 44 N.Y.2d 458, 462, 377 N.E.2d 721, 723, 406 N.Y.S.2d 268, 269-70 (1978);
People v. Gunner, 15 N.Y.2d 226, 230, 205 N.E.2d 852, 853, 257 N.Y.S.2d 924, 926 (1965); People v.
Failla, 14 N.Y.2d 178, 181, 199 N.E.2d 366, 367, 250 N.Y.S.2d 267, 269 (1964); People v. Donovan, 13
N.Y.2d 148, 151, 193 N.E.2d 628, 629, 243 N.Y.S.2d 841, 842 (1963); People v. Ressler, 24 A.D.2d 7, 8,
261 N.Y.S.2d 823, 824 (1965).
558. Rothblatt, supra note 65, at 51. See also Paulsen, supra note 504, at 305-06 ("[The Donovan rule]
puts the man of means and the experienced criminal with access to legal assistance in a much better
position than the poor and the inexperienced. It may be that we ought not to model out a system of
criminal justice on the privileges of the wealthy or on the advantages enjoyed by the professional criminal.
Yet we are not long likely to tolerate a system which gives advantages to those least in need of protection
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"professional criminal" most of all.559 At best, it seems "a fortuitous standard
upon which to build an exclusionary rule. '560
Chief Judge Breitel has made a forceful defense of the rule, and in the
process launched a strong attack on Miranda (or at least on Miranda as it has
come to be applied):
Notwithstanding that warnings alone might suffice to protect
the privilege against self-incrimination, the presence of counsel is a
more effective safeguard against an involuntary waiver of counsel
than a mere written or oral warning in the absence of counsel ...
and which fails to extend protection to the most vulnerable.").
Of course, a year later the Court handed down Miranda, which did seek to "extend protection to the
most vulnerable," but, as no one has articulated better than the defenders of the Donovan rule, Miranda, at
least as it has been generally applied, falls far short of the protection furnished by Donovan. See text at notes
561-66 infra.
One may try to defend the Donovan rule on the ground that "when the police bar consultation between a
suspect and his lawyer they are taking positive action designed solely to increase the likelihood of a
confession, in contravention of their constitutional duty to adopt a 'neutral' stance. . . ... Developments In
the Law-Confessions, supra note 467, at 1002 (describing argument made by Judge Friendly). As the
Miranda Court saw it, however, the government must do more than "carve the universe at a natural joint."
Cf. Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. RE. 341, 344-53 (1949). When
the government exerts its powers in the criminal area, stated the Miranda Court:
its obligation is surely no less than that of taking reasonable measures to eliminate those
factors [such as poverty] that are irrelevant to just administration of the law but which,
nevertheless, may occasionally affect determinations of the accused's liability or penalty.
While the government may not be required to relieve the accused of his poverty, it may
properly be required to minimize the influence of poverty on its administration of justice.
384 U.S. at 472-73 n.41 (quoting with approval from ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMM., REPORT ON
POVERTY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 9 (1963) (Allen Report)). "Denial
of counsel to the indigent at the time of interrogation while allowing an attorney to those who can afford
one would be no more supportable by reason or logic than the similar situation at trial and on appeal struck
down in [Gideon] and [Douglas]." Id. at 472-73.
Moreover, it is hard to see how confronting an individual "often ignorant and uneducated, and always
in fear" and "unadvised by anyone who has his interests at heart," see text at note 561 infra, "with the
coercive police power of the State" can be called "adopting'a neutral stance," cf. Developments in the
Law.-Confessions, supra note 467, at 1002 ("very process of skillful interrogation is designed to, and does,
increase the likelihood that a confession will be obtained").
559. The author of a pioneering study observed, a generation ago, that "it is not uncommon in some
cities for a 'mouthpiece' to appear at precinct headquarters before [a 'professional criminal' or 'syndicate
representative'] is brought in." W. BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS 207 (1955).
A decade later, the author of a major study on police practices reported that generally it is only the
professional criminal "whose counsel is likely to know when his arrest takes place." W. LAFAVE, ARREST
407 (F. Remington ed. 1965). See also id. at 393-94, 398.
Before ascending to the New York Court of Appeals, where he has since reaffirmed and revivified the
Donovan rule, Justice (now Chief Judge) Breitel defended the rule as "a practical accommodation." Breitel,
supra note 146, at 9-10. He conceded, however, that:
It is an accepted fact that in almost all cases the most effective protection for the individual is
the advice of counsel from the time of initial arrest or interrogation. Accepted also is the fact
that, except for the affluent or sophisticated criminal, it is the rare defendant who has a
lawyer available on call.
Id. at 14.
560. 51 CORNELL L.Q. 356, 368 (1966).
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The rule that once a lawyer has entered the proceedings in
connection with the charges under investigation, a person in
custody may validly waive the assistance of counsel only in the
presence of a lawyer breathes life into the requirement that a
waiver of a constitutional right must be competent, intelligent and
voluntary. Indeed, it may be said that a right too easily waived is no
right at all ...
[The Donovan rule] protect[s] the individual, often ignorant and
uneducated, and always in fear, when faced with the coercive
police power of the State. The right to the continued advice of a
lawyer, already retained or assigned, is his real protection against
an abuse of power by the organized State. It is more important than
the preinterrogation warnings given to defendants in custody.
These warnings often provide only a feeble opportunity to obtain a
lawyer, because the suspect or accused is required to determine his
need, unadvised by anyone who has his interests at heart. The
danger is not only the risk of unwise waivers . . , but the more
significant risk of inaccurate, sometimes false, and inevitably
incomplete descriptions of the events described.5 61
This argument proves too much. If all the unkind things Chief Judge
Breitel and other defenders of the Donovan rule 562 have said about the
Miranda warnings are true (and there is reason to think they are),5 63 the
Donovan rule is not a sufficient answer. If the Miranda warnings often
provide only a "feeble opportunity" for the assertion of constitutional rights,
if they do not furnish adequate protection against the "risk of inaccurate,
sometimes false, and inevitably incomplete descriptions of the events de-
scribed," if a warning "inevitably invites avoidance" 564 and "can easily
become a meaningless ritual," 565 if the warnings will not dispel "[i]nherent
intimidation . . because the usual suspect, especially the illiterate or non-
English speaking individual is so frightened and confused that he cannot fully
comprehend [them], ' 566 then why are these warnings good enough for the
suspect who has not, or whose family or friends have not, contacted a lawyer
or whose lawyer has not managed to win the race to the stationhouse or
telephone? If "life" must be "breathed" into the Miranda warnings (and I
561. People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479,484,485,348 N.E.2d 894, 898-99, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419,422 (1976).
Chief Judge Breitel also argued, on behalf of the Donovan rule, that attempts by a prosecutor to secure a
waiver of the right to counsel from one already represented by counsel, without notifying the defense
lawyer, or the use by a prosecutor of admissions so obtained from a suspect by the police would constitute a
violation of professional ethics. See note 539 supra.
562. See Rothblatt & Pitler, supra note 52, at 492-96.
563. See, e.g., Griffiths & Ayres, supra note 54; Leiken, Police Interrogation in Colorado: The
Implementation of Miranda, 47 DEN. L.J. 1 (1970); Medalie, Zeitz & Alexander, Custodial Police
Interrogation in Our Nation's Capital: The Attempt to Implement Miranda, 66 MICH. L. REV. 1347 (1968);
Project, supra note 371. These studies and others, including one by Professor Otis Stephens, are discussed
in 0. STEPHENS, THE SUPREME COURT AND CONFESSIONS OF GUILT 165-200 (1973).
564. Rothblatt & Pitler, supra note 537, at 493 (quoting from Weisberg, Police Interrogation of Arrested
Persons: A Skeptical View, in POLICE POWER AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 153, 175 (C. Sowle ed. 1962)).
565. Id.
566. Id. at 494.
1978]
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agree that it must), why should it be done haphazardly, as the Donovan rule
seems to do? Why not do it across the board?
If the Miranda safeguards have turned out to be as feeble in practice as
defenders of the Donovan rule and as others believe, why not establish a
system enabling a member of the public defender's staff to inform the police,
as soon as a suspect is brought to the stationhouse, that he represents the
individual, at least at this preliminary stage, and that he wishes to advise the
individual of his rights or-more bluntly-that he does not want the
individual questioned?567 Such an extension of the Donovan rule, I realize,
567. But see Breitel, supra note 146, at 14 (on eve of Miranda). Justice (now Chief Judge) Breitel
commented:
The argument is ... made by increasingly large numbers of people that the state or voluntary
organizations should provide the lawyer at the inception of the process if "inequality" in
treatment is to be avoided. The enormity of lawyer resources that such a proposal would
entail is only barely conceivable. It may suggest further problems as to how adequate
representation would be spread so far and so thinly. But beyond these practical considera-
tions, the proposal poses a serious question of whether this would be an acceptable disposition
of social resources ....
Id.
It may well be that I have spent too much time on "the high Alpine meadows" and too little "in the dust
of the marketplace," cf. H. FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS 1 (1967), but the logistical problems do not strike me
as that staggering, at least not in large urban centers---especially in light of the apparent holding by the
New York Court of Appeals that a law clerk, presumably a law student, may trigger the Donovan rule
(whose invocation hardly requires three full years of law school training). See People v. Ressler, 17 N.Y.2d
174, 178, 216 N.E.2d 582, 583-84, 269 N.Y.S.2d 414, 415 (1966) (discussed at note 542supra).
No doubt, it would be argued that, unlike the case of the suspect who has retained counsel, or whose
family or friends have done so for him, the indigent suspect is not yet the "client" of the public or voluntary
defender who takes it upon himself to instruct the police. This argument is hardly overwhelming when, as
the New York Court of Appeals held in People v. Arthur, 22 N.Y.2d 325, 239 N.E.2d 537, 292 N.Y.S.2d
663 (1968), the Donovan rule "is not dependent upon the existence of a formal retainer" but may be
invoked by a lawyer (at least on behalf of his former client) on his own initiative. Id. at 327, 329, 239
N.E.2d at 538, 539, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 664, 666; see text following note 507 supra; note 67 supra and
accompanying text.
No doubt, it would also be argued that the proposal I have suggested would give the indigent suspect an
advantage over his somewhat wealthier but less than affluent counterpart, for the latter would not often
command the services of retained counsel as swiftly as the former would gain the protection of the
defender's office. The answer to this may be that a goodly number of persons who are financially capable of
retaining counsel at later stages of the criminal process may not be at the immediate postarrest stage and
thus should be regarded as indigent at, but only at, this early point. See ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMM.,
supra note 558, at 7-8 ("[P]overty must be viewed as a relative concept with the consequence that [it] must
be measured in each case by reference to the particular need or service under consideration . . . . A
problem of poverty arises for the system of criminal justice when at any stage. . . lack of means in the
accused substantially inhibits or prevents the proper assertion of a right or a claim of right.").
Although the mechanical difficulties raised by this proposal are not insubstantial, neither, it seems, are
they insurmountable. A member of the defender's staff might be permitted to communicate immediately
with any person brought down to the police station to determine whether that person has counsel and, if
not and if he desires the defender's office to represent him, to determine initially whether he is "indigent" at
this stage of the process. See, eg., COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-3-402(3) (1973) (determination of indigency
shall be made by public defender subject to review by court). Under this procedure, or under a procedure
whereby all suspects are simply assumed to be indigent at the immediate postarrest stage, if it subsequently
develops (say, at the first appearance) that the suspect was not indigent, reimbursement could be made to
the government (or voluntary organization) for the defender's services. See Kamisar & Choper, supra note
526, at 53-54; cf. L. KATz, JUSTICE IS THE CRIME 129-30 (1972) (booking officer should be required to
appoint counsel for indigent being held; spurious claims of indigency can be handled later).
Of course, extending the protection of the Donovan rule to the generality of suspects would not
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might strain it to the breaking point, but what does this say about the rule
itself?568 Or, alternatively, why not require that an explanation of the nature
and importance of the constitutional rights at stake be given by a judicial
rather than a police officer and that waiver be made under judicial supervi-
sion?569 Or, at least, why not require that an in-custody suspect be promptly
brought before a judicial officer so that "the typically perfunctory reading of
Miranda warnings by police" can be swiftly reinforced by the "follow-up
advice of. . . a neutral officer of the court"? 570 Or, at the very least, why not
require that at the stationhouse, and wherever else feasible, all police
conversations and "waiver transactions" be electronically recorded for future
judicial scrutiny? 571
contribute to the goal of finding "an acceptable solution for the intermediate area of post-arrest, pre-station
house interrogation." Friendly, supra note 537, at 716. But neither does the Donovan rule in its present
form. Wider application of the Donovan rule might well lead the police to engage in more "on the street"
questioning and "to slow down or make more circuitous the ride to headquarters." Cf Kamisar, supra note
300, at 60-61. But in most cases the courts should be able to cope with such attempts at evasion, and the
capacity of the police to send resourceful and skillful interrogators "into the field" would seem to be quite
limited. Although "by defining 'custodial questioning' to cover 'field' and 'squad car' questioning,"
Miranda understandably sought to "protect its flanks," id. at 61 n.8, police station interrogation was "the
evil to which [Miranda] was primarily addressed," Friendly, supra, at 712.
568. Although many might voice opposition to such an extension of the Donovan rule on grounds of
logistics and mechanics, see note 567 supra, their underlying objection is probably concern about the
adverse impact of such an extension on prevalent police practices-a concern that does not loom large
when, as now, the rule is (and can only be) invoked infrequently and sporadically. An expanded Donovan
rule would, it cannot be denied, upset the "compromise" worked out by Miranda, but only in the same
respect, if not the same degree, that the rule does now.
569. See Developments in the Law-Confessions, supra note 467, at 1007. Another alternative to the
Miranda model is the Kauper-Schaefer-Friendly proposal, under which a person taken into custody may
be questioned only in the presence of and under the supervision of a judicial officer. In addition to being
advised of his rights, the suspect is informed that if he is subsequently prosecuted his refusal to answer any
questions will be disclosed at the trial. See Kamisar, supra note 392, at 23-37 (discussion of Kauper-
Schaefer-Friendly proposal providing for judicial warnings, judicial supervision over interrogation, and
recording of entire proceeding).
570. Johnson v. State, 282 Md. 314, _ 384 A.2d 709, 719 (1978). In Johnson the court indicated:
[O]ne important function of the initial appearance is to advise an arrestee of his right to
counsel; to this extent there is a partial overlap with Miranda. Even so, it has been
convincingly argued that the typically perfunctory reading of Miranda warnings by police at
the time of arrest may be insufficient to provide the accused with adequate notice of his
constitutional rights; and that a need exists for follow-up advice of the basic right to counsel
by a neutral officer of the court, such as is provided by [Maryland rules].
Id. See also Enker & Elsen, supra note 142, at 85-90 (advocating extension of McNabb-Mallory rule to
states and recording of interrogation); 51 CORNELL L.Q. 356, 366-68 (1966) (suggesting right to counsel
integrated with provisions for prompt arraignment as substitute for Gunner, all confessions following
unduly delayed arraignment would be excluded).
571. See MODEL CODE, supra note 112, § 130.4 (requires tape recordings of warnings and waiver
procedures at police station); UNIFORM RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 243 (Approved Draft 1974)
(requires that "the information of rights, any waiver thereof, aid any questioning shall be [electronically
recorded] whenever feasible and in any case where questioning occurs at a place of detention"). See also
Enker & Elsen, supra note 142, at 85-87 (record to include statement of time during which police interview
began and ended and could be required that record be deposited with the court under seal at time defendant
appears for preliminary arraignment); Kamisar, supra note 2, at 233-43 (incomplete, contradictory record
in Williams case underscores need to utilize tape recordings); Weisberg, supra note 564, at 179-80 (classic
statement of need to strip police interrogation of its "most unique feature"-"secrecy"-which is not the
1978]
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Miranda has weaknesses. The principal cluster of its weaknesses (from the
suspect's perspective, at any rate) is that it permits the police to obtain
waivers of constitutional rights without the advice or presence of counsel,
without the advice or presence of a judicial officer, and without any objective
recording of the proceedings. 572 But these weaknesses, as I have indicated, are
not irremediable.
Whatever its shortcomings, Miranda tried to take the "police interroga-
tion"-"confession" problem by the throat. Massiah does not. Nor does its first
cousin, New York's Donovan rule. The Massiah doctrine and the Donovan
rule turn on nice distinctions that often will have no more relationship to the
suspect's plight than "the kind of electronic equipment employed" 573 had to
the protection against unreasonable search and seizure. The distinctions
drawn by Massiah are also conducive to manipulation by law enforcers.
The danger is that the Court will let Miranda wither, placing increasing
reliance instead on Massiah and perhaps on the Donovan rule as well (or some
variation of it). There is a certain neat logic to these rules. They also strike
responsive chords and are readily rationalized. 574
The danger is that only when the incongruity between the pretrial
proceedings and the ideal of a fair trial is flaunted, when an arraignment or
indictment is followed by a "kangaroo court" proceeding or a defense lawyer
is spurned or deceived by the police, will the constitutional symbols prevail.
The added danger posed by the Donovan rule or some variation of it is that by
accommodating defense lawyers who insist on claiming their client's rights,
same thing as "privacy," but the power of police "to prevent objective recordation of the facts").
572. There is language in Miranda-although the state courts and lower federal courts have disregarded
it-strongly suggesting that, at least when feasible, the police must stenographically or electronically
record the warnings given to the suspect, as well as his response. See 384 U.S. at 475 ("heavy burden rests
on the government to demonstrate" valid waiver of Miranda rights; Court reasserted "high standards of
proof for the waiver of constitutional rights" "as applied to in-custody interrogation"; "since the State is
responsible for establishing the isolated circumstances" of interrogation and "has the only means of
making available corroborated evidence of warnings given during incommunicado interrogation, the
burden is rightly on its shoulders"); Thompson, supra note 292, at 421 (language of Miranda pointed out by
Professor (now Governor) Thompson). Several months before Miranda was handed down, one commenta-
tor suggested that "[a] determined Supreme Court might attempt to surmount the [secrecy] problem" by
declaring that a defendant's claim of involuntariness "must be accepted as true ... unless the police can
produce some reliable evidence such as a tape-recording of the interrogation to refute it," but then
suggested why the Court might stop short of promulgating such a doctrine: "[A] rule that in effect required
a tape-recording as a precondition of a confession's admissibility might be thought too naked an exercise of
control by the Court over state police practices." Developments in the Law-Confessions, supra note 467, at
1021.
573. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 513 (1961) (Douglas, J., concurring) ("[T]he command of
the Fourth Amendment" should not "be limited by nice distinctions turning on the kind of electronic
equipment employed. Rather our sole concern should be whether the privacy of the home was invaded.");
see Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (Justice Douglas' view prevailed).
574. The Donovan rule is said to have had "deep roots" in actual practice "for the longest time." Breitel,
supra note 146, at 9. Lawyers, no less than other persons, "are likely to claim as a right what they desire,
especially if they are accustomed to having it." Cf. R. PERRY, CHARACTERISTICALLY AMERICAN 153
(1949) (talking generally about Americans). See also Note, Reaffirmation of Confessions Inadmissible
Under McNabb-Mallory, 72 YALE L.J. 1434, 1454-55 n.106 (1963) (indicating on basis of letters from
various United States attorneys in the spring of 1963 that, if suspect has retained or appointed counsel,
United States attorney attempts to direct law enforcement agents to question suspect "either in the
presence of counsel or, at least, with his consent").
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law enforcers may gain a freer hand over those who, or whose families, lack
the means to summon a lawyer swiftly. To paraphrase Justice Jackson: There
is no more effective practical guaranty against police overreaching than to
require that the poor and bewildered be subjected to police interrogation in no
greater measure than the affluent and sophisticated. Conversely, nothing
opens the door to abuse so effectively as to allow the police to pick and choose
only the less fortunate to be the subjects of secret interrogation and thus to
escape the outcry from the bar (if not the public) that might be visited upon
them if all segments of society were so affected. 575
It is not enough to vindicate the prestige of the lawyer when he has entered
the proceedings, but otherwise to vindicate the prestige of the police officer.
Nor, to return to Massiah, is it enough to dramatize the ideal of the adversary
system when the issue is forced into the open by the commencement ofjudicial proceedings, but otherwise to look away when in-custody interroga-
tion takes place under conditions undermining a suspect's constitutional
rights.
Symbols are important, but more is needed. "[I]t is not sufficient to save
the Redwoods [and] the Everglades. . . ; it is equally essential to protect the
esthetic quality of farmlands and to improve Coney Island." 576
575. Cf. Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112-13 (1949) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
576. R. DUBOS, THE GENIUS OF THE PLACE 7 (1970) (H. Albright Conservation Lectureship). I am
indebted to my colleague, Joseph L. Sax, for calling this monograph to my attention.
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